Security proof methods for quantum key distribution protocols by Ferenczi, Agnes
Security proof methods for quantum
key distribution protocols
by
Agnes Ferenczi
A thesis
presented to the University of Waterloo
in fulfillment of the
thesis requirement for the degree of
Doctor of Philosophy
in
Physics
Waterloo, Ontario, Canada, 2013
c© Agnes Ferenczi 2013
I hereby declare that I am the sole author of this thesis. This is a true copy of the thesis,
including any required final revisions, as accepted by my examiners.
I understand that my thesis may be made electronically available to the public.
A. Ferenczi
ii
Abstract
In this thesis we develop practical tools for quantum key distribution (QKD) security
proofs. We apply the tools to provide security proofs for several protocols, ranging from
discrete variable protocols in high dimensions, protocols with realistic implementations,
measurement device independent QKD and continuous-variable QKD. The security proofs
are based on the Devetak-Winter security framework [31, 57].
In the key rate calculation, it is often convenient to assume that the optimal attack
is symmetric. Under the assumption that the parameter estimation is based on coarse-
grained observations, we show that the optimal attack is symmetric, if the protocol and
the postselection have sufficient symmetries. As an example we calculate the key rates of
protocols using 2, d and d+ 1 mutually unbiased bases in d-dimensional Hilbert spaces.
We investigate the connection between the optimal collective eavesdropping attack and
the optimal cloning attack, in which the eavesdropper employs an optimal cloner to attack
the protocol. We find that, in general, it does not hold that the optimal attack is an
optimal cloner. However, there are classes of protocols, for which we can identify the
optimal attack by an optimal cloner. We analyze protocols with mutually unbiased bases
in d dimensions, and show that for the protocols with 2 and d+ 1 mutually unbiased bases
the optimal attack is an optimal cloner, but for the protocols with d mutually unbiased
bases, it is not.
In optical implementations of the phase-encoded BB84 protocol, the bit information
is usually encoded in the phase of two consecutive photon pulses generated in a Mach-
Zehnder interferometer. In the actual experimental realization, the loss in the arms of the
Mach-Zehnder interferometer is not balanced, for example because only one arm contains a
lossy phase modulator. Since the imbalance changes the structure of the signals states and
measurements, the BB84 security analysis no longer applies in this scenario. We provide
a security proof for the unbalanced phase-encoded BB84. The loss does lower the key rate
compared to a protocol without loss. However, for a realistic parameter regime, the same
key rate is found by applying the original BB84 security analysis.
Recently, the security of a measurement device-independent QKD setup with BB84
signal states was proven in Refs. [61, 14]. In this setup Alice and Bob send quantum states
to an intermediate node, which performs the measurement, and is assumed to be controlled
by Eve. We analyze the security of a measurement device-independent QKD protocol with
B92 signal states, and calculate the key rates numerically for a realistic implementation.
Based on our security proof we were able to prove the security of the strong reference pulse
B92 protocol.
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We analyze the security of continuous-variable protocols using the entropic uncertainty
relations established in Ref. [11] to provide an estimate of the key rate based on the
observed first and second moments. We analyze a protocol with squeezed coherent states
and the 2-state protocol with two coherent states with opposite phases.
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Chapter 1
Introduction
The field of quantum cryptography including the subfield quantum key distribution emerged
through the need to provide unconditionally secure communication protocols. The security
of commonly used classical cryptography systems relies on concepts such as computational
hardness of mathematical problems. Factoring a large number into the prime components
is one such example, which is also the underlying security assumption of the classical cryp-
tographic system RSA. With the emergence of Shor’s factoring algorithms, such classical
cryptographic systems are threatened to be broken in reasonably short time. Although
the practical implementation of Shor’s algorithm using a quantum computer is still in its
infancy, it is necessary to start to build a defence system based on QKD before a quantum
computer is ready to break existing cryptographic systems.
The goal of QKD is to enable two distant parties to generate a secret key by means
of quantum mechanical principles. A secret key is a string of random bits known to both
parties, but unknown to any third party. The secure key is later used to enable secure
communication, message authentication or other cryptographic applications. QKD does
not impose any computational limitations on an eavesdropper. If we accept quantum
mechanics as a valid description of nature, then, in principle, unconditional security of the
secret key can be guaranteed by QKD.
The process that generates the key, called protocol, is a predefined series of steps ex-
ecuted by the two parties. In a QKD protocol, the sender, Alice, encodes random bits
into nonorthogonal quantum states in her laboratory. She sends the states one by one
through a quantum channel to the receiving party, Bob, who performs a measurement in
his laboratory to obtain the encoded data. Finally, by means of classical communication
protocols over an authenticated classical channel, Alice and Bob extract the secret key
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from their data. Typically it is assumed that Alice and Bob’s laboratories are private, but
the quantum channel and the classical channel are not. While the quantum states travel
through the quantum channel, they are vulnerable to any interaction by a third party, the
eavesdropper, Eve, whose aim is to learn about the key. Eve can also listen to all classical
messages exchanged between Alice and Bob, but she can not change them.
A fundamental question is how to guarantee that in the end of the protocol the key
is really safe to use in later applications. The basic intuition behind the security of a
QKD protocol is based on the no cloning theorem, which states that it is not possible to
make perfect copies of unknown quantum states. This theorem excludes the possibility
that Eve intercepts the quantum channel, makes a perfect copy of the quantum states
for herself, and forwards the original copies to Bob. Such a strategy would provide Eve
with some knowledge about the encoded bit, without Alice and Bob noticing. Instead,
Eve’s interaction (attack) with the signals does not go unnoticed by Alice and Bob. There
is a trade-off between the amount of information that leaks to Eve and the amount of
disturbance she causes to the signal states. This disturbance is observed by Alice and Bob
in their data, which allows them to infer that an eavesdropper interacted with the signals.
The main goal of a security proofs is to quantify the amount of information Eve obtains
in the trade-off. Security proofs were given based on information-theoretic arguments by
Devetak and Winter [31] or Renner, Kraus and Gisin [80, 57]. These proofs basically
provide a bound on the amount of data that must be sacrificed in order to cut out Eve’s
knowledge in the classical communication protocols. Furthermore, it is also necessary for
Alice and Bob to make their classical data strings uniformly distributed and correct errors.
The cost of this task also shortens the length of the final key.
Alice and Bob’s observations rarely identify the eavesdropping attack unambiguously.
For most protocols (including the BB84 protocol) there is an entire class of eavesdropping
strategies that can lead to the observed data. For each of the possible eavesdropping
strategies, the Devetak-Winter security proof predicts a key rate. In order for Alice and
Bob to be safe, they must protect themselves against the most powerful eavesdropping
strategy. They must pick the smallest of the key rates, which is essentially the result of an
optimization of the key rate over all possible attack strategies. The optimal eavesdropping
strategy is therefore defined as the strategy that creates the smallest key rate among the
class of strategies that fit to the observed data.
The primary goal of this thesis to advance the practical techniques used in the key rate
optimization based on the Devetak-Winter security proof. In particular, we show how to
exploit the underlying symmetries of a protocol in order to make the optimization problem
simpler. This motivates us to provide explicit key rate calculations for a range of protocols
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and scenarios: from highly theoretical protocols, such as the protocols using mutually
unbiased bases in d-dimensional Hilbert spaces, to experimentally implemented protocols,
such as the phase-encoded BB84 with realistic devices, to rather unusual setups, such as
measurement device independent QKD with two senders and one adversary receiver.
Furthermore, we investigate the connection between the optimal eavesdropping strategy
and the optimal cloning strategy. One type of eavesdropping strategy for Eve is to use
an optimal quantum cloner, which makes the best possible copy of the signal states for
her, while limiting the amount of disturbance in Bob’s copy to match his observations. It
is known that for the BB84 and the 6-state protocol the optimal cloning strategy is the
optimal eavesdropping strategy, but for other protocols this connection is not established.
We investigate under what conditions and for which protocols the optimal eavesdropping
strategy is identical with the optimal cloning strategy.
Finally, we explore new tools with the aim to tackle protocols, for which optimal security
solutions have not been derived so far. These tools are based on measurement device-
independent QKD and the entropic uncertainty relation.
This thesis is organized as follows: In Chapter 2 we review the basic elements of quan-
tum mechanics and representation theory that will be used later in the thesis. Chapter
3 is a summary of theoretical aspects of QKD: we describe the eavesdropping attacks in
the source-replacement scheme, the Devetak-Winter key rate formalism under postselec-
tion, and the key rate optimization problem. Chapters 4 to 8 contain the results of our
research. In Chapter 4 we show that, under certain conditions, the optimal attack carries
a certain symmetry inherent to the protocol. The symmetries are helpful for the practical
calculation of the key rates. In Chapter 5 we analyze the connection between the optimal
eavesdropping and the optimal cloning transformation. Chapter 6 is devoted to proving
the security of the unbalanced phase-encoded BB84 protocol taking into account the lossy
phase modulator. This protocol differs from the BB84 protocol, because the effect of a
lossy phase modulator changes the signal and measurement structure. In Chapter 7 we
provide a security proof for a measurement device-independent QKD setup with B92 signal
states, where Alice and Bob are both senders of quantum signals, and Eve is the receiver.
This security proof acts as a new security proof technique for the strong reference pulse
B92. In Chapter 8, we use an entropic uncertainty relation with the aim to prove the
security of continuous-variable protocols. Finally, in Chapter 9 we draw the conclusions.
3
Chapter 2
Background
2.1 Postulates of quantum mechanics
In this section we review the postulates of quantum mechanics with a focus on information
theory [76, 73, 84].
2.1.1 Quantum states
A pure quantum state is defined as normalized vector Ψ on a d-dimensional Hilbert space
H. In the Dirac notation the vector is represented by the symbol |Ψ〉, which is called a
ket. The dual Hilbert space carries the vectors 〈Ψ| = |Ψ〉† where the symbol † denotes the
Hermitian conjugate. The inner product 〈Ψ|Φ〉 of two vectors |Ψ〉, |Φ〉 ∈ H is identified
with a scalar in C. The outer product |Ψ〉〈Φ| of two vectors |Ψ〉, |Φ〉 ∈ H defines a
linear mapping from H to itself, i.e. an endomorphism on H. We denote the set of all
endomorphisms on H by B(H).
Definition 1 A density operator ρ ∈ B(H) is a Hermitian, normalized and positive semidef-
inite operator, i.e. ρ† = ρ, tr ρ = 1 and ρ ≥ 0. The set of all density operators on H are
defined as D(H).
Not all quantum states are pure states. For example, we might be interested in a
statistical mixture of pure states |Ψx〉 with probability p(x), called an ensemble, or we might
consider only the subsystem of a bigger system. The quantum states in these situations
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are generally not pure. The first postulate of quantum mechanics defines general quantum
states:
Postulate 1 Density operators provide a general mathematical description of quantum
states. Pure states are represented by projectors ρ = |Ψ〉〈Ψ|. Quantum states that are not
pure are called mixed states.
The density operator of the ensemble mentioned above is given by
ρ =
∑
x
p(x)|Ψx〉〈Ψx|. (2.1)
Since a density operator ρ is Hermitian, there is an eigenvalue decomposition
ρ =
d∑
i=1
λi|φi〉〈φi| (2.2)
with eigenvalues λi and eigenvectors |φi〉.
If we define an orthonormal basis {|i〉, i = 0, ..., d} of a finite-dimensional Hilbert space,
a quantum state ρ ∈ D(H) can be expressed in that basis by
ρ =
∑
i,j
ai,j|i〉〈j| (2.3)
with complex coefficients ai,j = 〈i|ρ|j〉. If the quantum state is pure, then |Ψ〉 =
∑
i ci|i〉
with complex coefficients ci = 〈i|Ψ〉.
Qubits and Pauli operators
A qubit is a quantum state defined on a two-dimensional Hilbert space H2. The word qubit
is a concatenation of the words ‘quantum’ and ‘bit’. Qubits are the most suitable choice
to represent a quantum analogue of the classical ‘bit’. Therefore, the canonical basis (also
called computational basis or standard basis) is typically denoted by the two normalized
vectors |0〉 and |1〉 in analogy to the classical bits 0 and 1.
An important set of operators onH2 are the Pauli operators σˆx, σˆy and σˆz, or sometimes
denoted by X, Y and Z. Together with the identity operator σˆ0 ≡ 1, they span an operator
basis of the Hermitian operators on H2.
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Definition 2 The Pauli operators are Hermitian, positive and unitary. In the computa-
tional basis {|0〉, |1〉}, they are expressed by
σˆx = |0〉〈1|+ |1〉〈0| (2.4)
σˆy = −i|0〉〈1|+ i|1〉〈0| (2.5)
σˆz = |0〉〈0| − |1〉〈1|. (2.6)
Any state ρ on the qubit Hilbert space is conveniently represented in the Bloch repre-
sentation
ρ =
1
2
(1+ ~s · ~σ) (2.7)
where ~σ = (σˆx, σˆy, σˆz) is a vector of Pauli operators. The vector ~s = (sx, sy, sz) is called
Bloch vector with real coefficients si with the property |~s|2 = s2x + s2y + s2z ≤ 1. The vector
~s defines a representation of a qubit on the three-dimensional real sphere known as Bloch
sphere. All pure states lie on the surface of the sphere with |~s|2 = 1.
2.1.2 Composite systems
Individual quantum systems can be joined to form a composite quantum system. The
second postulate of quantum mechanics defines joint systems.
Postulate 2 Let us denote the Hilbert spaces corresponding to the systems A and B by HA
and HB. Then the joint space is given by the tensor product Hilbert space HAB = HA⊗HB.
Quantum states of joint systems are denoted by density operators ρAB in D(HAB).
Perhaps we are only interested in one subsystem of a joint state ρAB. The state reduced
to one subsystem is defined as follows.
Definition 3 Let ρAB ∈ D(HAB). The reduced state ρA of ρAB on the subsystem A is
obtained by taking the partial trace over the system B
ρA = trB{ρAB}. (2.8)
Similarly, the the partial trace over A results in a reduced state ρB = trA ρAB on the
subsystem B.
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If the individual subsystems of a joint state ρAB are independent, the state is said to
be a product state.
Definition 4 A state ρAB is said to be a product state if it is of the form ρAB = ρA ⊗ ρB.
A pure state |Ψ〉AB is said to be a product state if it is of the form |Ψ〉AB = |Ψ〉A ⊗ |Ψ〉B.
For example, suppose {|iA〉}i and {|jB〉}j are two orthonormal bases of the Hilbert spaces
HA and HB. One choice of a basis for the joint system HAB is a product basis with the
basis vectors |iA〉 ⊗ |jB〉 ≡ |iA, jB〉.
A unique quantum mechanical feature of composite systems is entanglement. Entangle-
ment is a resource that plays a fundamental role in quantum communication and quantum
computation.
Definition 5 A state is called separable, if it is a convex combination of product states
ρsep =
∑
x
p(x)ρxA ⊗ ρxB. (2.9)
Definition 6 A state is called entangled if it is not separable.
An important example of two-qubit entangled states are the four Bell states.
|Φ+〉 = 1√
2
(|00〉+ |11〉), (2.10)
|Φ−〉 = 1√
2
(|00〉 − |11〉),
|Ψ+〉 = 1√
2
(|01〉+ |10〉),
|Ψ−〉 = 1√
2
(|01〉 − |10〉).
The Bell states are maximally entangled and form a basis of a two-qubit Hilbert space.
They are also commonly referred to as EPR states.
We introduce two useful theorems for composite systems:
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Theorem 1 Schmidt decomposition. Let |Ψ〉AB be a pure state on the composite sys-
tem AB. Then there exist orthonormal bases {|iA〉}i and {|iB〉}i of systems A and B, and
non-negative real numbers λi with the property that
|Ψ〉AB =
∑
i
λi|iA〉|iB〉. (2.11)
The bases are called Schmidt bases, and the coefficients λi are called Schmidt coefficients.
This theorem implies that the eigenvalue spectra of the reduced states ρA and ρB are
identical, namely {λ2i }i.
Theorem 2 Purification Suppose the state ρA on system A has a spectral decomposition
ρA =
∑
i pi|iA〉〈iA|. Then there exists an additional system R and a pure state |Ψ〉AR on the
joint system AR such that ρA = trR |Ψ〉〈Ψ|AR. The pure state |Ψ〉AR is called a purification
of ρA. If we introduce an orthonormal basis {|iR〉}i on the system R, then the purification
can be constructed as follows
|Ψ〉AR =
∑
i
√
pi|iA〉|iR〉. (2.12)
2.1.3 Measurements
In a measurement process, the quantum state ρ interacts with a measurement device,
which then reveals some information about the quantum state. The description of the
measurement is the third postulate of quantum mechanics:
Postulate 3 A measurement is a set of measurement operators (Kraus operators) {Kˆx}x
acting on a Hilbert space H. Each measurement operator Kˆx is associated to a measurement
outcome x. The measurement operators satisfy the completeness relation
∑
x Kˆ
†
xKˆx = 1.
If we measure a state ρ ∈ D(H), the probability to obtain the outcome x is
p(x) = tr{KˆxρKˆ†x}. (2.13)
The post-measurement state is
ρx =
KˆxρKˆ
†
x
p(x)
. (2.14)
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If the state after the measurement is not of interest, the positive operator valued measure
(POVM) formalism is a convenient mathematical tool to describe the measurement.
Definition 7 A POVM M is a set of positive semidefinite operators Fˆx ∈ B(H), called
POVM elements. The POVM elements satisfy
∑
x Fˆx = 1. In terms of the Kraus operators
the POVM elements are given by Fˆx = Kˆ
†
xKˆx.
A special case of a measurement is the projective measurement or von Neumann mea-
surement. The measurement operators of a von Neumann measurement are orthogonal
projectors Kˆx = |φx〉〈φx|. They are Hermitian Kˆ†x = Kˆx and satisfy KˆxKˆy = Kxδx,y. A
projective measurement defines an observable Xˆ, which is a Hermitian operator with a
spectral decomposition
Xˆ =
∑
x
x|φx〉〈φx|. (2.15)
When we say we measure the observable Xˆ, it means that a state ρ is measured with
respect to the projective measurement that defines the observable. The expectation value
of an observable Xˆ is
〈Xˆ〉ρ = tr{ρXˆ}. (2.16)
2.1.4 Quantum evolution
Postulate 4 The time evolution of a closed quantum system is a unitary evolution, fa-
cilitated by the time evolution operator Uˆ(t, t0). A pure state |Ψ(t0)〉 at time t0 evolves
to a state |Ψ(t)〉 = Uˆ(t, t0)|Ψ(t0)〉 at time t. Mixed states evolve according to ρ(t) =
Uˆ(t, t0)ρ(t0)Uˆ(t, t0)
†.
The time evolution operator is governed by the Schro¨dinger equation:
i~
d
dt
Uˆ(t, t0) = Hˆ Uˆ(t, t0) (2.17)
In this equation Hˆ is a Hermitian operator called Hamiltonian, and the constant ~ is
Planck’s constant. We choose here the convention where ~ = 1. In case of a time in-
dependent Hamiltonian, the time evolution operator obtained by solving the Schro¨dinger
equation is
Uˆ(t, t0) = e
iHˆ(t−t0)/~. (2.18)
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The Schro¨dinger equation for the time evolution operator implies the Schro¨dinger equation
for pure states |Ψ(t)〉
i~
d|Ψ(t)〉
dt
= Hˆ|Ψ(t)〉, (2.19)
and the von Neumann equation for mixed states ρ(t)
i~
dρ(t)
dt
= [Hˆ, ρ(t)]. (2.20)
In this equation the bracket [Xˆ, Yˆ ] := XˆYˆ − Yˆ Xˆ is the commutator.
The evolution of an open quantum system refers to the evolution of a subsystem A that
is in contact with an environment E. The joint system AE evolves like a closed system.
An open evolution also refers to the evolution of a system A to another system B.
The evolution of an open system is described by a completely positive and trace pre-
serving (CPTP) map, or quantum map. The important feature of a CPTP map is that
density operators are mapped onto density operators. First, let us define a positive map:
Definition 8 A positive map E : B(HA)→ B(HB) takes positive semidefinite operators to
positive semidefinite operators.
If a positive map E acts only on a subsystem A of a composite system AB, we must ensure
that the result is again a positive semidefinite operator. Surprisingly, though, the tensor
product of two positive maps is not necessarily positive. The completely positive maps,
which are a subset of the positive maps, have a stronger requirement on positivity, that
guarantees the positivity of tensor products:
Definition 9 Completely positive (CP) maps A completely positive map E : B(HA)→
B(HB) is a linear map with the property that for any Hilbert space HR, the map E ⊗ 1R is
positive.
Finally, the map must be trace preserving, meaning that tr E(ρ) = tr(ρ).
The Choi-Jamiolkowski isomorphism and the Stinespring dilation
The Choi-Jamiolkowski isomorphism links quantum maps to density operators. It is a
useful tool in that it reduces the study of quantum maps to the study of density operators.
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Let HA be isomorphic to HA′ with orthonormal bases {|iA〉} and {|iA′〉} for i = 1, ..., d.
We define the maximally entangled state on the joint Hilbert space HAA′ by
|Φ+〉AA′ = 1√
d
∑
i
|iA〉|iA′〉. (2.21)
Theorem 3 The Choi-Jamiolkowski isomorphism relates the CPTP map E : B(HA′) →
B(HB) to a density operator σAB on D(HAB) by the rule
σAB = (1A ⊗ E)|Φ+〉〈Φ+|AA′ (2.22)
The map E is recovered from σAB by the reverse transformation
E(ρA) = d trA{ρTA ⊗ 1BσAB}. (2.23)
The symbol T stands for transposition with respect to the basis {|iA〉}.
The Stinespring dilation theorem relates every CPTP map to a unitary map on a dilated
Hilbert space.
Theorem 4 Let E : B(HA) → B(HA) be a CPTP map. Then there exists a an environ-
ment HE and a unitary map U on B(HAE) such that
E(ρA) = trE{U(ρA ⊗ |0〉〈0|E)U †}. (2.24)
The Stinespring theorem also applies if the quantum map takes a system A to a different
system B.
2.2 Basic quantum optics
Quantum communication protocols use light as a preferred carrier of information. We
review in this section the fundamentals of quantum optics that are relevant for the further
chapters of this thesis [84, 73, 13, 94].
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2.2.1 Quantum harmonic oscillator
The classical electromagnetic field is composed of independent modes which are solutions
to Maxwell’s equations. When we quantize the electromagnetic field, a single mode is
described by a quantum harmonic oscillator governed by the Hamiltonian
Hˆ = ~ω(aˆ†aˆ+ 1/2). (2.25)
In this equation, ω is the frequency of the harmonic oscillator. The operators aˆ and aˆ†
are not Hermitian and they satisfy the commutation relation [aˆ, aˆ†] = 1. Their product
defines the Hermitian number operator nˆ = aˆ†aˆ. The number operator has a discrete
eigenbasis |n〉 with eigenvalues n which denote the number of excitations in the mode.
These eigenstates are called the Fock states or photon number states. Each excitation
corresponds to a photon in the mode, for example |n〉 denotes n photons in the mode.
The operators aˆ and aˆ† annihilate and create mode excitations according to the rule
aˆ|n〉 = √n|n− 1〉, (2.26)
aˆ†|n〉 = √n+ 1|n+ 1〉. (2.27)
They are commonly referred to as annihilation and creation operators.
Quadrature operators
The annihilation and creation operators are related to the quadrature operators
xˆ =
1√
2
(aˆ† + aˆ), (2.28)
pˆ =
i√
2
(aˆ† − aˆ). (2.29)
The xˆ and pˆ operators are the analogue of the position and momentum operators.
They satisfy the commutator [xˆ, pˆ] = i. An xˆ or pˆ quadrature measurement is referred to
as a homodyne measurement. Since xˆ and pˆ are Hermitian operators, they give rise to a
complete basis with eigenvectors |x〉 and |p〉 and continuous spectra x, p ∈ R
xˆ =
∫
dx x |x〉〈x|, (2.30)
pˆ =
∫
dp p |p〉〈p|. (2.31)
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Every quantum state ρ must satisfy the Heisenberg uncertainty relation
Varx(ρ)Varp(ρ) ≥ 1
4
, (2.32)
where Varx(ρ) = 〈xˆ2〉ρ − 〈xˆ〉2ρ and Varp(ρ) = 〈pˆ2〉ρ − 〈pˆ〉2ρ. States, for which the ‘=’ sign
holds, are called minimum uncertainty states.
2.2.2 Coherent states and squeezed states
A coherent state |α〉 is a particular state of the quantum harmonic oscillator. It is an
eigenstate of the annihilation operator aˆ with a complex eigenvalue α = eiφ|α|. The
coherent state corresponding to the eigenvalue α is
|α〉 = e|α|2/2
∞∑
n=0
αn√
n
|n〉. (2.33)
If we perform a quadrature measurement on |α〉, the distribution of the measurement
outcomes x follows a Gaussian distribution
pα(x) = |〈x|α〉|2 = 1√
2piVarx(|α〉)
exp
(
−(x− 〈x〉|α〉)
2
2Varx(|α〉)
)
, (2.34)
with mean 〈xˆ〉α = 〈α|xˆ|α〉 =
√
2Re[α] and variance Varx(|α〉) = 12 . A measurement of the
pˆ quadrature also results in a Gaussian profile with mean 〈pˆ〉α = 〈α|pˆ|α〉 =
√
2Im[α] and
Varp(|α〉) = 12 . Since coherent states satisfy the equality in the Heisenberg uncertainty
relation, thus they are minimum uncertainty states.
Coherent states are important because they describe the light that exits a laser. A
phase randomized laser source emits a mixture of coherent states
ρlaser =
∫
dφ
2pi
|eiφ|α|〉〈eiφ|α||. (2.35)
This mixed state is diagonal in the Fock basis
ρlaser =
∞∑
n=0
e−|α|
2 |α|2n
n!
|n〉〈n|. (2.36)
The probability to observe an n-photon state follows a Poisson distribution p(n) = e−|α|
2 |α|2n
n!
.
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Another interesting quantum state of the quantum harmonic oscillator is a squeezed
coherent state. A squeezed coherent state
|α, r〉 = Sˆ(r)|α〉 (2.37)
is obtained by applying the squeezing operator Sˆ(r) = exp(r(aˆ2 − aˆ†2)/2) to the coherent
state |α〉. The coefficient r ∈ R is called the squeezing parameter. If we perform an xˆ or pˆ
quadrature measurement on |α, r〉, the outcomes are distributed according to a Gaussian
distribution. The expectation values are 〈xˆ〉|α,r〉 =
√
2 Re[α] and 〈pˆ〉|α,r〉 =
√
2 Im[α].
Furthermore, the states |α, r〉 are minimum uncertainty states with a squeezed variance in
one quadrature and an anti-squeezed variance in the other quadrature:
Varx(|α, r〉) = 1
2
e−2r, Varp(|α, r〉) = 1
2
e2r. (2.38)
2.2.3 Two-mode squeezed state
The counterpart to the maximally entangled state |Φ〉 = 1√
2
(|00〉 + |11〉) on a two-qubit
Hilbert space is the two-mode squeezed state. In the Fock basis of two systems A and B,
it is given by
|ΨTMSS〉AB =
√
1− λ2
∑
n
λn|n〉A|n〉B, (2.39)
where λ = tanh r. Let xˆA, xˆB and pˆA, pˆB be the quadrature operators of the systems A
and B. The wave functions of the two-mode squeezed state expressed in the quadrature
operator bases are
〈xA, xB|ΨTMSS〉 = 1√
pi
exp
[
−e−2r (xA + xB)
2
4
− e2r (xA − xB)
2
4
]
(2.40)
〈pA, pB|ΨTMSS〉 = 1√
pi
exp
[
−e−2r (pA − pB)
2
4
− e2r (pA + pB)
2
4
]
(2.41)
If we measure the xˆA quadrature on system A, we effectively prepare on B a squeezed
coherent state |α′, r′〉B = 〈xA|ΨTMSS〉 with variance VarxB(|α′, r′〉) = 12 cosh 2r and mean〈xB〉|α′,r′〉 = tanh 2r xA. Furthermore, the probability distribution to obtain the outcome
xA on system A follows a Gaussian distribution
p(xA) =
1√
2piVarxA
exp
[
− x
2
A
2VarxA
]
(2.42)
centred around zero with variance VarxA =
cosh 2r
2
.
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2.3 Quantum information theory
In this section we give a short introduction to quantum information theory according to
Ref. [73].
2.3.1 Notation
Let X be a random variable that takes on values x and has a probability distribution p(x).
In the language of quantum mechanics, the classical random variable X can be represented
by a (classical) state
ρX =
∑
x
p(x)|x〉〈x|X . (2.43)
on a system X, which we denote by the same letter as the random variable. In the following,
we denote quantum systems by letters from the beginning of the alphabet, such as A, B
or E, and classical systems by letters from the end of the alphabet, such as X and Y .
If there are two random variables X and Y with a joint probability distribution p(x, y)
and values (x, y), the classical state
ρXY =
∑
x,y
p(x, y)|x〉〈x|X ⊗ |y〉〈y|Y (2.44)
representing these random variables lives on two classical subsystems X and Y . This
notation is suitable to describe hybrid systems, where one subsystem is quantum, and the
other subsystem is classical, such as the classical-quantum (cq) state
ρXB =
∑
x
p(x)|x〉〈x|X ⊗ ρxB. (2.45)
This state could be obtained, for example, by partial measurement of the subsystem A of a
bipartite quantum state ρAB with respect to a POVM. If the outcome of the measurement
is x, which happens with probability p(x), the remaining conditional state on system B is
ρxB.
2.3.2 Classical entropy and mutual information
Consider we inquire the value of a random variable X. The Shannon entropy
H(X) ≡ H(px) = −
∑
x
p(x) log2 p(x). (2.46)
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is a measure of uncertainty that we have about the outcome of the inquiry. If the logarithm
is taken to the basis 2, the entropy is in units of bits.
The entropy of a joint probability distribution p(x, y) is captured in the joint entropy
H(X, Y ) = −
∑
x,y
p(x, y) log2 p(x, y). (2.47)
If we ignore the system X, we can recover the probability distribution on the system Y
alone by taking the marginal of p(x, y), which is defined by p(y) =
∑
x p(x, y).
We define the conditional entropy of X with respect to Y by
H(X|Y ) = H(X, Y )−H(Y ). (2.48)
The conditional entropy is a measure of the uncertainty in X, provided we know Y . Fur-
thermore, it follows from this definition that H(X|Y ) +H(Y ) = H(Y |X) +H(X).
We define the mutual information, which is a measure of the correlations between two
classical systems by
I(X : Y ) = H(X) +H(Y )−H(X, Y ). (2.49)
2.3.3 Quantum entropy and quantum mutual information
The entropy of a quantum state ρA on the system A is called von Neumann entropy and
is defined by
S(A) ≡ S(ρA) = − tr{ρA log2 ρA} (2.50)
If the eigenvalues of ρA are {λi}i, the von Neumann entropy can be calculated straightfor-
wardly
S(ρA) = −
∑
i
λi log2 λi. (2.51)
For a composite state ρAB, the joint von Neumann entropy is defined by
S(A,B) = − trAB{ρAB log2 ρAB}. (2.52)
We define the quantum conditional entropy and the quantum mutual information analo-
gously to the classical case in Eqs. (2.48) and (2.49).
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In the following we are interested in the correlations between a classical system X and
a quantum system B described by the classical-quantum state ρXB in Eq. 2.45. The joint
entropy of this state can be explicitly calculated
S(X,B) = S(ρXB) = H(X) +
∑
x
p(x)S(ρxB). (2.53)
In analogy to the classical conditional entropy, the uncertainty about the quantum system
B, given full access to the classical system X, is captured in the conditional entropy
S(B|X) =
∑
x
p(x)S(ρxB). (2.54)
Finally, the mutual information between X and B
I(X : B) = S(ρB)−
∑
x
p(x)S(ρxB) (2.55)
is given a special name, the Holevo quantity, and is denoted by χ(X : B).
Lastly, quantum operations E never increase the mutual information [see, for example,
Ref. [73], page 522]:
Theorem 5 Let AB be a composite system, and let E : B(B)→ B(B′) be a quantum opera-
tion. The mutual information never increases under quantum operations on one subsystme,
i.e.,
I(A : B) ≥ I(A : B′). (2.56)
2.4 Representation theory
The concept of symmetries occurs very commonly in nature. The tools to analyze sym-
metries with mathematical rigour are provided in group and representation theory. In this
section we give a short introduction to representation theory of finite groups with emphasis
on applications to the topics in later chapters. See also Refs. [3, 70].
2.4.1 Groups
A group represents the concept of symmetry in a mathematical sense.
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Definition 10 A group G is a (finite or infinite) set of elements (g1, g2, ...) and an oper-
ation called group multiplication, which associates to any two elements g1 and g2 a third
element g1g2. The following axioms define the group structure:
1. There exists an identity element e in G that satisfies: eg = ge = g for all g ∈ G.
2. There exists an inverse element g−1 for each g ∈ G that satisfies: gg−1 = g−1g = e.
3. The group multiplication is associative: (g1g2)g3 = g1(g2g3) for all g1, g2, g3 ∈ G.
The group elements are divided into conjugacy classes. Each group element belongs to
exactly one conjugacy class.
Definition 11 The conjugacy class Kg contain all group elements g
′ = hgh−1 for all
h ∈ G. For finite groups the number of group elements nKg in the conjugacy class Kg
defines the order of the class.
2.4.2 Representations
The idea of representation theory is to assign to each abstract group element a unitary
operator which acts on a real or complex vector space. To make things fit the language of
quantum mechanics, let the vector space be a the Hilbert space H with dimension n. We
define the abstract group of all n-dimensional unitary operators acting on H by U(n,H).
Every group element g is now identified with an n-dimensional unitary operator Ug in
U(n,H). The homomorphism U that takes the group elements g to the unitary operators
Ug is called a unitary representation of G on U(n,H):
U : G→ U(n,H), (2.57)
g 7→ Ug. (2.58)
The representation conserves the group structure on U(n,H), but with the group multi-
plication replaced by multiplication between operators: Ug1Ug2 = Ug1g2 , U
−1
g = Ug−1 and
Ue = 1n, where 1n is the identity operator on the n-dimensional Hilbert space. Since the
operators are unitary, U−1g = U
†
g .
The operators Ug of a group representation act as transformations onH and are suitable
to describe the symmetries of objects on H. In the forthcoming chapters, these objects are
sets of quantum states.
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Definition 12 Let S be a set containing |S| quantum states {|ϕ1〉, |ϕ2〉, ..., |ϕ|S|〉} defined
on D(H), and let Ug be a unitary representation of the group G on U(n,H). The set S is
called G-invariant, if
Ug |ϕx〉 ∈ S (2.59)
for all |ϕx〉 ∈ S, and all g ∈ G. A G-invariant set is essentially mapped onto itself by the
action of the group G.
2.4.3 Irreducible representations
There are many representations of the group G on a finite-dimensional Hilbert space H.
Two representations R and U are said to be equivalent (R ∼= U), if there exists a unitary
transformation S in U(n,H) such that
Rg = SUgS
† ∀g ∈ G. (2.60)
This transformation corresponds to a basis transformation. The equivalent representations
define an equivalence class of representations. In order to characterize all representations
of the group G, it is sufficient to determine one representation in each equivalence class.
One goals of representation theory is to characterized all representations of a group.
Definition 13 A subspace H′ of H is called invariant under U, or U-invariant, if for all
Ug and all vectors |v〉 ∈ H′, Ug|v〉 ∈ H′.
Definition 14 A representation is called irreducible, if the only invariant subspaces are
the null-space and H itself. Otherwise (if there exists a proper subspace), the representation
it is called reducible.
A Hilbert space H carrying a reducible representation U can be decomposed into a direct
sum of subspaces Hi, each carrying irreducible representations Ui:
H = H1 ⊕H2 ⊕ ...Hk (2.61)
U = U1 ⊕U2 ⊕ ...Uk. (2.62)
Since this decomposition is unique, the irreducible representations form the fundamental
building blocks of the representation of a group.
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2.4.4 Characters
In order to decompose reducible representation into irreducible representations (irreps) Uµ,
we must first identify all irreps of the group. For many groups the irreps can be found in
tables, such as in Refs. [56, 17] for the crystallographic groups. Each irrep is identified by
the character, which is defined as follows:
Definition 15 Let Uµ be a representation that takes the group elements g of a group G
to the operators Ug on U(n,H). The character χµ of the irrep Uµ is a vector with entries
χµ(g) = tr{Uµg } for each g ∈ G.
The character of representation is an important quantity. Some useful properties of the
characters are listed here.
1. The character χµχν of the tensor product Uµ ⊗Uν is given by
χµχν(g) = χµ(g)χν(g). (2.63)
This is a simple consequence of the trace of tensor products.
2. All group elements in the same conjugacy classKg have the same character entry χ(g).
This is a consequence of the cyclic property of the trace: χ(hgh−1) = tr{UhUgU−1h } =
tr{Ug} = χ(g).
3. The number of different irreps of a group G is equal to the number of conjugacy
classes. If a group has a finite number of conjugacy classes, the number of irreps is
also finite.
4. Two representations Uµ and Uν of a group G are equivalent Uµ ∼= Uν , if and only if
they have the same character.
5. The characters of two irreps Uµ and Uν of a group G satisfy the orthonormality
conditions 〈χµ, χν〉 = δµ,ν . The inner product is defined by
〈χµ, χν〉 = 1|G|
∑
g
(χµ(g))∗χν(g), (2.64)
where the ∗ stands for complex conjugation.
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Table 2.1: The character table of the Dihedral Group D4. The horizontal line divides the
real irreps (U1 to U5) from the symplectic irreps (U6 and U7).
(1) (2) (2) (4) (4) (1) (2)
D4 e C4z C2z C2y C2xy e¯ C¯4z
U1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
U2 1 1 1 −1 −1 1 1
U3 1 −1 1 1 −1 1 −1
U4 1 −1 1 −1 1 1 −1
U5 2 0 −2 0 0 2 0
U6 2
√
2 0 0 0 −2 −√2
U7 2 −√2 0 0 0 −2 √2
As an illustration, the character tables of the groups D4 and C4 are shown in Tables
2.1 and 2.2. Each row of a character table corresponds to a group irrep Uµ. The irrep
in the first row is always the trivial irrep, where all group elements are identified on a
one-dimensional space by the identity operator 1. The characters of this representation
are trivially all equal to 1. The columns denote the conjugacy classes, e.g. e, C4z, etc.
and the number of elements in the conjugacy class, e.g. (1), (2), etc. The first column
always shows the character of the identity element e, and is equal to the dimension n of
the representation.
The symmetry group D4 plays an important role in QKD, as it is the symmetry group
of the signal states of the BB84 protocol. The group has 16 elements, divided into 7
conjugacy classes. Therefore, there are also 7 different irreps. The symmetry group C4 is
the symmetry group of the unbalanced phase-encoded BB84 protocol in Chapter 6. The
group has 8 elements, 8 conjugacy classes, and 8 different irreps.
2.4.5 The complex conjugate irrep
Let U be an irrep of the group G with unitary operators Ug. The operators Ug can be
represented by n × n matrices with complex matrix elements. We can construct a new
irrep of the group G by taking the complex conjugate of the matrices with respect to a
basis. The complex conjugate matrices then define the complex conjugate irrep U∗ [see
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Table 2.2: The character table of the Cyclic Group C4. The order of each conjugacy class is
one, and all irreps are one-dimensional. We define ω = e−ipi/4. The horizontal line divides
the real irreps (U1 and U2) from the complex irreps (U3 to U8).
C4 e C4z C2z C
−1
4z e¯ C¯4z C¯2z C¯
−1
4z
U1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
U2 1 −1 1 −1 1 −1 1 −1
U3 1 −i −1 i 1 −i −1 i
U4 1 i −1 −i 1 i −1 −i
U5 1 ω −i ω7 −1 ω5 i ω3
U6 1 ω7 i ω −1 ω3 −i ω5
U7 1 ω5 −i ω3 −1 ω i ω7
U8 1 ω3 i ω5 −1 ω7 −i ω
for example Refs. [56, 17]]. Although complex conjugation depends on the choice of basis,
the complex conjugate irreps defined in this way are all equivalent up to unitary rotations.
There is a relationship between the irreps U and U∗. If the irrep U is real, then U∗ is
necessarily also real, and therefore, U∗ ∼= U. If the vector space is complex, there are two
cases: (i) The matrices of the irrep U have complex entries, but the characters χ(g) are
real (symplectic irrep). Due to the uniqueness of the characters, it follows that U ∼= U∗.
(ii) The matrices of the irrep U have complex entries and the characters χ(g) are complex
(complex irrep). Then, U∗ is necessarily different from U.
In the character table of the Dihedral Group D4 in Table 2.1, the irreps U
1 through U5
are real, and U6 and U7 are symplectic. For the Cyclic Group C4 in Table 2.2, the irreps
U1 and U2 are real, and the rest are complex.
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2.4.6 Tensor products of irreps
Direct sum decomposition
The tensor product of two irreps Uµ⊗Uν onHµ⊗Hν is normally a reducible representation
and can be decomposed into a direct sum of irreps Uω on Hilbert spaces Hωi :
Hµ ⊗Hν =
⊕
ω
mω⊕
i=1
Hωi . (2.65)
In this decomposition, the index i runs over 1, ...,mω, and the irrep U
ω occurs mω times
in the decomposition.
Which irreps Uω appear in the direct sum decomposition? What are their multiplicities
mω? Once the character table of a group G has been established there is a systematic
method to answer these questions based on character theory. The multiplicities mµ are
uniquely determined in the following theorem:
Theorem 6 The multiplicity mω of the irrep U
ω in the direct sum decomposition (??) is
mω = 〈χµχν , χω〉. (2.66)
The inner product between the characters is defined in Eq. (2.64), and χµχν is the character
of the tensor product representation Uµ ⊗Uν.
In Chapter 4, we are interested in the decomposition of tensor product representations
of the form (Uµ)∗ ⊗Uµ. The irreps Uµ describe transformations of the signal states of a
QKD protocol. We calculate the decomposition for two examples.
Example 1 Let HA and HB be two isomorphic qubit Hilbert spaces carrying the two-
dimensional irreps (U6)∗ and (U6). We are interested in the decomposition of the tensor
product
(U6)∗ ⊗U6 := UBB84 (2.67)
on the composite space HA⊗HB. Since U6 is a symplectic irrep, it holds that (U6)∗ ∼= U6.
The character of the tensor product according to Eq. (2.63) is given by
e C4z C2z C2y C2xy e¯ C¯4z
U6 ⊗U6 4 2 0 0 0 4 2 (2.68)
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The multiplicities mω for each irrep U
µ are given according to Eq. (2.66) by m1 = m2 =
m5 = 1 and m3 = m4 = m6 = m7 = 0. Therefore, the tensor product decomposes into
three irreps: two one-dimensional irreps U1 and U2, and one two-dimensional irrep U5
UBB84 ∼= U1 ⊕U5 ⊕U2. (2.69)
Example 2 We define the sum of two one-dimensional irreps U1⊕U4 of the group C4. Let
HA and HB be two isomorphic qubit Hilbert spaces carrying the representations (U1⊕U4)∗
and U1 ⊕U4. We are interested in the decomposition of the representation
UUPE = (U
1 ⊕U4)∗ ⊗ (U1 ⊕U4) (2.70)
= ((U1)∗ ⊗U1)⊕ ((U1)∗ ⊗U4)⊕ ((U4)∗ ⊗U1)⊕ ((U4)∗ ⊗U4) (2.71)
on HA ⊗ HB. From the uniqueness of the characters we determine that (U1)∗ ∼= U1 and
(U4)∗ ∼= U3. Furthermore, any product with the trivial irrep satisfies U1 ⊗Uµ = Uµ. It
remains to compute the direct sum decomposition of the product U3 ⊗ U4, which is easy
because all irreps of C4 are one-dimensional. It follows that χ
3χ4 = χ1, which uniquely
determines the decomposition
UUPE = U
1 ⊕U4 ⊕U3 ⊕U1. (2.72)
Clebsch-Gordan coefficients
Let Uµ and Uν be two irreps of G on Hµ and Hν . We denote the bases of Hµ and Hν by
{|iµ〉}i and {|jν〉}j. The canonical basis on Hµ⊗Hν is the tensor product basis {|iµ, jν〉}i,j.
There exists a basis {|φk〉}k on Hµ⊗Hν in which the direct sum decomposition of Uµ⊗Uν
is block diagonal in the matrix representation, namely
Uµg ⊗ Uνg →

Uω1g 0 0 0
0
Uω2g
0
0 0
0 0 0
. . .
 . (2.73)
This new basis is related to the tensor product basis by the Clebsch-Gordan coefficients :
Definition 16 The coefficients 〈iµ, jν |φk〉 in the expansion |φk〉 =
∑
i,j〈iµ, jν |φk〉|iµ, jν〉
are called Clebsch-Gordan coefficients.
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The Clebsch-Gordan coefficients for tensor products of crystallographic groups representa-
tions can be found in Ref. [17]
Continuing Example 1, we define the canonical basis of the isomorphic spaces HA and
HB by {|0〉, |1〉}. Then, the Clebsch-Gordan coefficients found in Ref [17] tell us that the
matrix representation of UBB84 ∼= (U6)∗ ⊗U6 is block diagonal in the Bell basis defined
in Eq. (2.10). Each irrep appearing in the direct sum decomposition of UBB84 lives on a
subspace spanned by the basis vectors of the Bell basis
U1 → {|Φ+〉} (2.74)
U5 → {|Φ−〉, |Ψ+〉} (2.75)
U2 → {|Ψ−〉}. (2.76)
Note that U5 is a two-dimensional irrep, while U1 and U2 are both one-dimensional.
2.4.7 Schur’s lemma
Schur’s lemma is a simple but powerful lemma.
Lemma 1 (Schur’s lemma). Let Uµ and Uν be irreducible representations of a group
G on Hilbert spaces Hµ and Hν, and let A be a linear map from Hµ → Hν. If the linear
map and the irreps commute,
A Uµg = U
ν
g A, (2.77)
for all g ∈ G, then A satisfies one of the two cases:
(i) if Uµ ∼= Uν, A = c 1n, where c ∈ C is a scalar and 1n is the identity operator
mapping Hµ → Hν.
(ii) if Uµ  Uν, then A is equal to zero.
We continue Example 1. Suppose a density operator ρA ∈ D(HA) commutes with all
group elements of U6:
[ρA, U
6
g ] = 0, ∀g ∈ G. (2.78)
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It follows from (i) in Schur’s lemma that ρA is proportional to the identity 12. In the
matrix formulation with the proper normalization tr ρA = 1 this amounts to
ρA =
1
2
12 =
1
2
(
1 0
0 1
)
. (2.79)
Let ρAB be a composite density operator on D(HAB). Suppose ρAB commutes with the
representation UBB84 = (U
6)∗ ⊗U6 of the group D4 on HAB:
[ρAB, U
6
g ⊗ U6g ] = 0, ∀g ∈ G. (2.80)
Since we know that the direct sum decomposition of UBB84 is block-diagonal in the Bell
basis, let us parametrize ρAB in the Bell basis by
ρAB =

ρ11 ρ12 ρ13 ρ14
ρ∗12 ρ22 ρ23 ρ24
ρ∗13 ρ
∗
23 ρ33 ρ34
ρ∗14 ρ
∗
24 ρ
∗
34 ρ44
 . (2.81)
Then, the diagonal blocks of ρAB satisfy the following commutation relations
ρ11 U
1
g = U
1
g ρ11, (2.82)(
ρ22 ρ23
ρ∗23 ρ33
)
U5g = U
5
g
(
ρ22 ρ23
ρ∗23 ρ33
)
, (2.83)
ρ44 U
2
g = U
2
g ρ44. (2.84)
The commutation relation of the off-diagonal blocks of ρAB is given by(
ρ12 ρ13
)
U5g = U
1
g
(
ρ12 ρ13
)
, (2.85)
ρ14 U
2
g = U
1
g ρ14, (2.86)(
ρ24
ρ34
)
U2g = U
5
g
(
ρ24
ρ34
)
. (2.87)
We apply Schur’s lemma to each of the blocks individually. All diagonal blocks satisfy (i)
in Schur’s lemma, while all off-diagonal blocks satisfy (ii). Hence,
ρ11 = a 11, (2.88)(
ρ22 ρ23
ρ32 ρ33
)
= b 12, (2.89)
ρ44 = c 11, (2.90)
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where a, b and c are constants. All other entries are zero. Thus,
ρAB =

a 0 0 0
0 b 0 0
0 0 b 0
0 0 0 c
 (2.91)
in the Bell basis with the normalization a+ 2b+ c = 1.
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Chapter 3
Quantum key distribution
background
This chapter is a background chapter about quantum key distribution. References can be
found in [86, 39, 77].
3.1 QKD protocols
The objective of QKD is to establish a secret key between two legitimate parties, Alice and
Bob. The secret key can be used later in classical cryptographic applications, for example
to facilitate secure communication.
A secret key is a string k of independent and uniformly distributed random variables,
that is known to Alice and Bob, but unknown to any eavesdropper, Eve. In order to
generate a secret key, Alice and Bob follow a protocol with well-defined steps. Typically,
the protocol has a quantum phase and the classical phase. In the quantum phase, Alice
and Bob exchange quantum signals over a quantum channel. In the classical phase, they
communicate over an authenticated classical channel and extract a secret key using classical
communication protocols. During the whole process, the goal of the eavesdropper is to learn
about the key by launching an attack on the protocol.
First, we describe the steps of a protocol in the prepare-and-measure scheme.
Quantum phase:
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1. Preparation. Let S = {|ϕx〉, x = 1, 2, ..., |S|} be a set of |S| quantum states |ϕx〉
defined on a d-dimensional Hilbert space HS. Alice chooses n states (signal states)
with probability p(x) from the set S in her laboratory. The quantum states encode
the random variables of the key. Alice keeps a record of the chosen sequence of
quantum states before sending them over a quantum channel to Bob.
2. Measurement. Bob measures the quantum states in his laboratory by means of a
POVM MB = {F yB}y. He records the measurement outcomes, which results in cor-
related data (raw data) according to the conditional probability distribution p(y|x),
shared between Alice and Bob.
Classical phase:
1. Parameter estimation. Alice and Bob publicly announce a small amount of their
data to determine the statistics of the remaining data. If the statistics indicate that
the remaining data is suitable to generate a key, the protocol continues, otherwise it
aborts.
2. Postprocessing. Alice and Bob can process their data to their advantage. For exam-
ple, they can discard data that they identify to be unsuitable for the key. Then they
agree how to map their data to the actual key values.
3. Error correction. If the key strings are not perfectly correlated Alice and Bob perform
error correction (sometimes called reconciliation), to generate a pair of perfectly
correlated, but shorter strings. A typical choice for the error correction is one-way
error correction, in which the data of one party is set as a reference key. The party
with the reference key sends error correction information to the other party, who
then must correct her or his noisy data to match the reference key. We speak of
direct/reverse reconciliation, if Alice’s/Bob’s data serves as the reference key. If the
error correction is successful, Alice and Bob share two identical strings. There is also
the possibility that the error correction fails, and the protocol aborts.
4. Privacy amplification. In the last step, Alice and Bob eliminate Eve’s information
about their strings through privacy amplificaion. They obtain two shorter strings
kA = kB ≡ k of length ` ≤ n on which Eve has no information. For this to succeed,
Alice and Bob need to be able to upper bound the amount of information Eve knows
about the correlated data. If the privacy amplification is successful, Alice and Bob
generate a secret key, otherwise, the protocol aborts.
29
3.1.1 Source-replacement scheme
The preparation step of the quantum phase is equivalently described in the source-replacement
scheme, which is convenient scheme to analyze the security of a protocol. The source-
replacement scheme is a thought setup, in which Alice creates a hypothetical bipartite
entangled state (source state)
|Φ〉 =
∑
x
√
p(x)|x〉X |ϕx〉S (3.1)
in her laboratory, keeps the first half for herself and sends the other half to Bob. The states
|x〉 form an orthonormal basis X = {|x〉, x = 0, ..., |S| − 1} of an |S|-dimensional Hilbert
space HX . In order to prepare the state |ϕx〉 on Bob’s side, Alice performs a projective
measurement in the basis X , which triggers the source state to collapse onto the conditional
state |ϕx〉 with probability p(x).
If the signal states are linearly dependent, the source state assumes a more compact
form. We define a d-dimensional subsystem A of the system X, and express the source
state on the “compact” Hilbert space HA ⊗HS
|Φ〉AS =
d−1∑
i=0
√
κi |¯i〉A|i〉S. (3.2)
In this expression, the basis B = {|i〉S; i = 0, ..., d − 1} is the Schmidt basis, and the
coefficients
√
κi are the Schmidt coefficients. They are the eigenbasis and the square
roots of the eigenvalues of the reduced operator φS = trX{|Φ〉XS〈Φ|}. The Schmidt basis
A = {|¯i〉A; i = 0, ..., d − 1} of the system A can be explicitly given by the orthonormal
vectors |¯i〉 = ∑x√p(x)α(x)i |x〉/√κi, where α(x)i = 〈i|ϕx〉 are the coefficients of the signal
states in the Schmidt basis B. In the following, we omit the bar in |¯i〉.
Alice’s projective measurement in the basis X on HX is equal to a measurement MA =
{F xA}x with respect to rank-one POVM elements F xA on the smaller space HA given by
F xA = p(x)
√
ρA
−1|ϕ∗x〉〈ϕ∗x|
√
ρA
−1. (3.3)
Here we define the density matrix of Alice’s reduced state as
ρA = trS{|Φ〉AS〈Φ|}, (3.4)
and the states
|ϕ∗x〉 =
∑
i
〈ϕx|i〉 |i〉 =
∑
i
(α
(x)
i )
∗ |i〉, (3.5)
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where the symbol ∗ denotes the complex conjugate with respect to the Schmidt basis A.
The operators F xA are positive, sum up to the identity, and satisfy the property trA{F xA ⊗
1|Φ〉〈Φ|} = p(x)|ϕx〉〈ϕx|.
3.2 Eavesdropping attacks
Quantum key distribution promises unconditional security. This means that the security of
the key is established without limitations imposed on the computational or a technological
power of the eavesdropper. However, unconditional security only holds within a certain
framework. Outside of the framework, we are not able to claim unconditional security.
The requirements of the framework are the following:
(i) Eve has no access to any device inside Alice and Bob’s laboratories.
(ii) Eve can tamper with the quantum channel at will, but she is limited by the laws of
quantum mechanics.
(iii) Eve can listen to all the messages sent over the classical channel, but the authentica-
tion prevents her from changing the messages. Authentication, which is a well-known
problem in the field of classical cryptography, can be achieved by means of secure
classical authentication algorithms requiring only a short pre-shared secret key.
In this framework, Eve’s most general attack is on the quantum signals. She attaches
a fresh quantum system E ′ (ancilla) to the second half of the source states |Φ〉⊗nAS followed
by a unitary transformation, that takes the joint systems SnE ′ to BnE. She then keeps
the transformed ancilla E for herself, and resends the remaining systems Bn to Bob. After
Eve’s interaction with the signals, but prior to Alice and Bob’s measurements, the state
held by Alice and Bob is described by an unknown (mixed) state ρnAB, instead of n perfect
copies of the source state |Φ〉AS.
Historically, Eve’s attack strategy is divided into three classes.
1. In the individual attack Eve interacts with each of the signals sent by Alice individ-
ually. She attaches a fresh quantum system E ′ to each source state |Φ〉AS and uses
the same unitary UE each time. The unitary takes the composite system SE
′ to BE.
Eve sends B to Bob (see Fig. 3.1), keeps E for herself, and performs a measurement
on each individual system E in order to extract information about the key. Some
protocols have been analyzed under this assumption in Refs. [15, 6, 22]. However,
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Figure 3.1: In the source-replacement scheme, Alice prepares the entangled state |Φ〉. The
system A is kept by Alice, while the system S is sent through the quantum channel to Bob.
Eve attaches ancillas to the signal states and performs a unitary transformation on the
joint system SE, transforming it to BE. She resends the system B to Bob. After Eve’s
interaction, Alice and Bob no longer share a perfect copy of |Φ〉, but a bipartite state ρAB,
which is only partially characterized by their observations.
individual attacks are no longer analyzed in the QKD community, not only because
they are less powerful than other attacks (e.g. collective attacks), but also because
the calculation of the key rate involves an optimization over Eve’s measurement,
which is generally difficult to perform, and does not lead to a composable security
proof (see Sec. 3.3 for the definition of composability).
2. The second type of attack is the collective attack. While in the collective attack the
interaction with the signals is the same as in the individual attack, Eve is allowed to
do a collective measurement on all signals jointly at the end of the protocol. She can
also use all information revealed to her during the classical phase of the protocol. In
particular, under the assumption of collective attacks, ρnAB assumes a product form:
ρnAB = ρ
⊗n
AB.
3. Finally, in the most general attack, the coherent attack, Eve interacts with all the
signals coherently using one large ancilla on all n systems. Under this type of attack
no simplification of ρnAB can be given.
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3.2.1 Collective attacks in the source-replacement scheme
For collective attacks, Eve’s interaction is completely determined by the unitary UE be-
tween each signal and the ancilla. According to the Choi-Jamiolkowski isomorphism, the
transformation UE is equivalently characterized by the purification |Ψ〉ABE of ρAB on the
dilated space HABE. The dimension of the purifying system E is the same as the di-
mension of AB. In order to guarantee unconditional security, we must assume that Eve
can exploit everything allowed by quantum mechanics for her attack, which is realized by
giving her full control over |Ψ〉ABE. Note that to each ρAB an entire class of purifications
|Ψ〉WABE = 1AB ⊗WE|Ψ〉ABE can be constructed, where W is local unitary transformation
on Eve’s system. However, such local transformations on Eve’s system are irrelevant when
quantifying Eve’s knowledge on the key.
After Alice and Bob measure the systems AB of |Ψ〉ABE with respect to the POVMs
MA = {F xA} and MB = {F yB}, the resulting state shared between Alice, Bob and Eve is a
tripartite classical-classical-quantum (ccq) state [31]
ρXY E =
∑
x,y
p(x, y)|x〉〈x|X ⊗ |y〉〈y|Y ⊗ ρxyE (3.6)
where |x〉 and |y〉 are two sets of orthonormal bases,
p(x, y) = tr{F xA ⊗ F yB ρAB} (3.7)
is the probability distribution of the measurement outcomes, and
ρxyE = trAB{F xA ⊗ F yB ⊗ 1E|Ψ〉〈Ψ|}/p(x, y) (3.8)
are Eve’s quantum states conditioned on the event that Alice and Bob’s outcomes were x
and y.
3.3 Key rate formalism
The security proof presented in Refs. [31, 80, 57] provides a bound on the rate at which
Alice and Bob can extract a secret key in the infinite key limit n→∞. The proof is valid
for collective attacks and for one-way classical communication, but can also be extended to
coherent attacks for discrete and continuous-variable schemes via the de Finetti theorems,
and two-way communication [78, 77, 79, 26].
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3.3.1 Security definition
In the classical phase of the protocol, Alice and Bob transform their data into a pair of
shorter key strings kA = kB ≡ k, provided that the protocol did not abort. If we describe
the key k on the classical system K, and Eve’s knowledge about the key at the end of the
protocol by a quantum system Ek, the output of the protocol is a joint classical-quantum
state ρKEk describing the key and Eve’s knowledge.
Ultimately, the security of the key k is defined as its deviation  from an ideal key,
which is a uniformly distributed string about which Eve has no information. For a given
state ρEk held by Eve, a key is defined to be -secure [81], if
1
2
|ρKEk−1K⊗ρEk |1 ≤ , where
|A|1 = tr
√
A†A is the trace norm and 1K is the completely mixed state on the system K
representing the ideal key. The trace norm in the criterion ensures that the protocol fails
to output a key that is identical to the ideal key at most with probability . This security
definition also ensures composability, which means that the key can be securely used in
other applications.
In the asymptotic limit n → ∞ (infinite key limit), the security parameter  can go
to zero. If one considers a non-asymptotic scenario with a finite number of signals, then
 remains finite in general. Finite-size effects is another branch of research in the field of
QKD found for example in Ref. [85].
3.3.2 The Devetak-Winter security proof
At the end of a successful protocol, a secret key of length ` ≤ n is generated. The quantity
of interest for all QKD protocols is the secret key rate
r = lim
n→∞
`
n
. (3.9)
In the infinite key limit, this rate was established by Devetak and Winter in Ref. [31], and
Renner et al. in Refs. [57, 80] against collective attacks by the formula
r(ρXY E) = I(X : Y )− χ(X : E). (3.10)
The first term is the mutual information I(X : Y ) = H(X) − H(X|Y ) between Alice
and Bob’s data and quantifies the amount of bits that need to be sacrificed for the error
correction. According to Shannon’s coding theorem, the fraction of error-free bits that can
be extracted from data distributed according to a probability distribution p(x, y) is given
by I(X : Y ). The amount of privacy amplification necessary to eliminate Eve’s information
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is given by the Holevo quantity, or quantum mutual information, between Alice and Eve
χ(X : E) = H(X) + S(E)− S(X,E). The Holevo quantity is explicitly given by
χ(X : E) = S(ρE)−
∑
x
p(x)S(ρxE), (3.11)
where ρxE is Eve’s state conditioned on x, and ρE =
∑
x p(x)ρ
x
E. For the practical calculation
of the Holevo quantity, often an explicit reference to the system E can be eliminated,
because the entropies S(ρE) and S(ρ
x
E) can be expressed in terms of quantities on the
systems AB: If the state |Ψ〉 is pure, then S(ρAB) = S(ρE). Furthermore, if Alice uses
rank-one POVM elements, then the conditional states ρxBE = trA{F xA ⊗ 1BE|Ψ〉〈Ψ|}/p(x)
are pure, and therefore S(ρxE) = S(ρ
x
B). Thus, the Holevo quantity simplifies to
χ(X : E) = S(ρAB)−
∑
x
p(x)S(ρxB). (3.12)
3.4 Properties of mutual information and Holevo quan-
tity
In this section we give three properties of the classical mutual information and the Holevo
quantity, that were shown in Ref. [34]. At first, we introduce the same notation for the
mutual information and the Holevo quantity as in Ref. [34]. This new notation is more
convenient for our purposes throughout the rest of this thesis.
Let Alice and Bob share a quantum state ρAB, which they measure with respect to
the POVM MAB = {F xA ⊗ F yB : F xA ∈ MA, F yB ∈ MB}. We always assume that Eve
holds the purification |Ψ〉 of ρAB. Instead of denoting the mutual information I(X : Y ) in
dependence of the registers XY of the measured state ρXY , we rather specify the mutual
information in dependence of the quantum state ρAB and the POVM MAB,
I(ρAB,MAB) := I(X : Y ). (3.13)
On the other hand, the Holevo quantity can be calculated from the cq-state ρXE which is
the result of Alice’s measurement of ρAE = trB |Ψ〉〈Ψ|. Therefore, we denote the Holevo
quantity
χ(ρAB,MA) := χ(X : E) (3.14)
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as a function of ρAB and the measurement MA. In the new notation the key rate r(ρXY E)
in Eq. (3.10) is a function of the quantum state ρAB
r(ρAB) = I(ρAB,MAB)− χ(ρAB,MA), (3.15)
The first property in this section deals with the convexity of the classical mutual in-
formation. We show that I(ρAB,MAB) is convex in the argument ρAB, if the a priori
probability distribution p(x) = tr{F xA ρA} is fixed. We call this feature “weak convexity”
to indicate that convexity only holds with the restriction on p(x).
Theorem 7 (Weak convexity). Consider the states ρAB, σAB and the convex sum
ρ¯AB = λρAB + (1− λ)σAB for λ ∈ [0, 1] with measurement outcomes distributed according
to the probability distributions p(x, y) = tr{F xA ⊗ F yB ρAB}, q(x, y) = tr{F xA ⊗ F yB σAB} and
p¯(x, y) = λp(x, y) + (1 − λ)q(x, y). If the probability distributions satisfy p(x) = q(x) for
all x, then the mutual information is convex in the sense that
I(ρ¯AB,MAB) ≤ λI(ρAB,MAB) + (1− λ)I(σAB,MAB). (3.16)
The proof of this theorem is given in Appendix A.1.
The second property is about the concavity of the Holevo quantity χ(ρAB,MA) as a
function of ρAB.
Theorem 8 (Concavity). Consider the states ρAB, σAB and the convex sum ρ¯AB =
λρAB + (1− λ)σAB for λ ∈ [0, 1]. Then, the Holevo quantity is concave:
χ(ρ¯AB,MA) ≥ λχ(ρAB,MA) + (1− λ)χ(σAB,MA). (3.17)
The proof of this theorem is in Appendix A.2.
The third property deals with unitary transformations of the input state ρAB.
Lemma 2 Consider the states ρAB and σAB = U⊗V ρABU †⊗V †, where U and V are uni-
taries on the systems A and B. The mutual information and the Holevo quantity transform
as follows:
I(σAB,MAB) = I(ρAB, U
† ⊗ V †MABU ⊗ V ), (3.18)
χ(σAB,MA) = χ(ρAB, U
†MAU). (3.19)
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In these expressions the transformed measurements are defined by
U †MAU := {U †F xAU} (3.20)
V †MBV := {V †F yBV } (3.21)
U † ⊗ V † MAB U ⊗ V := {U † ⊗ V †(F xA ⊗ F yB) U ⊗ V }. (3.22)
The proof of this lemma is based on the cyclic property of the trace, and that the von
Neumann entropy is unitarily invariant: S(UρU †) = S(ρ).
3.5 Postselection
This section describes the postselection step similar to Refs. [34, 35]. Usually, the key
is not directly extracted from the state ρXY E, because the data might be only weakly
correlated. Alice and Bob typically postselect on highly correlated data before proceeding
with the protocol. A typical example is the basis sifting. In many QKD protocols Alice
encodes the values of the key into quantum states in various bases, and Bob randomly
chooses to measure in one of those bases. If they measured in the same basis, their data is
typically strongly correlated, but if they measure in different bases, the data is only weakly
correlated. In this case, they need to be able to identify where their basis choice matched,
so that they can keep those signals with matching basis, and discard the others. Another
possible postselection is to discard those events, where Bob did not record a detection
event, because the signal got lost.
Let us first examine the classical version of the postselection step, which starts with the
ccq state ρXY E. Alice and Bob calculate to each measurement outcome x and y some values
f(x) = v and f(y) = w, and announcing v and w publicly. Typically, the announcements
v and w do not reveal any information about the key. Based on the announcements, Alice
and Bob decide if they want to keep the data or discard it (filtering). For example, they
only keep data with matching announcements, v = w ≡ u. In the case of sifting, v and w
plays the role of a basis announcement.
By identifying the values v and w, Alice and Bob effectively partition their original
POVMs MA and MB into subsets m
v
A = {F xA : f(x) = v} and mwB = {F yB : f(y) = w},
each containing the POVM elements labeled by the value v or w of the announcement.
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3.5.1 Quantum description of postselection
The quantum version of the postselection procedure is described by a two-step process: in
the first step, the announcement is described by a coarse-grained measurement, represented
by a quantum map E , with the classical outcomes u or “discard”. In the second step, a
refined measurement yields the final data.
The quantum map E is described by the Kraus operators KuA ⊗ KuB that are acting
on the state ρAB. Since only events with w = v ≡ u are kept, the Kraus operators come
in pairs with the same index u. There is also a Kraus operator corresponding to the
discarded events. The Kraus operators with index u satisfy
∑
uK
u†
A K
u
A⊗Ku†B KuB ≤ 1, and
are related to the POVM elements in the sets muA and m
u
B by the rule K
u
A =
√∑
muA
F xA
and KuB =
√∑
muB
F yB. For each Kraus operator, the outcome u is announced to all parties
and stored in three classical registers A¯, B¯ and E¯ held by Alice, Bob and Eve, respectively.
The action of the quantum map on ρAB results thus in a state
E(ρAB) =
∑
u
p(u)Ku[ρAB]⊗ |u〉〈u|A¯B¯E¯, (3.23)
with normalized conditional states
Ku[ρAB] = KuA ⊗KuBρAB(KuA ⊗KuB)†/p˜(u) (3.24)
p˜(u) = tr{KuA ⊗KuBρAB(KuA ⊗KuB)†}. (3.25)
each appearing with probability p(u) = p˜(u)
pkept
. The probability that the state ρAB is kept
during the postselection is pkept =
∑
u p˜(u).
The announcement and filtering step is followed by the refined measurement. Each
Ku[ρAB] is measured with respect to a new (normalized) joint POVM MuAB = {F x,uA ⊗F y,uB :
F x,uA ∈MuA, F y,uB ∈MuB} conditioned on u. The POVMs
MuA = {F x,uA } = {(KuA)−1F xA(Ku†A )−1 : F xA ∈muA}, (3.26)
MuB = {F y,uB } = {(KuB)−1F yB(Ku†B )−1 : F yB ∈muB}, (3.27)
are constructed by renormalizing the sets muA and m
u
B. The inverses (K
u
A)
−1 and (KuB)
−1
are pseudo-inverses, which means they are only defined on the non-zero subspace of KuA
and KuB. The new measurement guarantees that measuring Ku[ρAB] with respect to MuAB
results in the same distribution as measuring ρAB with respect to MA ⊗MB followed by
classical postselection.
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3.5.2 Key rate formula with postselection
We choose to calculate the key rate for each coinciding announcement u independently
(alternatively, one could also merge the data from the different subsets u, and extract
a key from the joint data string). Thus, Eve is given the purification |Ψu〉 of the state
Ku[ρAB]. If we denote the state after the measurement by ρuXY E, the key rate including
postselection is
r¯(E(ρAB)) =
∑
u
p(u)r(ρuXY E). (3.28)
Each individual rate r(ρuXY E) = I(Ku[ρAB],MuAB)−χ(Ku[ρAB],MuA) is calculated according
Eq. (3.10). We denote in the following the mutual information and Holevo quantity
including postselection by
I¯(E(ρAB)) :=
∑
u
p(u) I(Ku[ρAB],MuAB), (3.29)
χ¯(E(ρAB)) :=
∑
u
p(u) χ(Ku[ρAB],MuA). (3.30)
3.6 Key rate optimization problem
If Alice and Bob knew Eve’s attack strategy, the calculation of the key rate would be
straightforward. They would know ρAB exactly and could estimate the necessary amount
of privacy amplification and error correction. Typically, though, Alice and Bob do not
know Eve’s attack and hold only partial information about ρAB, which they acquired
during the parameter estimation. In addition, since the system A never leaves Alice’s lab
(see Fig. 3.1), Alice and Bob know that the reduced density matrix ρA = trB ρAB remains
unchanged, as already anticipated in equation (3.4). However, unless Alice and Bob’s
measurements are sufficient to obtain a complete (tomographic) parametrization of ρAB,
there could be many states ρAB that are compatible with p(x, y) and ρA. For what follows,
it is useful to make the following definition
Definition 17 The set Γ contains all bipartite states ρAB that are compatible with the
measurement outcomes p(x, y) and that have a given reduced state ρA.
In order to be on the safe side, we must give Eve the freedom to chose any attack that
is compatible with the states ρAB in Γ. Among all these possible attacks, the one that
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generates the lowest key rate,
rmin = inf
ρAB∈Γ
r¯(E(ρAB)) = inf
ρAB∈Γ
{
I¯obs − χ¯(E(ρAB))
}
, (3.31)
is defined as the optimal attack. In this expression, we wrote I¯obs for the mutual informa-
tion, because it is determined from actual measurement data and is independent of ρAB.
Since all density matrices ρAB ∈ Γ yield the same measurement data, we can introduce
I¯obs = I¯(E(ρAB)). Only the amount of privacy amplification, χ¯(E(ρAB)), depends on ρAB.
If Alice and Bob want to guarantee that their protocol is secure, they must assume
that Eve performed the optimal attack. Hence, they cannot generate a secret key at a
rate higher than rmin for the given protocol. We define the state associated to the optimal
attack by ρoptAB.
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Chapter 4
Symmetries in quantum key
distribution
4.1 Introduction
In the previous chapter we introduced the key rate optimization problem under collective
attacks, but without an explicit recipe how to actually calculate the optimal attack. In
this chapter we calculate the key rates of several protocols and provide a simplification of
the optimization problem by exploiting the inherent symmetries of the protocols.
The key rate optimization problem is greatly simplified if we can make the assumption
that the optimal attack carries a certain symmetry. In previous publications [80, 57], it
was typically assumed that the observations p(x, y) are only compatible with symmetric
attacks in order to simplify the calculations. In this chapter we analyze protocols in a
scenario where the parameter estimation is based on a coarse-grained version of p(x, y). In
this scenario we show that the optimal attack can always be assumed to be a symmetric
attack, if the protocol and the postselection exhibit sufficient symmetries. Protocols with
orthonormal bases as signal states and sifting, for example, exhibit enough symmetries to
support the claim of a symmetric optimal attack.
We calculate the optimal attack for qubit-based protocols (e.g. the BB84 [10] and the
6-state protocol [15]) and for protocols in d-dimensional Hilbert spaces using mutually
unbiased bases (MUBs) (e.g. protocols with 2 MUBs, d+1 MUBs [22] or d MUBs). The
security of these protocols has been studied previously in Refs. [15, 6, 36, 16, 22, 33] for
individual attacks. In Ref. [87], the security was proven for protocols with 2 and d + 1
MUBs using the security proof methods of Refs. [31, 57].
41
Additionally, we observe that some classes of QKD protocols, which share some common
symmetry features, can be proven to have the same optimal attack, despite having different
sets of signal states. As an example, we present qubit protocols which have the same
optimal attack as the BB84 protocol or the 6-state protocol, and we give criteria to identify
these protocols.
All the results of this chapter have been published in Ref. [34].
4.2 Symmetries in protocols
In this section we show that the density operator ρoptAB corresponding to the optimal attack
lies in a “symmetrized” set Γ¯, instead of Γ. If ρoptAB lies in Γ¯, we call the optimal attack a
symmetric optimal attack. The symmetric states in the set Γ¯ are easily characterized using
representation theory and Schur’s lemma shown in Sec. 2.4.
4.2.1 Symmetries of signal states and measurements
Let G be a group with a unitary representation {Ug; g ∈ G} on the Hilbert space H of the
signal states S = {|ϕx〉}x of a protocol. The group is said to be the symmetry group of the
signal states, if S is G-invariant, namely, if for all |ϕx〉 ∈ S, the transformed states
|ϕg(x)〉 := Ug|ϕx〉 (4.1)
are again in the set S for all g ∈ G and all |ϕx〉 ∈ S. Here the index g(x) denotes the index
of the state Ug|ϕx〉.
If the set of signal states of a protocol is G-invariant, the POVM elements F xA and the
reduced state ρA appearing the source-replacement scheme in Eqs. (3.3) and (3.4) also
have certain symmetry properties.
Lemma 3 If the initial probability distribution p(x) is uniform (p(x) = 1/|S| for all x)
and the set of signal states is G-invariant, then the POVM MA = {F xA}x and the reduced
state ρA are G
∗-invariant, namely
U∗gF
x
AU
T
g = F
g(x)
A ∈MA, (4.2)
U∗g ρAU
T
g = ρA, (4.3)
for all g ∈ G. The symbols ∗ and T denote the complex conjugate and the transpose with
respect to the fixed Schmidt basis B.
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We prove Lemma 3 in Appendix A.3. Note that, with our particular definition of ∗ and T
with respect to the Schmidt basis, the operators U∗g and U
T
g are well-defined.
In the following, we only consider protocols in which Bob’s POVM MB = {F yB}y is
equipped with the G-invariance
UgF
y
BU
†
g = F
g(y)
B ∈MB. (4.4)
4.2.2 Coarse-grained parameter estimation
In many cases, the parameter estimation is based on a set of coarse-grained or averaged
quantities, instead of the more detailed distribution p(x, y). Often there is only one coarse-
grained quantity, Q, for example, the quantum bit error rate (QBER) averaged over all
signal states.
The coarse-grained quantity Q is defined as a linear function of the probability distri-
bution p(x, y) with the invariance property
Q[{p(x, y)}] = Q[{pg(x, y)}] ∀g ∈ G. (4.5)
In this expression, the distribution
pg(x, y) = tr{F g(x)A ⊗ F g(y)B ρAB} (4.6)
is generated by relabelling the POVM elements F xA ⊗ F yB by F g(x)A ⊗ F g(y)B .
In a coarse-grained parameter estimation scenario, the set of states that are compatible
with Q and ρA is given by Γave. This new set is a superset of the previously defined set
Γ, because for each ρAB ∈ Γ, an entire equivalence class of states {Ug[ρAB] : g ∈ G} of the
form
Ug[ρAB] = U∗g ⊗ UgρABUTg ⊗ U †g , (4.7)
are found in Γave. These states are (i) compatible withQ, because of the invariance property
of Q, and (ii) have a reduced state trB{Ug[ρAB]} = ρA because of the G∗-invariance of ρA.
Furthermore, for all ρAB ∈ Γ, the set Γave contains all symmetrized states
T G[ρAB] ≡ ρ¯AB = 1|G|
∑
g∈G
ρ
(Ug)
AB , (4.8)
because of the linearity of Q. In this definition |G| is the number of group elements in G.
The map T G is commonly known as the twirling map in the literature. The symmetrized
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states form a subset Γ¯ of the set Γave. The subset Γ¯ is obtained by applying the twirling
map to all density operators ρAB in Γave.
The symmetrized states have some nice properties: they commute with all tensor prod-
ucts U∗g ⊗ Ug, [
ρ¯AB, U
∗
g ⊗ Ug
]
= 0 ∀g ∈ G. (4.9)
Furthermore, a purification of ρ¯AB can be chosen to satisfy the invariance
U∗g ⊗ Ug ⊗ Ug ⊗ U∗g |Ψ〉 = |Ψ〉 ∀g ∈ G. (4.10)
The existence of this particular choice of the purification has been proven in Ref. [25] for
permutation groups, but the same proof holds for arbitrary groups as well.
In the coarse-grained parameter estimation scenario, the optimization of the key rate is
changed. Since the set Γave is a superset of Γ, we can safely evaluate the key rate r¯(E(ρAB))
over the enlarged set without running the risk of underestimating Eve. Therefore, we can
bound the key rate by
rmin = inf
ρAB∈Γ
r¯(E(ρAB)) ≥ inf
ρAB∈Γave
r¯(E(ρAB)). (4.11)
4.2.3 Symmetric optimal attack
We show here that for any state ρAB ∈ Γave, the key rate is bounded by
r(ρ¯AB) ≤ r(ρAB). (4.12)
Proof. Recall that the key rate is defined as the difference r(ρ¯AB) = I(ρAB,MAB) −
χ(ρAB,MA). Since the POVMs MA and MB are G
∗- and G-invariant (see Eqs. (4.2) and
(4.4)), we apply Lemma 2 to I and χ, which shows that all states in the equivalence class
{Ug[ρAB] : g ∈ G} in Γave yield equivalent key rates
r(Ug[ρAB]) = r(ρAB) (4.13)
Moreover, because the reduced state ρA of each state in Γave is invariant by definition, the
a priori probability distribution p(x) = trA{F xAρA} is fixed throughout the entire set Γave.
Using the theorems about the convexity and concavity of I and χ (Theorems 7 and 8), it
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follows that the key rate of the symmetrized state ρ¯AB is bounded by
r(ρ¯AB) = I(ρ¯AB,MAB)− χ(ρ¯AB,MA) (4.14)
≤ 1|G|
∑
g
I(Ug[ρAB],MAB)− χ(Ug[ρAB],MA) (4.15)
=
1
|G|
∑
g
r(Ug[ρAB]). (4.16)
We can now use the equivalence property in Eq. (4.13) to show that
1
|G|
∑
g
r(Ug[ρAB]) = r(ρAB). (4.17)
This last equation together with Eq. (4.16) implies the desired result. 
If there is a postselection step in a protocol, we need to extend the equivalence property
in Eq. (4.13) and the convexity property in Eq. (4.16) to the key rate r¯(E(ρAB)), namely,
r¯(E(ρAB)) = r¯(E(Ug[ρAB])), (4.18)
r¯(E(ρ¯AB)) ≤ 1|G|
∑
g
r¯(E(Ug[ρAB])). (4.19)
These properties do not necessarily hold in general. For example, under certain postselec-
tion strategies, the restriction on p(x) that is needed in Theorem 7 may be violated. We
will later analyze a family of protocols with a special postselection where the convexity
and equivalence properties of key rate r¯(E(ρAB)) always holds.
However, if Eqs. (4.19) and (4.18) hold, then for any state ρAB ∈ Γave, the key rate is
bounded by
r(E(ρAB)) ≥ r(E(ρ¯AB)). (4.20)
This implies that the optimization can be carried out over the symmetric set Γ¯
inf
ρAB∈Γave
r¯(E(ρAB)) ≥ inf
ρ¯AB∈Γ¯
r¯(E(ρ¯AB)). (4.21)
Therefore, we can continue the estimation of the key rate in Eq. (4.11) and restrict the
search for the optimal attack to a search over the set Γ¯:
rmin ≥ inf
ρ¯AB∈Γ¯
r¯(E(ρ¯AB)). (4.22)
In Fig. 4.1 we represent the transition from Γ to Γ¯ schematically. The symmetrized states
ρ¯AB can be characterized using representation theory, as shown for two examples in Sec.
2.4.
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Figure 4.1: By only using coarse-grained quantities Q for parameter estimation, the set
Γ is replaced by a bigger set Γave. Using the weak convexity of the key rate, the optimal
attack can be chosen from a symmetrized set Γ¯.
4.3 A family of protocols with symmetric optimal at-
tack
We construct a family of protocols, where the set S contains only complete sets of or-
thonormal bases (ONB), and where Alice and Bob postselect on data that they measured
in the same basis (sifting). We call this family of protocols ONB protocols, and show
that the convexity (4.19) and equivalence (4.18) properties of the key rate r¯(E(ρAB)) hold.
Therefore, by choosing to do a coarse-grained parameter estimation, the optimal attack
can always be assumed to be symmetric for ONB protocols.
4.3.1 Protocols with orthonormal bases (ONB)
Let us denote a basis of a d-dimensional Hilbert space by Bβ = {|ϕ(β,k)〉 : k = 0, ..., d −
1}, where β is the basis index. Note that in the following the states |ϕ(β,k)〉 carry two
independent indices (β, k) instead of only one. We identify the set of signal states of an
ONB protocol by
SL = {Bβ : β ∈ L}, (4.23)
where L is the set from which the bases β are drawn. For each protocol the set L is fixed
and contains |L| elements.
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Each signal state |ϕ(β,k)〉 is chosen with equal a priori probability p(β, k) = 1/(d · |L|).
This implies that Alice’s reduced state ρA is proportional to the identity ρA = 1/d. Thus,
Alice’s POVM elements in Eq. (3.3) reduce to the projectors
F
(β,k)
A =
1
|L| |ϕ
∗
(β,k)〉〈ϕ∗(β,k)| (4.24)
with |ϕ∗(β,k)〉 =
∑
i |i〉〈ϕ(β,k)|i〉 defined in Eq. (3.5). On Bob’s side, we construct a POVM
that is isomorphic to Alice’s POVM:
F
(β,k)
B =
1
|L| |ϕ(β,k)〉〈ϕ(β,k)|. (4.25)
4.3.2 Postselection on the same basis
Alice and Bob postselect on those measurement outcomes, which they performed in the
same basis. In this particular case, Alice and Bob’s announcement u is the basis β. This
announcement partitions the POVMs MA and MB into |L| disjoint sets mvA = {F (β,k)A :
β = v} and mwB = {F (β,k)B : β = w}. Alice and Bob then decide to keep only those
events which were measured and announced the the same basis v = w ≡ u. Because
the POVM elements in each mvA and m
w
B add up the the identity, each Krauss operator
KuA = K
u
B = 1/
√|L|, is proportional to the identity for all u. Consequently,
Ku[ρAB] = ρAB
and the new POVMs
MuA = {|L| F (β,k)A : β = u} (4.26)
MuB = {|L| F (β,k)B : β = u} (4.27)
are simply rescaled versions of the old POVMs. Furthermore, each basis is kept with equal
probability p(u) = 1|L| .
4.3.3 Convexity and equivalence property for ONB protocols
The parameter estimation for many QKD protocols is typically based on the average error
rate Q, defined as follows.
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Definition 18 The average error rate is the probability that Alice sent the signal state
|ϕ(β,k)〉, but Bob received an orthogonal state |ϕ(β,k′)〉 (k′ 6= k), averaged over all k and all
bases β
Q =
1
|L|
∑
β∈L
Qβ, (4.28)
where Qβ =
∑
k,k′
k′ 6=k
tr
{
|ϕ∗(β,k)〉〈ϕ∗(β,k)| ⊗ |ϕ(β,k′)〉〈ϕ(β,k′)|ρAB
}
is the average error rate found
in each basis, and |L| is the number of bases in the set L.
We now prove the following theorem for ONB protocols.
Theorem 9 For ONB protocols with sifting on matching bases, the key rate r¯(E(ρAB))
satisfies the convexity and the equivalence properties in Eqs. (4.19) and (4.18).
Using this theorem we can conclude that the optimal attack is symmetric for all ONB
protocols, if the parameter estimation is coarse-grained. The key rate is therefore given by
rmin in Eq. 4.22.
Proof. Recall that the key rate is define as
r¯(E(ρAB)) = 1|L|
∑
u
(
I(ρAB,M
u
AB)− χ(ρAB,MuA)
)
. (4.29)
The a priori probability distribution is fixed for each ρAB, because ρA is the identity.
Therefore, we use Theorems 7 and 8 to show that each term I and χ in the sum satisfies
the convexity and concavity property, respectively:
I(ρ¯AB,M
u
AB) ≤
1
|G|
∑
g
I(Ug[ρAB], ,MuAB), (4.30)
χ(ρ¯AB,M
u
A) ≥
1
|G|
∑
g
χ(Ug[ρAB], ,MuA). (4.31)
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From these two properties, it follows directly that the key rate is convex as a function of
ρAB:
r¯(E(ρ¯AB)) = 1|L|
∑
u
(
I(ρ¯AB,M
u
AB)− χ(ρ¯AB,MuA)
)
(4.32)
≤ 1|L|
∑
u
( 1
|G|
∑
g
I(Ug[ρAB],MuAB)−
1
|G|
∑
g
χ(Ug[ρAB],MuA)
)
(4.33)
=
1
|G|
∑
g
r¯(E(Ug[ρAB])). (4.34)
Next, we show the equivalence property of r¯(E(ρAB)) under the symmetry group G of
the signal states. Since any unitary acts like a basis transformation, the sets MuA and M
u
B
effectively inherit the G∗- and G-invariance from the individual POVM elements F (β,k)A and
F
(β,k)
B . More precisely, the sets
M
g(u)
A := U
∗
gM
u
AU
T
g , (4.35)
M
g(u)
B := UgM
u
BU
†
g , (4.36)
are again POVMs corresponding to the announcement with index g(u) in the protocol.
Using Eqs. (4.35) and (4.36), and applying Lemma 2, each term I and χ transforms as
follows under group unitaries:
I(Ug[ρAB],MuAB) = I(ρAB,Mg
−1(u)
AB ) (4.37)
χ(Ug[ρAB],MuA) = χ(ρAB,Mg
−1(u)
A ). (4.38)
From these two equations it follows that for each Ug[ρAB]
r¯(E(Ug[ρAB])) = 1|L|
∑
u
(
I(Ug[ρAB],MuAB)− χ(Ug[ρAB],MuA)
)
(4.39)
=
1
|L|
∑
u
(
I(ρAB,M
g−1(u)
AB )− χ(ρAB,Mg
−1(u)
A )
)
(4.40)
=
1
|L|
∑
g(u′)
(
I(ρAB,M
u′
AB)− χ(ρAB,Mu
′
A )
)
(4.41)
=
1
|L|
∑
u′
(
I(ρAB,M
u′
AB)− χ(ρAB,Mu
′
A )
)
(4.42)
= r¯(E(ρAB)). (4.43)
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In the third last line, we made a index transformation u′ = g−1(u). In the second last line
we used the fact that
∑
g(u) =
∑
u for any g ∈ G, because g(u) is just a permutation of
the index u. 
4.4 Classes of protocols with the same optimal attack
and key rate
We observe that for certain protocols with different signal states, the same attack ρoptAB is
found to be optimal. In this section we analyze under what conditions two protocols P
and P ′ from the ONB family have the same optimal attack and same key rate.
Let the sets of signal states S and S′ be G- and G′-invariant, respectively. We denote
the average error rate for each protocol by Q and Q′. Let us denote Alice and Bob’s
POVM elements by F xA and F
y
B for the protocol P and by F
′
A
x′ and F ′B
y′ for the protocol
P ′. The POVMs conditioned on the basis announcement u given in Eqs. (4.35) and (4.36)
are denoted by MuA and M
u
B for protocol P and M
′u′
A and M
′u′
B for protocol P
′. The sets
characterizing the possible symmetric attacks are denoted by Γ¯ and Γ¯′. We also define the
set of twirled states as follows
Definition 19 The sets of all twirled bipartite states ρ¯AB with respect to the group G is
TG = {T G[ρAB]|ρAB ∈ HA ⊗HB}.
The following theorem states the criteria under which two protocols have the same optimal
attack and the same key rate.
Theorem 10 If the following three conditions are satisfied, the protocols P and P ′ have
the same optimal attack and the same key rate
(I) TG = TG′.
(II) The subset of TG with fixed Q is the same as the subset of TG′ with fixed Q
′.
(III) There exists a third group H with a representation {Wh;h ∈ H}, such that G and
G′ are subgroups of H, with the following properties:
(a) TH = TG = TG′, and
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(b) for all POVM elements F xA ∈MA and F ′Ax
′ ∈M′A there exists a Wh(x,x′) in H
such that
|L|2W ∗h(x,x′)F xAW Th(x,x′) = |L′|2F ′Ax
′
. (4.44)
Note that IIIb also implies the relation |L|2Wh(x,x′)F xBW †h(x,x′) = |L′|2F ′Bx
′
for Bob’s
measurement operators defined in equation (4.25).
Proof. We show that the optimization of the key rate in Eq. (4.22) leads to the same
optimal ρoptAB and the same key rate for both protocols. There are two parts to the proof.
First, from (I) and (II) it follows that Γ¯ = Γ¯′ by definition. Therefore, the set over which
the key rate is optimized is identical for the two protocols. Second, we show that the
mutual information and the Holevo quantity
I¯(E(ρAB)) = 1|L|
∑
u
I(ρAB,M
u
AB), (4.45)
χ¯(E(ρAB)) = 1|L|
∑
u
χ(ρAB,M
u
A). (4.46)
are identical for both protocols for all states in the set Γ¯. We show this for the example of
the mutual information, but the same arguments apply to the Holevo quantity as well.
For ONB protocols it is possible to uniquely relabel the unitaries Wh(x,x′) by Wh(u,u′),
where u and u′ are the basis announcements of the protocols P and P ′, respectively. We
can now restate (IIIb) as a condition on the POVMs MuA and M
u
B. For each pair (u, u
′)
there exists unitaries Wh(u,u′), such that
W ∗h(u,u′)M
u
AW
T
h(u,u′) = M
′u′
A (4.47)
Wh(u,u′)M
u
BW
†
h(u,u′) = M
′u′
B . (4.48)
Furthermore, for a fixed u0 in P , there exist unitaries Wh(u,u0) = Wh(u′,u0)Wh(u,u′),
connecting all u in P to the fixed u0. Similarly, there exist unitaries Wh(u′,u′0) connecting
all u′ in P ′ to a fixed u′0. Using the invariance ρ¯AB = W
∗
h ⊗Whρ¯AB(W ∗h ⊗Wh)† and Lemma
2, the mutual information I¯(E(ρ¯AB)) of P and I¯(E ′(ρ¯AB)) of P ′ satisfy that
I¯(E(ρ¯AB)) = 1|L|
|L|∑
u=1
I(ρ¯AB,M
u
AB) = I(ρ¯AB,M
u0
AB),
I¯(E ′(ρ¯AB)) = 1|L′|
|L′|∑
u′=1
I(ρ¯AB,M
′u′
AB) = I(ρ¯AB,M
′u′0
AB).
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Furthermore, since there exists also a unitary Wh(u0,u′0) that connects u0 to u
′
0, the same
argumentation implies that I(ρ¯AB,M
u0
AB) = I(ρ¯AB,M
′u′0
AB) and thus,
I¯(E(ρ¯AB)) = I¯(E ′(ρ¯AB)).
A similar argumentation also holds for the Holevo quantity.
It follows now that the same function r¯(E(ρAB)) = r¯(E ′(ρAB)) appears in the optimiza-
tion of protocols P and P ′. Since these are now identical optimization problems, they must
have the same solution, and therefore the same optimal attack and same key rate. 
In the next section we will give some examples of protocols with the same optimal
attack. We analyze qubit protocols, where we can make use of the point group symmetries,
which are commonly used and well studied in the field of crystallography.
4.5 Examples
4.5.1 Generalized Pauli group symmetry
We analyze protocols from the ONB family with signal states that are invariant under
the generalized Pauli Πd group in d dimensions. This group is very well studied, and the
symmetrized states ρ¯AB have a particularly simple from. Furthermore, this group will also
appear in the next chapter of this thesis (Chapter 5).
Definition 20 The generalized Pauli group Πd in d dimensions has d
2 elements. The set
of unitaries
Ur,s =
d−1∑
k=0
ωks|k + r〉〈k|, ω = e2pii/d, (4.49)
for r, s = 0, ..., d − 1 form an irreducible unitary representation of Πd on a d-dimensional
Hilbert space. The group has two generators Z := U0,1 and X := U1,0, from which the
entire group is generated by the relation Ur,s = X
rZs.
A nice property of the generalized Pauli group is that twirling map T Pauli generates
Bell-diagonal states
T Pauli[ρAB] = ρBellAB =
d−1∑
r,s=0
ur,s|Ur,s〉〈Ur,s|, (4.50)
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with eigenvalues ur,s ≥ 0 that satisfy
∑
r,s ur,s = 1. The eigenvectors |Ur,s〉 = 1√d
∑
k ω
ks|k+
r〉|k〉 are called Bell states and form a maximally entangled basis of H⊗2. We show
this property by first expanding an arbitrary state ρAB in the Bell basis with coefficients
um,n,m,′,n′ ,
ρAB =
∑
m,n
∑
m′,n′
um,n,m′,n′|Um,n〉〈Um′,n′|. (4.51)
If we apply the twirling map T Pauli to ρAB, and use the relation that U∗r,s ⊗ Ur,s|Um,n〉 =
ω−sm+rn|Um,n〉, we find that the diagonal elements remain unchanged,
1
d2
um,n,m,n
∑
r,s
U∗r,s ⊗ Ur,s|Um,n〉〈Um,n|(U∗r,s ⊗ Ur,s)† (4.52)
=
1
d2
um,n,m,n
∑
r,s
|Um,n〉〈Um,n| (4.53)
= um,n,m,n ≡ um,n, (4.54)
and the off-diagonal elements disappear,
1
d2
um,n,m′,n′
∑
r,s
U∗r,s ⊗ Ur,s|Um,n〉〈Um′,n′|(U∗r,s ⊗ Ur,s)† (4.55)
=
1
d2
um,n,m′,n′
∑
r,s
ω−s(m−m
′)ωr(n−n
′)|Um,n〉〈Um′,n′| (4.56)
= 0. (4.57)
As shown in Refs. [22, 24], the general form of the purification of ρBellAB is given by
|ΨBell〉 = ∑r,s√ur,s|Ur,s〉|Ur,d−s〉. The representation Ur,s is irreducible. Because the com-
plex conjugate representation with the unitaries U∗r,s is also irreducible on Hd, it follows
from Schur’s lemma that the reduced state ρBellA =
1
d
is proportional to the identity.
4.5.2 Protocols with mutually unbiased bases
Mutually unbiased bases (MUBs), which were first introduced in Refs. [53, 52], are a
common choice for the signal states of QKD protocols. For example, in the qubit space,
the BB84 and the 6-state protocol use 2 and 3 MUBs, respectively. In higher-dimensional
Hilbert spaces, MUB protocols have been studied in Refs. [7, 16, 22, 32, 33, 19].
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MUBs are orthonormal bases Bα = {|ψα1 〉, |ψα2 〉, ..., |ψαd−1〉} on d-dimensional Hilbert
spaces with the property |〈ψαk |ψα′k′ 〉| = 1√d for all k, k′ = 0, ..., d− 1 and α 6= α′.
The eigenbases of two generalized Pauli operators (for example Z and X) form two
MUBs in any dimension d. It was shown in Ref. [95] that there exist at most d+ 1 MUBs
for a d-dimensional Hilbert space. Up to now, no explicite construction of the d+ 1 MUBs
is known for an arbitrary dimensions d. If, however, d is a prime number, the existence
of exactly d + 1 MUBs was proven in Ref. [95], and a construction of these d + 1 MUBs
was given in Ref. [4] based on the eigenbases of the d + 1 generalized Pauli operators Z,
ZX, ZX2, ... , ZXd−2, and ZXd−1. The eigenbasis of the operator Z is denoted by the
standard basis with the index Z,
BZ = {|ψZ1 〉, |ψZ2 〉, ..., |ψZd−1〉}, (4.58)
|ψZk 〉 = |k〉, (4.59)
and the eigenbases of the operators XZβ with indices β = 0, ..., d− 1 by
Bβ = {|ψβ1 〉, |ψβ2 〉, ..., |ψβd−1〉}, (4.60)
|ψβk 〉 =
1√
d
d−1∑
j=0
ω−kjω−βsj |j〉, (4.61)
where sj =
1
2
(d − j)(d + j − 1), ω = e2pii/d, and where |j〉 are the basis vectors of the
standard basis BZ .
Let us consider protocols, where the set of signal states SL contains a selection of the
Pauli-MUBs. We call these protocols Pauli-MUB protocols. In a slight generalization of
the result of theorem 2.2 in Ref. [4], we can show that the action of any Pauli operator
Ur,s on the eigenstates of the Pauli eigenbasis Bα for α ∈ {Z, 0, 1, ..., d − 1} permutes the
eigenstates without changing the basis index α. Using this invariance, the set of signal
states SL is invariant under the generalized Pauli group (Pauli-invariant).
The key rate of Pauli-MUB protocols
Unfortunately, the full symmetry group of a set SL of Pauli-MUBs is not known explicitly.
Thus, one cannot simply write down the general form of the symmetrized states ρ¯AB.
However, in a first step, we can exploit the invariance of the set SL with respect to the
generalized Pauli group. This partial symmetry implies that the optimal attack ρoptAB must
lie in the subset ΓBell containing only Bell-diagonal states defined in Eq. (4.50).
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Since the Pauli-MUB protocols belong to the ONB family, Eqs. (4.45) and (4.46)
can be used to calculate the mutual information I¯ and the Holevo quantity χ¯, as well
as Eqs. (4.26) and (4.27) to calculate the conditional POVMs MαA = {|ψ∗αk 〉〈ψ∗αk |}k and
MαB = {|ψαk 〉〈ψαk |}k. Knowing these formulas, we calculate the conditional states on Bob’s
side
ρ
(α,k)
B =
∑
r,s
ur,s〈ψ∗αk |Ur,s〉〈Ur,s|ψ∗αk 〉/N. (4.62)
up to a normalization constant N for each α ∈ {Z, 0, 1, ..., d − 1}, and for Bell-diagonal
states ρBellAB . In the following calculations, all operations are done modulo d, and in par-
ticular, the indices are to be understood modulo d. The overlaps in ρ
(α,k)
B are found to
be
〈ψ∗Zk |Ur,s〉 =
1√
d
ω(k−r)s|k − r〉, (4.63)
〈ψ∗βk |Ur,s〉 =
1√
d
ω−kr−
β
2
(r−r2)|ψβk−(s+βr)〉, (4.64)
for Z and for β ∈ {0, ..., d− 1}, respectively. After reinserting the overlaps into ρ(α,k)B and
using N = 1
d
, we do an index substitution y = s+βr in Eq. (4.64) to obtain the eigenvalue
decomposition of the conditional states for α ∈ {Z, 0, 1, ..., d− 1}
ρ
(α,k)
B =
∑
y
λαy |ψαk−y〉〈ψαk−y|, (4.65)
with eigenvalues
λZy =
d−1∑
r=0
uy,r, (4.66)
λβy =
d−1∑
r=0
ur,y−βr, (4.67)
for Z and β ∈ {0, ..., d− 1}, respectively. The eigenvalue spectrum Λα = {λα0 , λα1 , ..., λαd−1}
for each ρ
(α,k)
B is independent of the index k.
Using this notation, the average error rate, the mutual information and the Holevo
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quantity turn out to be
Q = 1− 1|L|
∑
α∈L
λα0 , (4.68)
I¯(E(ρAB)) = log2 d−
1
|L|
∑
α∈L
H(Λα), (4.69)
χ¯(E(ρAB)) = S(ρAB)− 1|L|
∑
α∈L
H(Λα), (4.70)
where H(Λα) = −∑y λαy log(λαy ). Therefore, the key rate for Pauli-MUB protocols is given
by the simple formula
r¯(E(ρAB)) = log d− S(ρAB). (4.71)
For the special protocols with 2, d and d+1 Pauli MUBs, we further confine our search
for the optimal attack to smaller subsets Γ˜ ⊂ ΓBell. The procedure is essentially the same
as the one we used in Sec. 4.2 to go from the set Γave to the subset Γ¯: for each state
ρBellAB in ΓBell, we generate an equivalence class of Bell-diagonal states {ρ(Pi)AB ; i = 1, ..., n}
by applying permutations Pi to the eigenvalues of ρ
Bell
AB . In contrast to the states ρ
(Ug)
AB
in Eq. (4.7), the states ρ
(Pi)
AB are not generated using the symmetry group of the signal
states. However, since the key rate r¯(E(ρAB)) = log d− S(ρAB) is proportional to S(ρAB),
all permuted states satisfy the invariance property r¯(E(ρBellAB )) = r¯(E(ρ(Pi)AB )). Furthermore,
we choose the permutations in such a way, that the states ρ
(Pi)
AB give the same error rate as
ρAB. This ensures that the ρ
(Pi)
AB are again in ΓBell. Using the convexity property of the key
rate, we can conclude that the optimal attack is found in the subset Γ˜ ⊂ ΓBell containing
only convex combinations,
ρ˜AB =
1
n
∑
i
ρ
(Pi)
AB ∈ Γ˜.
Note that it suffices to check that the states ρ
(Pi)
AB have the same average error rate Q as
ρAB in order to be in the set ΓBell. We do not need to monitor the condition on ρA, because
ρBellA = 1/d is automatically satisfied for any Bell-diagonal state.
Protocols with 2 Pauli-MUBs
We show how to obtain the states ρ˜AB ∈ Γ˜ on the example of the 2 Pauli-MUB protocols
with signal states SL = {B0,BZ}. The results in this subsection are also valid for any
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dimension d, because the construction of two Pauli-MUBs is possible in any dimension,
and the set SL is invariant under the generalized Pauli group.
We start with a Bell-diagonal state parametrized by ρBellAB =
∑
r,s ur,s|Ur,s〉〈Ur,s|. As
mentioned above, we generate the (Bell-diagonal) permuted states ρ
(Pi)
AB by keeping the
error rate [see Eq. (4.68) for Bell-diagonal states]
Q = 1− 1
2
(
λ00 + λ
Z
0
)
= 1− 1
2
(
2u0,0 +
d−1∑
r=1
(ur,0 + u0,r)
)
, (4.72)
invariant. The invariance of Q is guaranteed if the permutations Pi leave the sets Ua =
{u0,0}, Ub = {u0,r, ur,0; r = 1, ..., d − 1} and Uc = {ur,s; r, s = 1, ..., d − 1} invariant.
Such permutations Pi are, for example, independent permutations of the eigenvalues in
each set. Therefore, the average over all eigenvalues in each set will appear in the convex
combination ρ˜AB. In this particular example, the state ρ˜AB will have three different types
of independent eigenvalues a, b and c corresponding to the three sets Ua, Ub and Uc:
ρ˜AB = a|U0,0〉〈U0,0|+ c
d−1∑
r,s=1
|Ur,s〉〈Ur,s|+ b
d−1∑
r=1
(|Ur,0〉〈Ur,0|+ |U0,r〉|U0,r〉) . (4.73)
The error rate of ρ˜AB reads Q = (d− 1)b + (d− 1)2c and the normalization condition
is a + 2(d− 1)b + d2c = 1. From these two extra conditions, we are able to eliminate two
of the three coefficients a and b. Afterwards, we optimize the key rate over the remaining
coefficient c analytically. The optimum is found at
a = (1−Q)2, b = Q(1−Q)
d− 1 , c =
Q2
(d− 1) , (4.74)
and the minimum key rate, which was independently obtained in Ref. [87], is given by
rmin = log d+ 2(1−Q) log(1−Q) + 2Q log
(
Q
d− 1
)
. (4.75)
We plot the key rates for d = 2, 3, 5, 7, 11, 13 in Fig. 4.2 in dependence of the average
error rate. This plot compares the performance of the protocols in dependence of the error
rate. For a fair comparaison, we must specify the channel model and the corresponding
error model. Then, we can compare the key rates in dependence of channel parameters,
for example, the distance between Alice and Bob.
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Figure 4.2: Key rates of protocols with (a) 2, (b) d + 1 and (c) d Pauli-MUBs for d = 2
(thick (bottom) line, black), d = 3 (dashed line, blue), d = 5 (dotted line, purple) , d = 7
(dash-dotted line, yellow) , d = 11 (large dashed line, green) and d = 13 (solid (top)
line, red). These plots do not serve as a comparison of the performance of the different
protocols. For a fair comparaison, we must specify the channel model, and plot the key
rates in dependence of channel parameters.
Protocols with d+ 1 Pauli-MUBs
Consider protocols with d+1 MUBs SL = {BZ ,B0,B1, ...Bd−1}. This construction of MUBs
is only valid when d is a prime number. In contrast to the protocols with 2 Pauli-MUBs,
the protocols with d + 1 Pauli-MUBs are tomographically complete, which means that
ρAB can be uniquely determined. Using the strategy described in the previous section, we
construct the set Γ˜ for d + 1 Pauli-MUB protocols. We choose a Bell-diagonal state ρBellAB
and calculate the error rate
Q = 1− 1
d+ 1
(d+ 1)u0,0 + ∑
(r,s)6=(0,0)
ur,s
 . (4.76)
In this formula we used that
∑d−1
β=0 ur,−βr =
∑d−1
γ=0 ur,γ for r 6= 0. The error rate defines the
sets Ua = {u0,0} with one eigenvalue, and Ub = {ur,s; (r, s) 6= (0, 0)} with the remaining
d2− 1 eigenvalues. By averaging over all permutations Pi, which leave the sets Ua and Ub
unchanged, we determine the form of the states
ρ˜AB = a|U0,0〉〈U0,0|+ b
∑
(r,s)6=(0,0)
|Ur,s〉〈Ur,s|, (4.77)
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The average error rate Q = d(d − 1)b and the normalization condition a + (d2 − 1)b = 1
uniquely define the coefficients a and b:
a = 1− d+ 1
d
Q, b =
Q
d(d− 1) . (4.78)
Since there are no free parameters, there is only one state in the set Γ˜, and, therefore, the
optimization of the key rate is trivial. The key rate reads
rmin = log d+
d+ 1
d
Q log
(
Q
d(d− 1)
)
+
(
1− d+ 1
d
Q
)
log
(
1− d+ 1
d
Q
)
, (4.79)
which was independently found in Ref. [87]. We plot the key rates for d = 2, 3, 5, 7, 11, 13
in Fig. 4.2. Again, the plot is not intended to compare the performance of the protocols.
Protocols with d Pauli-MUBs
The signal states of protocols using d Pauli-MUBs are SL = {B0,B1, ...Bd−1}. The construc-
tion of d MUBs is valid for prime dimensions. Unlike the protocols with d+1 Pauli-MUBs,
the protocols analyzed here are not tomographically complete. The error rate
Q = 1− 1
d
(
d u0,0 +
d−1∑
r=0
d−1∑
s=1
ur,s
)
(4.80)
defines three sets Ua = {u0,0}, Ub = {ur,s; r = 0, ..., d − 1, s = 1, ..., d − 1} and Uc =
{u0,s; s = 1, ..., d− 1}, which determine the states in Γ˜ by
ρ˜AB = a|U0,0〉〈U0,0|+ c
d−1∑
s=1
|U0,s〉〈U0,s|+ b
d−1∑
r=0
d−1∑
s=1
|Ur,s〉〈Ur,s|. (4.81)
The parameters a, b and c are further constricted by the normalization condition a+d(d−
1)b+ (d− 1)c = 1, and the error rate condition Q = (d− 1)2b+ (d− 1)c. We can express
two of the three eigenvalues by
a = 1 + c− dQ
d− 1 b =
Q− (d− 1)c
(d− 1)2 . (4.82)
We optimize the key rate over the free parameter c, and plot the numerically obtained key
rates rmin in Fig. 4.2 for different dimensions.
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4.5.3 Qubit protocols
In this section we show examples of protocols with the same optimal attack as the BB84
protocol and the 6-state protocol. We analyze qubit protocols, because we can make use
of the point group symmetries, which are well studied groups.
Protocols with the same optimal attack as the 6-state protocol
The 6-state protocol is a Pauli-MUB protocol with 3 MUBs on a qubit Hilbert space. The
key rate and the states ρ¯AB in the set Γ¯ were already calculated in Sec. 4.5.2.
The signal states of the 6-state protocol form a regular octahedron in the Bloch sphere
representation, as shown in Fig. 4.3 (b). The symmetry group of the octahedron is the
discrete group O with a unitary irreducible representation on the qubit space. A symmetry
group G′ that satisfies condition (I) in Theorem 10 is for example the icosahedron group I
[56, 17]. We can now construct protocols with signal states that are invariant under O- or I-
symmetry. There are many sets of signal states that are invariant under these symmetries.
Our choices are sets of signal states that form a cube (O-symmetry), a dodecahedron (I-
symmetry) or an icosahedron (again I-symmetry) on the Bloch sphere, consisting of 8, 20
and 12 states, respectively. For each state there exists an orthogonal state on the opposite
side of the Bloch sphere, which together form a basis of the qubit space. See Fig. 4.3 for
a representation of the signal states of the 6-state and the cube protocol.
The average error rate adopts the same form for our chosen protocols, namely, Q = 2b,
where b is defined in Eq. (4.77). Therefore, condition (II) in Theorem 10 is also satisfied,
and we conclude that the sets Γ¯ for these protocols are identical to the set given in the
case of the 6-state protocol. Since there is only one state in Γ¯ for the 6-state protocol, we
can already conclude that the optimal attack of the 6-state, the cube, the icosahedron and
the dodecahedron protocols is the same.
Protocols with the same optimal attack as the BB84 protocol
We analyze protocols with 2n (n ≥ 2) signal states S{|ϕx〉, x = 0, ..., 2n − 1}, that are
distributed equally in the equatorial plane of the Bloch sphere, represented by the Bloch
vectors
~s (2n)x = (sin(pix/n), 0, cos(pix/n)) x = 0, ..., 2n− 1. (4.83)
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Figure 4.3: Representation of sets of signal states on the Bloch sphere related to the 6-
state protocol. (a) States that are invariant under SU(2) (b) States of the 6-state protocol
(Octahedron), invariant under O-symmetry, (c) States of the cube protocol, invariant under
O-symmetry. The octahedron protocol has the same optimal attack and the same key rate
as the 6-state protocol.
For each state |ϕx〉 there exists an orthogonal state on the opposite side of the Bloch sphere,
which together form a basis. For n = 2, we recover the signal states of the BB84 protocol.
In Fig. 4.4 the signal states of the 2n protocols for n = 2, 3 are represented on the Bloch
sphere.
The symmetry group of the signal states of the 2n-protocol is called the Dihedral group
denoted by D2n. In the character tables of Refs. [56, 17], we find the form of the set TD2n
for n = 2, 3. It turns out that TD6 = TD4 , where TD4 contains the symmetrized states
ρ¯AB of the BB84 protocol [see Eq. (4.73) for d = 2, and Example 1 in Sec. 2.4.7]. The
error rate Q = b + c of the 2n-protocol with n = 3 is the same as for the BB84 protocol,
where b and c are defined in Eq. (4.73). Thus we can conclude that Γ¯6 = Γ¯4 ≡ Γ¯BB84.
Let us define Alice’s POVM elements of the BB84 and the 2n-protocol by F
(BB84),x
A for
x = 1, ...4 and F
(2n),x′
A for x
′ = 1, ..., 2n. In both cases, the POVM elements are projectors
onto the signal states. We can identify the group H in Theorem 10 by the phase-covariant
symmetry group D∞ = U(1)×Π2, where Π2 is the Pauli group of dimension 2 and U(1) is
the unitary group. In the tables of Ref. [17], we find that the set TD∞ is identical to TD4
and TD6 . The phase-covariant group contains all rotations about the axis (0, 1, 0) on the
Bloch sphere, as well as rotations by pi about all axes lying in the (x, z)-plane. Thus, it
also contains group elements that satisfy Eq. (4.44) in Theorem 10 for any pair F
(BB84),x
A
and F
(2n),x
A . Therefore, we conclude that the optimal attack for the 2n-protocol for n = 3
can be identified by the same as the optimal attack of the BB84 protocol.
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Figure 4.4: Representation of signal states on the Bloch sphere for protocols related to the
BB84 protocol. (a) States that are invariant under D∞ (b) States of the BB84 protocol,
D4-symmetry (c) States of the 2n-protocol for n = 3, D6-symmetry. The 2n-protocol for
n = 3 has the same optimal attack and the same key rate as the BB84 protocol.
The cuboid protocol
For some protocols with tomographically complete measurement settings the set Γ¯ contains
more than one state. This has to do with loss of information during the symmetrization
process. Recall that Alice and Bob only keep the averaged quantity Q, but otherwise
ignore the measurement outcomes completely. This means that introducing symmetries to
a problem can come at the expense of increasing the number of states in Γ¯.
As an example consider a qubit protocol where the signal states lie on the corners of a
rectangular cuboid. The 8 signal states form 4 bases defined by the Bloch vectors
~s1 = (± sin θ,± cos θ, 0), (4.84)
~s2 = (± sin θ,∓ cos θ, 0), (4.85)
~s3 = (0,± cos θ,± sin θ), (4.86)
~s4 = (0,± cos θ,∓ sin θ), (4.87)
where θ describes the angle between the y-axis of the Bloch sphere and the corners of the
cuboid. This protocol is composed of four bases.
The symmetry group of this protocol is the same as of the BB84 protocol (D4). Al-
though condition (I) in Theorem 10 is satisfied, the error rate of the cuboid protocol is
given by Q = 1
2
(3b+ c+ (b− c) cos(2θ)), which is different from the BB84 error definition.
Moreover, we could not find a group H to satisfy the condition (III). We performed nu-
merical optimizations and found that the optimal attack of the cuboid protocol is different
from the optimal attack on the BB84 protocol.
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Note that for θ = pi
2
, we recover the BB84 protocol. For θ = pi
4
the signal states span a
cube, which we already discussed in Sec. 4.5.3.
4.6 Conclusion
We analyze the conditions under which a symmetric optimal attack can be assumed on a
QKD protocol. If the parameter estimation is based on coarse-grained quantities, we prove
that the optimal attack is without loss of generality a symmetric attack, if the protocol and
the postselection exhibit sufficient symmetries. In particular, we show that for protocols
with signal states that are orthonormal bases, and postselection on matching bases, the
optimal attack is always symmetric. Furthermore, we identify classes of protocols which
are characterized by a common optimal attack.
We calculate the key rate of protocols where the signal states are eigenbases of the
generalized Pauli operators for 2, d and d+ 1 bases in a d-dimensional Hilbert space. We
also give examples of protocols that have the same optimal attack as the BB84 and the
6-state protocols
Throughout the subsequent chapters of this thesis, we will use the tools developed in
this chapter to claim symmetric optimal attacks for other protocols.
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Chapter 5
Connection between optimal cloning
and optimal eavesdropping
5.1 Introduction
In the previous chapter the objective was to find the optimal attack in order to calculate
the key rate for a protocol. In this chapter we want to investigate about the optimal
interaction UoptE between Eve and the signals.
One specific type of interaction that Eve can use to attack a QKD protocol is an optimal
quantum cloner [18]. An optimal cloner is a unitary transformation UoptC that acts on the
signal states (and some ancilla states), with the objective of producing two copies of the
signal states. The optimal cloner has the property that the copies emerge with the highest
fidelity (with respect to the original signal states) allowed by quantum mechanics. An
optimal cloner is called symmetric if the fidelities of the two copies are the same, and
asymmetric if the fidelities are different. Consider now the following eavesdropping attack:
Eve uses an optimal asymmetric cloner to copy the signal states sent by Alice, forwards one
copy to Bob, and keeps the other copy for herself. She choses the optimal cloner in such a
way that the fidelity of Bob’s copy is in agreement with Bob’s measurement outcomes.
A cloning attack is optimal if it coincides with the optimal eavesdropping strategy,
namely if UoptE = U
opt
C . In Refs. [22, 32, 33] cloning attacks were used to model Eve’s
attack, but optimality was only conjectured. Indeed, for some protocols (e.g. the BB84 or
the 6-state protocol), the optimal attack is known to be an optimal cloner, for example, by
comparing the optimal attacks in Ref. [80] to the optimal cloners in Ref. [24]. However, in
general the relationship between optimal cloning and optimal eavesdropping is unknown.
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The goal in the present chapter is to establish the connection between optimal eaves-
dropping on QKD protocols and optimal cloning in the context of the Devetak-Winter
security proof for protocols with direct, one-way reconciliation. We consider protocols
with enough symmetries so that, without loss of generality, the optimal attack is symmet-
ric. In this scenario, it turns out that a necessary condition for an optimal cloner to be
a candidate for an optimal attack is the strong covariance condition defined in Ref. [24].
This condition ensures that the optimal cloner and the optimal attack are drawn from the
same set, and that the optimal cloner uses the same number of ancilla states as the optimal
eavesdropping attack. If strong covariance does not hold for the optimal cloner, we can
already conclude that the optimal attack on the QKD protocol is not an optimal cloner.
We have already calculated the optimal attack for qubit-based protocols (e.g. the BB84
and the 6-state protocol) and for protocols in d-dimensional Hilbert spaces using mutually
unbiased bases (MUBs) (e.g. protocols with 2 MUBs, d + 1 MUBs or d MUBs) in the
previous chapter. Here we will compare these attacks to the optimal cloner. The results
of this chapter are published in Ref. [34].
5.2 Optimal quantum Cloners
In this section we summarize quantum cloners along the lines of Refs. [24, 30]. A quantum
cloner C is a map that creates two copies of quantum states ϕx = |ϕx〉〈ϕx| drawn from a
set S. Let us define three isomorphic Hilbert spaces HA, HB and HC each with dimension
d. A cloner C is a completely positive and trace preserving map C : HA → HB ⊗HC that
takes a state ϕx ∈ HA to C(ϕx) ∈ HB ⊗HC .
The quality of each copy k (k = B,C) is determined by the single-clone Uhlmann
fidelity fk(ϕx, C(ϕx)) of the copy with respect to the original state ϕx. If the states ϕx are
pure, the Uhlmann fidelity reads
fB(ϕx, C(ϕx)) = tr{|ϕx〉〈ϕx|B ⊗ 1C · C(ϕx)} (5.1)
fC(ϕx, C(ϕx)) = tr{1B ⊗ |ϕx〉〈ϕx|C · C(ϕx)} (5.2)
Instead of the single-clone fidelity fk(ϕx, C(ϕx)), it is often assumed that only the
average fidelity over all signal states
Fk =
1
|S|
∑
ϕx∈S
fk(ϕx, C(ϕx)) (5.3)
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is of interest. The cloner is called optimal if copy C emerges with maximal average fidelity
(FC), while the fidelity FB of the copy B has a fixed value.
The cloning transformation can also be described using the Choi-Jamiolkowski isomor-
phism [54, 8] with a non-maximally entangled state. For this purpose, let C act on the
second half of a source state |Φ〉 defined in Eq. (3.1) for the set of signal states S. This
relates C to a positive operator σABC ∈ HA ⊗HB ⊗HC via the rule
σABC = (1⊗ C)|Φ〉〈Φ|. (5.4)
The trace-preserving property of C translates to σA = trBC σABC = ρA, where ρA is the
reduced state of the source state |Φ〉. The map C can be recovered trom σABC via the
reverse transformation realized by
C(ϕx) = 1
p(x)
trA[F
x
A ⊗ 1B ⊗ 1C · σABC ]. (5.5)
where the F xA are the POVM elements defined in Eq. (3.3). The reverse transformation
effectively corresponds to preparing the states |ϕx〉 in the source-replacement scheme for
the cloner. In this language, the optimal cloning map described by a state σoptABC .
5.2.1 Covariant cloners
Let the set of quantum states S be G-invariant. If the figure of merit of the cloning
transformation is the average fidelity, then for every cloning map σABC , the equivalence
class of maps {U∗g ⊗Ug ⊗UgσABC(U∗g ⊗Ug ⊗Ug)†;∀g ∈ G} yields the same average fidelity
Fk. Furthermore, due to the linearity of the trace, there exists a covariant cloning map
σ¯ABC =
∑
g∈G
U∗g ⊗ Ug ⊗ UgσABC(U∗g ⊗ Ug ⊗ Ug)† (5.6)
with the same average fidelity Fk as σABC . As a consequence, the optimal cloning map,
σoptABC , can always be chosen as a covariant map, without loss of generality [30]. The
covariant state in Eq. (5.6) satisfies the commutation relation
[σ¯ABC , U
∗
g ⊗ Ug ⊗ Ug] = 0. (5.7)
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5.2.2 Strong covariant cloner
The unitary realization UC of the map C can be uniquely described by the purification of
σ¯ABC . In the canonical formulation, the purification of such a state lives on the extended
Hilbert space H⊗6. Some cloners, however, can be realized with a purification on a smaller
Hilbert space H⊗4 composed of four systems HA⊗HB⊗HC⊗HD, each system having the
same dimension. In Ref. [24], cloners with such a purification are called strong covariant
cloners and are defined as follows:
Definition 21 A cloner is called strong covariant if it has a purification |Σ〉ABCD on
HABCD with the property
U∗g ⊗ Ug ⊗ Ug ⊗ U∗g |Σ〉ABCD = |Σ〉ABCD ∀g ∈ G. (5.8)
The strong covariant cloners are a subset of the covariant cloners, because for every strong
covariant cloner |Σ〉, the trace over the fourth system D returns a covariant state σ¯ABC .
In Ref. [24], it is shown that determining the optimal cloner is a convex optimization
problem. That means, the optimal cloner is an extremal point of the convex set of covariant
cloning maps. Two theorems about extremal maps are proven in Ref. [24].
Theorem 11 (Chiribella et al. [24]). Let the unitaries Ug be an irreducible representation
of the group G, and let K = {σ¯ABC} denote the set of covariant cloning maps defined in
Eq. (5.7). Then, every cloning map σ¯ABC, which allows a strong covariant purification is
an extremal point of the convex set K.
This theorem states that the strong covariant maps are a subset of the extremal maps.
The converse - that the extremal maps are a subset of the strong covariant maps - is not
true in general. The next theorem, however, describes a special case in which the set of
extremal maps and the set of strong covariant maps coincide:
Theorem 12 (Chiribella et al. [24]). If the set of states S to be cloned is G-invariant
under the generalized Pauli group Πd, then the set of strong covariant cloning maps is
equal to the set of extremal maps. The generalized Pauli group is defined in Def. 20 in
Sec. 4.5.1.
Using this Theorem, the optimal cloner σoptABC is found in the set of strong covariant
maps, if the signals in S are invariant under the generalized Pauli group. This means that
the purification of σoptABC is described by a four-partite state |Σ〉optABCD with the property
(5.8).
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5.3 Connection between optimal cloners and optimal
attacks
Recall that the optimal attack ρ¯optAB was found by optimizing the key rate over the set of
symmetrized states Γ¯. In Eq. (4.10), we showed that the purification |Ψ〉 of a symmetrized
state ρ¯AB ∈ Γ¯ has the property U∗g ⊗ Ug ⊗ Ug ⊗ U∗g |Ψ〉 = |Ψ〉 for all g ∈ G. We define the
set of all such purifications as follows:
Definition 22 The set ∆ contains the purifications |Ψ〉 of the symmetrized states in Γ¯.
All states in ∆ satisfy the symmetry condition U∗g ⊗Ug ⊗Ug ⊗U∗g |Ψ〉 = |Ψ〉 for all g ∈ G,
and are compatible with the averaged quantity Q and fixed ρA.
We identify the optimal attack on a QKD protocol with an optimal cloner if Eve’s
interaction UoptE coincides with the optimal cloning transformation U
opt
C , or, in terms of
the purifications, if |Ψ〉opt = |Σ〉opt. Comparing the purifications in the set ∆ to the
cloning interactions, it turns out that all eavesdropping attacks described in the set ∆
correspond to representations of strong covariant cloners. We can therefore make the
following conclusion:
Observation 1 The optimal cloner can only be the optimal attack, if it is strong covariant.
Otherwise, one can already conclude that |Ψ〉opt 6= |Σ〉opt.
At this point, the strong covariance property alone does not uniquely determine if the
optimal attack is an optimal cloner. Even if the optimal cloner is strong covariant, we can
only conclude that the optimal attack is an optimal cloner if the set ∆ contains exactly
one state. Otherwise, in order to compare the optimal attack with the optimal cloner, we
must perform the optimization.
5.3.1 Examples with Pauli-invariant signal states
As mentioned in Theorem 12, a sufficient requirement for a cloning map to allow a strong
covariant realization is the Pauli-invariance of the set of states to be cloned. Hence, if the
signal states of a QKD protocol are Pauli-invariant, the corresponding cloning attack on
that protocol is certainly realized by a strong covariant cloner. Therefore, we compare the
optimal attack of protocols with Pauli-invariant signal states to the corresponding optimal
cloners. In this section, we analyse protocols with 2, d and d+ 1 Pauli-MUBs, which have
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Pauli-invariant signal states. These protocols already appeared in Sec. 4.5.2. For protocols
with d and d+1 Pauli-MUBs, the dimension d is prime, while for 2 Pauli-MUBs the results
hold for any dimension.
For ONB protocols the average error rate Q in Def. 18 is related to the average fidelity
FB of Bob’s clone by the simple relation FB = 1 − Q. The average fidelity for ONB
protocols is given by
FB =
1
|L|
∑
β∈L
∑
k
tr
{|ϕ∗(β,k)〉〈ϕ∗(β,k)| ⊗ |ϕ(β,k)〉〈ϕ(β,k)|ρAB} . (5.9)
2 Pauli-MUBs
The optimal attack on a protocol with 2 Pauli-MUBs calculated in Eq. (4.74) is exactly
the same as the optimal phase-covariant cloner in d dimensions found in Ref. [22]. This
can be seen by comparing the state ρoptAB to the cloner in Ref. [22].The connection between
optimal cloning and the optimal attack for 2 MUBs was already conjectured in [22].
When d = 2 we recover the BB84 protocol. Furthermore, since we showed Sec. 4.5.3
that the 2n protocol for n = 3 has the same optimal attack as the BB84 protocol, the
optimal attack on the 2n protocol is also the optimal phase-covariant cloner.
We also analyze the cuboid protocol, for which we know from Sec. 4.5.3 that the
optimal attack is different from the optimal attack on the BB84. Numerical optimizations
show that the optimal attack on the cuboid protocol is not an optimal cloner.
d+ 1 Pauli-MUBs
As shown in Sec. 4.5.2, there is only one state state in the set Γ¯ for protocols with d + 1
Pauli-MUBs. Therefore, we can already conclude that the optimal cloner and the optimal
attack are equal. This connection was already conjectured in [22]. The cloner in this case
is the optimal universal cloner in d dimensions [21, 20].
For d = 2, we recover the the 6-state protocol. The optimal attack on the 6-state
protocol is the universal cloner [18, 38] that clones all the states on the Bloch sphere equally
well. Since we know from Sec. 4.5.3 that the optimal attack on the cube, the icosahedron
and the dodecahedron protocol is the same as the optimal attack on the 6-state protocol,
we can conclude that it is also the optimal universal cloner.
69
(a)
(b)
0 10 20 30 40 50 60
0.00000
0.00005
0.00010
0.00015
0.00020
Average error rate Q in !
F
id
el
it
y
d
if
fe
re
n
ce
0 5 10 15
0.00000
0.00005
0.00010
0.00015
0.00020
Average error rate Q in !
K
ey
ra
te
d
if
fe
re
n
ce
Friday, March 30, 2012
(a)
(b)
0 10 20 30 40 50 60
0.00000
0.00005
0.00010
0.00015
0.00020
Average error rate Q in !
F
id
el
it
y
d
if
fe
re
n
ce
0 5 10 15
0.00000
0.00005
0.00010
0.00015
0.00020
Average error rate Q in !
K
ey
ra
te
d
if
fe
re
n
ce
Friday, March 30, 2012
Monday, October 8, 2012
Figure 5.1: (a) A plot of the difference of the key rates δr = rMPC− rmin for the scenarios
where Eve uses the optimal cloner (rMPC), and where she uses the optimal attack (rmin) for
d = 3. (b) A plot of the difference of the fidelities δFE = F
MPC
E − F attackE for the scenarios
where Eve uses the optimal MPC cloner (FMPCE ) and where she uses the optimal attack
(F attackE ) for d = 3.
d Paul-MUBs
For the protocol with d Pauli-MUBs, we compare the optimal attack to the optimal multiple
phase-covariant (MPC) cloner UMPC given in Ref. [59]. This cloner copies all states of the
form |ψ〉 = 1√
d
∑d−1
j=0 e
iφj |j〉 for φj ∈ [0, 2pi) optimally. If it is known that the eavesdropper
performed an attack based on the optimal MPC cloner, Alice and Bob can expect some
key rate rMPC. Numerical optimizations for d = 3, 5, 7, 11 and 13 show that rMPC is always
bigger or equal than the key rate rmin in Eq. (4.22) that results from the optimal attack.
Therefore, the optimal MPC cloner is not the optimal attack: UMPC 6= UoptE . In Fig. 5.1
we plot the difference between the key rates rMPC− rmin. We denote Eve’s average fidelity
of the optimal MPC cloner by FMPCE calculated according to equation (5.3). Since each of
Eve’s attacks UE can be viewed as a (non-optimal) cloner, we can calculate the average
clone fidelity of the transformation corresponding to the optimal attack UoptE . We call this
fidelity F attackE , and plot the difference F
MPC
E − F attackE for d = 3 in Fig. 5.1.
We would like to remark that the UMPC produces optimal copies of more than just the
necessary d Pauli MUBs. It is possible that there exists a cloner Ud that provides copies of
the d Pauli-MUBs with a higher fidelity F dE for a fixed error rate, than UMPC: F
d
E ≥ FMPCE .
This raises the question, if the cloner Ud could be the optimal attack U
opt
E . To answer this,
we turn the question around and ask from the cloning point of view, whether the optimal
attack UoptE can play the role of the optimal cloner Ud. For this purpose, we compare Eve’s
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fidelity F attackE to the fidelity F
d
E. We know from our numerical optimization how F
attack
E
compares to FMPCE : we plotted the difference F
MPC
E − F attackE in Fig. 5.1. From this plot
we see that, in general, FMPCE > F
attack
E . However, we know by construction of Ud that the
fidelity F dE ≥ FMPCE . By transitivity it follows that F dE > F attackE , which proves that the
optimal attack is not equivalent to the optimal cloner Ud either.
5.4 Conclusion
We analyze the connection between the optimal attack on a QKD protocol and the optimal
cloning attack, in which the eavesdropper uses an optimal cloner to attack the protocol.
We analyze protocols that are from the ONB family with Pauli group symmetries in the
signal states and compare the optimal symmetric attack to optimal covariant cloners.
It turns out that a necessary condition for the cloning transformation to be an optimal
attack is the strong covariance condition, which guarantees that the optimal attack and
the optimal cloner are chosen from the same set. However, this condition is not sufficient
to uniquely identify the optimal attack with the optimal cloner, except in the case where
only one state is found in the set from which the optimal attack and the optimal cloner
are chosen. Protocols which use the d+ 1 mutually unbiased eigenbases of the generalized
Pauli group fall into this category.
We analyze the optimal attack of protocols using 2, d and d + 1 Pauli-MUBs in d-
dimensional Hilbert spaces. Intuitively, one expects that the optimal attack can always
be identified with an optimal cloner. We prove that this intuition is correct in the case of
2 and d + 1 Pauli-MUBs, but for protocols using d Pauli-MUBs, the connection between
optimal attack and optimal cloner fails.
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Chapter 6
Unbalanced phase-encoded BB84
protocol
6.1 Introduction
Perhaps the BB84 protocol [10] is the most well-known QKD protocol. In the BB84 pro-
tocol, the bit values of the key are encoded in orthogonal quantum states of two conjugate
bases. Next to the theoretical security analysis of the BB84 protocol [88, 57, 67, 68], there
have been numerous experimental implementations of this protocol, both using optical fibre
[40] and free space links [48, 58] as the quantum channel. Furthermore, the bit information
is usually encoded in a photonic degree of freedom, either in the polarization of photons,
or the phase of two consecutive photon pulses [40].
In the phase-encoded implementation of the BB84 protocol, the phase between two
consecutive pulses prepared by Alice determines the bit and the basis value of the sent
signal. In the actual experimental realization of the phase-encoded BB84 protocol with
Mach-Zehnder interferometers (see Fig. 6.1), the phase modulator, which is in one arm of
the interferometer, introduces loss. While this does not change the observed error rate in
the data, it changes the signal states and the measurements of the protocol. Since this is
now a different protocol, the security proofs tailored to the BB84 protocol no longer apply
in this scenario.
In this chapter, we provide a security proof of the phase-encoded BB84 in the infinite
key limit where we take into account the loss in the phase modulator (unbalanced phase-
encoded protocol). We use the Devetak-Winter security proof [31, 57] to calculate the key
rate.
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In the limit where the phase reference is a strong pulse corresponding to the extreme case
of an unbalanced interferometer, the security has been analyzed in Ref. [63]. Furthermore,
a first rough security proof approach linking the unbalanced phase-encoded protocol to the
BB84 protocol at the cost of key rate has been presented in Ref. [60].
We provide a qubit-based security proof, that we later extend to optical modes. On the
source side, we extend the validity of the qubit-based security proof to optical modes using
the tagging approach [41, 51] in the decoy framework [49, 62, 93]. On the other hand, the
squashing model [5, 92, 71] justifies the assumption of a qubit-based security proof on the
receiver’s side. The results in this chapter were published in Ref. [35].
6.2 Protocol setup
6.2.1 Unbalanced phase-encoded (UPE) protocol
A scheme of the protocol setup is depicted in Fig. 6.1. Alice sends photon pulses through a
Mach-Zehnder interferometer with a long arm and a short arm, to create the signal states
|ϕx〉. In the long arm, Alice changes the relative phase ϕx of the two pulses with a phase
modulator to imprint the basis and bit information on the signal. Alice chooses the phases
ϕx =
pi
2
x for x ∈ {0, 1, 2, 3} with equal probability for the four signal states. The phases
ϕx ∈ {0, pi} and ϕx ∈ {pi/2, 3pi/2} correspond to the bit values {0, 1} in the “even” and
“odd” basis, respectively. Likewise, the receiver, Bob, detects the signals by means of a
Mach-Zehnder interferometer. Bob chooses the phase ϕB ∈ {0, pi/2}, which determines the
basis (“even” or “odd”) of his measurement. Bob chooses each measurement setting with
probability 1/2.
The pulses arrive at Bob’s detectors in three different time slots, either in the top
output port (slots c1, c2, and c3 in Fig. 6.1) or in the bottom output port (slots d1, d2, and
d3 in Fig. 6.1). Only the middle clicks (slots c2 and d2) are used for the key generation.
The outside clicks (slots c1, c3, d1, and d3) are pulses that did not interfere at Bob’s second
beam splitter. If the signal produces interference (i. e., if the detectors click in the middle
time slot), then Bob determines the bit value of the incoming signal based on his phase
setting.
To obtain the raw data for the key generation, Alice and Bob first execute a sifting step,
in which they announce the basis (“even” or “odd”) for each signal publicly and discard
all data points where their basis choices did not match.
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Figure 6.1: Alice and Bob use a Mach-Zehnder interferometer to prepare and detect the
signal pulses. Only the interfering pulses, which produce clicks in the time slots c2 and d2
(black-red and red-black overlapping pulses) are used for the key generation.
The lossy phase modulator typically introduces a loss in one of the arms of the interfer-
ometer, producing pulses with different amplitudes. We model the lossy phase modulator
by a perfect (lossless) phase modulator followed by a beamsplitter with transmissivity
κ ≤ 1 that simulates the loss.
We will refer to this protocol with three different detection time slots as the unbalanced
phase-encoded (UPE) protocol.
6.2.2 Polarizing beam splitter (PBS) protocol
As a slight variation of the protocol, consider Alice encoding her outgoing pulses in different
polarizations, and Bob replacing his first beamsplitter by a polarizing beamsplitter (see
Fig. 6.2). This causes the two pulses to arrive simultaneously at Bob’s second (interfering)
beamsplitter. If he also rotates the polarization of the signal in one arm, all signals will
interfere. We analyze the security proof of this protocol as well. Throughout this chapter
we will call this protocol the PBS protocol.
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Figure 6.2: A variation of the protocol with the pulses encoded in different polarization.
Bob places a polarizing beam splitter (PBS) at the entrance of his interferometer, and
rotates the polarization in one arm of the interferometer, for example by using a half wave
plate (HWP) to cause the desired interference.
6.3 Security proof framework
6.3.1 Lossless interferometer picture
It is generally difficult to provide a security proof for a scenario with a lossy measurement.
Therefore, in the case of the UPE protocol we construct a picture where a lossy beam-
s litter with transmissivity 1
2ξ
is placed into the quantum channel followed by a lossless
interferometer with an uneven first beamsplitter with transmissivity
ξ =
1
1 + κ
. (6.1)
This lossless interferometer picture is equivalent to the original picture with the lossy
phase modulator in the long arm of the interferometer, as it yields the same measurement
outcomes. The two pictures are shown in Fig. 6.3. However, in the lossless interferometer
picture we can deal with the loss (that has now been outsourced to the channel) by giving
Eve control over it and treating it like regular channel loss in the security proof.
In the case of the PBS protocol, we allot the control over the polarizing beam splitter
and the lossy beamsplitter with transmissivity κ in the long arm to Eve, leaving Bob with
a lossless detector.
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Figure 6.3: a) Original picture of the unbalanced phase-encoded protocol with the loss in
Bob’s interferometer. b) Equivalent lossless interferometer picture with a loss 1/(2ξ) in the
channel followed by lossless interferometer with an uneven beam splitter with transmissivity
ξ.
6.3.2 Hardware fix
One simple way to recover the original BB84 scenario is by manually introducing a beam-
splitter with the same transmissivity κ in the shorter arm of each of the interferometers
to compensate for the loss due to the phase modulator. Alternatively, one can replace the
first beamsplitter in the interferometer by a biased beamsplitter with transmissivity 1− ξ.
A schematic of these alternatives is shown in Figs. 6.4 a) and 6.5 a).
The BB84 signal states and measurements are recovered in the equivalent lossless in-
terferometer pictures, which are shown in Figs. 6.4 b) and 6.5 b) for the two hardware fix
possibilities. Under the assumption that the loss in Bob’s detector is attributed to Eve,
the security proof reduces to the known BB84 security proof. The loss in Alice’s device,
however, is not attributed to Eve, because the intensity of the outgoing signal is calibrated
at the output of Alice’s lab.
6.4 Qubit-to-qubit scenario
In the following, we study the case where Alice sends a single photon and Bob obtains
a single photon (qubit-to-qubit scenario). We analyze the signal structure and the mea-
surements of the UPE protocol and the PBS protocol and provide a security proof (qubit
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Figure 6.4: a) Hardware fix with the same amount of loss introduced in the short arm of
the interferometer to compensate for the loss due to the phase modulator. b) Equivalent
lossless interferometer picture.
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Figure 6.5: Hardware fix with a biased beamsplitter in the interferometer to compensate
for the loss due to the phase modulator. b) Equivalent lossless interferometer picture.
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security proof ). Later, in Sec. 6.6, we embed the qubit security proof into the more real-
istic scenario with optical modes in infinite-dimensional Hilbert spaces using decoy states
[62], tagging [41, 51] and squashing [5, 92, 71].
6.4.1 Alice’s signal states
If a single photon is distributed over the two time modes (pulses) that are emerging from
Alice’s device, the resulting Hilbert space of the signal states (HS) is a qubit space. We
denote the creation operators of the two time modes by a†0 and a
†
1, and define the two
canonical basis vectors |0〉 = a†0|vac〉 and |1〉 = a†1|vac〉 of HS. After Alice has imprinted
her phase choice onto the pulses, the signal leaving her apparatus can be in any of the four
possible states
|ϕx〉 =
√
ξ|0〉+
√
1− ξeipix/2|1〉 (6.2)
for x ∈ {0, 1, 2, 3}. Recall Eq. (6.1) that ξ = 1
1+κ
. In Fig. 6.6 we show a representation
of the signal state on the Bloch sphere in comparison to the signal states of the BB84
protocol. Alice then sends the signal states, each prepared in one of the above four forms
with equal probability, through a quantum channel to Bob.
We describe the signal preparation in the source-replacement scheme. In our case, the
entangled source state is |Φ〉AS =
√
ξ|00〉+√1− ξ|11〉 with a reduced density matrix
ρA = ξ|0〉〈0|+ (1− ξ)|1〉〈1|. (6.3)
Alice’s POVM elements on the system A are then essentially BB84 measurements
F xA =
1
2
P
[ |0〉+ e−ipix/2|1〉√
2
]
. (6.4)
for x ∈ {0, 1, 2, 3}. We use the notation P [|α〉] = |α〉〈α|.
6.4.2 Bob’s detection in the case of the UPE protocol
The modes a†0 and a
†
1 arrive at Bob’s detector after Eve has interacted with the signals.
The output of Bob’s detectors carries six modes in total, two in each of the three time slots.
We denote the modes of the top (bottom) detector by c†i (d
†
i ) for i = 1, 2, 3, respectively.
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For a fixed phase ϕB ∈ {0, pi/2}, the transformation of the a†i to the modes in the top and
bottom detectors yields (up to global phases):
c†1 =
1√
2
√
ξa†0,
c†2 =
1√
2
(
√
1− ξa†0 + eiϕB
√
ξa†1),
c†3 =
1√
2
√
1− ξa†1,
d†1 =
1√
2
√
ξa†0,
d†2 =
1√
2
(
√
1− ξa†0 − eiϕB
√
ξa†1),
d†3 =
1√
2
√
1− ξa†1.
We choose to combine several outputs into one POVM element of Bob’s measurement. In
terms of the incoming modes |0〉 and |1〉, Bob’s POVM elements are
F yB =
1
4
P [
√
1− ξ|0〉+
√
ξeipiy/2|1〉)],
F outB = ξ|0〉〈0|+ (1− ξ)|1〉〈1|, (6.5)
where y runs over {0, 1, 2, 3}. The four POVM elements F yB correspond to inside clicks
(time slot 2) in the two bases, while F outB denotes the POVM element of the outside clicks
(time slots 1 and 3).
6.4.3 Bob’s detection in the case of the PBS protocol
In a similar manner, the modes in the output ports of Bob’s interferometer in the PBS
protocol are found to be
c† =
1√
2
(e−iϕBa†0 − ia†1),
d† =
1√
2
(−ie−iϕBa†0 + a†1).
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Figure 6.6: Comparison of the qubit signal states on the Bloch sphere. a) The signal states
of the BB84 protocol, b) the signal states of the protocol with a lossy phase modulator.
There are only two output modes, since there are no outside clicks in this protocol. Bob’s
corresponding POVM on the input system has four elements for y ∈ {0, 1, 2, 3}
F ′B
y
=
1
2
P
[
(|0〉+ eipiy/2|1〉√
2
]
, (6.6)
which is essentially a BB84 measurement.
Remark: Indeed, in the PBS scenario, both Alice’s and Bob’s measurements are BB84
measurements. However, the difference between the PBS protocol and the BB84 protocol
is found in the reduced density matrix ρA in Eq. (6.3), which contains the information
about the modified signal structure.
6.4.4 Postselection
In order to filter out uncorrelated data, Alice announces the basis of her outcome (“even”
or “odd”), and Bob announces the basis of his outcome (“even” or “odd”) if he saw an
inside click. If he saw an outside click, Bob announces “out”. Based on the announcements,
they keep the events where both announced “even” or both announced “odd”, and discard
the rest. We denote the events where they had the same announcement by u = “even” or
u = “odd”. The identification of the announcements effectively defines the subsets mevenA =
{F 0A, F 2A}, moddA = {F 1A, F 3A}, mevenB = {F 0B, F 2B} and moddB = {F 1B, F 3B} of the POVMs MA
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and MB, which contain the POVM elements corresponding to the announcement u =
“even” or u = “odd”.
The Kraus operators on Alice’s side for this kind of postselection are
KA := K
odd
A = K
even
A = 1/
√
2. (6.7)
The new, renormalized POVM elements in MuA conditioned on u are related to the original
POVM elements in muA simply by a factor of 2:
MevenA = {2F 0A, 2F 2A},
ModdA = {2F 1A, 2F 3A}. (6.8)
We also calculate the Kraus operators on Bob’s side for “odd” and “even” announcements.
There is now a dependence on the imbalance ξ in Bob’s Kraus operators, but the Kraus
operators are again equal for the “even” and “odd” bases
KB := K
even
B = K
odd
B =
1√
2
( √
1− ξ 0
0
√
ξ
)
. (6.9)
Here the Kraus operators are presented in the basis {|0〉, |1〉}. It is straightforward to find
Bob’s new POVMs after postselection
MevenB = {F y,evenB } = {2F ′B0, 2F ′B2},
ModdB = {FBy,odd} = {2F ′B1, 2F ′B3}, (6.10)
expressed in terms of the BB84-type measurements F ′B
y in Eq. (6.6).
Since the Kraus operators for “even” and “odd” announcements are equal, we obtain
the conditional density operators
K[ρAB] := Keven[ρAB] = Kodd[ρAB], (6.11)
where
K[ρAB] = KA ⊗KB ρABK
†
A ⊗K†B
p˜
, (6.12)
p˜ = tr{KA ⊗KB ρABK†A ⊗K†B}. (6.13)
Alice and Bob extract a key from the data sets with coinciding basis independently. Accord-
ing to Eq. (3.28), the key rate extracted from a ρAB with postselection on u ∈ {even, odd}
is given by
r¯(E(ρAB)) =
∑
u
p(u)
(
I(K[ρAB],MuAB)− χ(K[ρAB],MuA)
)
(6.14)
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While the normalization p˜ depends on the density matrix ρAB, the normalized probability
distribution p(u) appearing in the key rate does not, and is given by p(odd) = p(even) = 1
2
.
6.4.5 The key rate optimization problem
Optimizing the key rate r¯(E(ρAB)) over the set Γ gives the minimum key rate (see also Eq.
(3.31)):
rmin = I¯obs − sup
ρAB∈Γ
χ¯(E(ρAB)). (6.15)
In this expression, I¯obs is fixed for all ρAB ∈ Γ, and thus does not enter the optimization.
The Holevo quantity is χ¯(E(ρAB)) = 12
∑
u χ(K[ρAB],MuA) for u ∈ {even, odd}.
6.5 Symmetric optimal attack
6.5.1 Symmetries of signal states
The symmetry group G of the set of signal states is the cyclic group C4 with four elements.
A reducible representation of C4 in the canonical basis of the signal states is given by
Ug =
(
1 0
0 eigpi/2
)
g ∈ {0, 1, 2, 3}. (6.16)
While Alice and Bob’s POVMs F xA, F
y
B and F
′
B
y satisfy the symmetry relations
U∗gF
x
AU
T
g = F
x+g
A , (6.17)
UgF
y
BU
†
g = F
y+g
B , (6.18)
UgF
′
B
y
U †g = F
′
B
y+g
, (6.19)
where addition is taken modulo 4, the reduced density operator ρA and the POVM element
of the outside clicks F outB remain invariant under the action of Ug
ρA = U
∗
g ρAU
T
g , (6.20)
F outB = UgF
out
B U
†
g . (6.21)
Note that complex conjugation in the canonical basis and Hermitian conjugation are equiv-
alent operations for all unitaries Ug, because they are simultaneously diagonal in this basis.
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Not only are the POVMs MA and MB C4-invariant, but also the postselected POVMs
MuA and M
u
B for u ∈ {even, odd} satisfy a certain symmetry relation with respect to C4:
U∗gM
u
AU
T
g = M
g(u)
A ,
UgM
u
BU
†
g = M
g(u)
B . (6.22)
For this particular example g(u) = u⊕parity(g) with parity(g) ∈ {even, odd}. The addition
is defined by the rules: even⊕even = odd⊕odd = even and odd⊕even = even⊕odd = odd.
6.5.2 Coarse-grained parameter estimation
We show now that the optimal attack is symmetric with respect to the symmetry group of
the signal states. We assume that Alice and Bob perform the parameter estimation based
on the average error rate
Q[{p(x, y)}] = p(0, 2) + p(2, 0) + p(1, 3) + p(3, 1)
2p˜
, (6.23)
which is calculated from the detailed probability distribution p(x, y) and the normalization
p˜ in Eq. (6.13). The average error rate satisfies the invariance property Q[{p(x, y)}] =
Q[{pg(x, y)}] in Eq. (4.5). In this scenario, the key rate is optimized over the larger set
Γave, which contains all state ρAB with fixed Q and ρA in Eq. (6.3).
In order to restrict the optimization to the subset Γ¯ containing only symmetric states,
ρ¯AB, it suffices to show that
− sup
ρAB∈Γave
χ¯(E(ρAB)) ≥ − sup
ρ¯AB∈Γ¯
χ¯(E(ρ¯AB)), (6.24)
because the Holevo quantity is the only term that depends on ρAB. In fact, we do not use
the weak convexity of the terms I(K[ρAB],MuAB) (Theorem 7) for this protocol, because
the restriction on the a priori probability distribution is violated for states of the form
K[ρAB] and K[Ug[ρAB]]. If Eq. (6.24) holds, we can assume a symmetric optimal attack
and bound the key rate by
rmin ≥ I¯obs − sup
ρ¯AB∈Γ¯
χ¯(E(ρ¯AB)). (6.25)
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6.5.3 Concavity and equivalence properties of the Holevo quan-
tity
In this section the goal is to prove the inequality (6.24) for both the UPE and the PBS
protocol. To prove this inequality, we need to show the following two properties of the
Holevo quantity: the concavity property,
χ¯(E(ρ¯AB)) ≥ 1|G|
∑
g
χ¯(E(Ug[ρAB])), (6.26)
and equivalence property,
χ¯(E(ρAB)) = χ¯(E(Ug[ρAB])). (6.27)
UPE protocol
First, we show the concavity and equivalence properties of χ¯ in case of the UPE protocol.
As a consequence of the commutation relation of the Kraus operators KA and KB with all
unitaries Ug,
[KA, Ug] = [KB, Ug] = 0, (6.28)
the map K also commutes with the symmetry group:
K[Ug[ρAB]] = Ug[K[ρAB]]. (6.29)
Moreover, K acts linearly on any convex combination of states of the form Ug[ρAB], for
example on the symmetrized state ρ¯AB
K[ρ¯AB] = 1|G|
∑
g
K[Ug[ρAB]]. (6.30)
We have now all ingredients to show the concavity and the equivalence property of χ¯.
Using Eq. (6.30) and the concavity property of χ (Theorem 8), the concavity of χ¯ follows:
χ¯(E(ρ¯AB)) = 1
2
∑
u
χ (K[ρ¯AB],MuA)
≥ 1
2
∑
u
1
|G|
∑
g
χ (K[Ug[ρAB]],MuA) (6.31)
=
1
|G|
∑
g
χ¯(E(Ug[ρAB]).
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To show the equivalence property (6.27), we first use Lemma 2, and apply it to each
term
χ(Ug[ρAB],MA) = χ(ρAB, UTg MAU∗g ). (6.32)
Because of the commutation rule in Eq. (6.29) and the G-invariance of the MuA in Eq.
(6.22), it also holds that
χ
(
K[Ug[ρAB]],Mg(u)A
)
= χ
(
Ug[K[ρAB]],Mg(u)A
)
(6.33)
= χ
(
Ug[K[ρAB]], UTg Mg(u)A U∗g
)
(6.34)
= χ (K[ρAB],MuA) . (6.35)
The equivalence transfers to χ¯ by means of Eqs. (6.35) and (6.11):
χ¯(E(ρAB)) = 1
2
∑
u
χ(K[ρAB],MuA)
=
1
2
∑
u
χ(K[Ug[ρAB]],Mg(u)A ) (6.36)
=
1
2
∑
g(u)
χ(K[Ug[ρAB]],MuA) = χ¯(E(Ug[ρAB])).
Having showed concavity and equivalence, we can assume without loss of generality
that the optimal attack is chosen from the set Γ¯. The main properties used to prove the
equivalence and concavity were essentially Eqs. (6.7), (6.9) and (6.28).
PBS protocol
The PBS protocol differs from the UPE protocol only in the measurements on Bob’s side.
Bob’s filters for the PBS protocol,
KB′ := K
even
B′ = K
odd
B′ = 1/
√
2 (6.37)
also satisfy the properties in Eqs. (6.7), (6.9) and (6.28). As these were the two properties
needed to show concavity and equivalence of χ¯, a similar proof goes through for the PBS
case, and so we can again assume a symmetric optimal attack of the form (6.38).
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6.5.4 Numerical results
We now calculate the key rate of the unbalanced phase-encoded protocol in the qubit-to-
qubit scenario. The most general symmetric state ρ¯AB with respect to the C4 symmetry
group is described by the density matrix
ρ¯AB =

a f ∗
b
c
f d
 (6.38)
with open parameters a, b, c, d and f that satisfy the trace condition tr ρ¯AB = 1. The
matrix representation of ρ¯AB is with respect to the canonical basis {|00〉, |01〉, |10〉, |11〉}.
This density operator was obtained using representation theory and Schur’s lemma in Sec.
2.4.
The states in the set Γ¯ are further constrained by the fixed reduced density operator
ρA and the error rate Q. For a symmetric state ρ¯AB the reduced density matrix and the
error rate are given by
trB(ρ¯AB) =
(
a+ b
c+ d
)
, (6.39)
and
Q =
p˜− 1
2
<[f ]√ξ(1− ξ)
2p˜
, (6.40)
with the normalization p˜ = 1
4
((1− ξ)(a + c) + ξ(b + d)), where <[f ] denotes the real part
of f .
We calculate the Holevo quantity χ¯ and use MATLAB, calling the optimization function
fmincon to perform a numerical optimization of χ¯(E(ρ¯AB)) over the states ρ¯AB ∈ Γ¯. The
symmetry arguments so far only concerned the Holevo quantity. In order to simulate the
classical data, which is used for the calculation of the mutual information, we assume a
typical scenario with symmetric observations. The mutual information I¯obs = 1− h(Q) is
then a function of the average error rate Q only.
In Fig. 6.7 we show a plot of the key rates renormalized on matching bases and clicks
in the middle time slot for different values of κ in the case of a lossless channel. In
particular, observe that as κ increases, the key rate, renormalized to clicks in the middle
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Figure 6.7: Key rates per postselected signal in the middle time slot for unbalanced phase-
encoded protocol in dependence on the error rate Q for different values of κ in the phase
modulator. The case κ = 1 corresponds to the lossless phase modulator. Decreasing values
of κ mean more loss in the phase modulator.
slot, increases as well. This behaviour originates from the signal state structure: as the
signals become more non-orthogonal with increasing κ, the eavesdropper has more difficulty
in distinguishing them. In the limit of κ→ 0, we find a tolerable error rate of about 22%
through numerical optimization. In a simple intercept-resend attack, where Eve does the
same measurement as Bob and resends the states based on her measurement outcomes, an
error rate of Qintercept−resend = 14 +
1
4
pout is expected, where pout is the probability to find
an outside click corresponding to Bob’s POVM F outB . In the limit of κ → 0, pout tends to
1, and thus the error rate associated to the intercept-resend attack goes to 1
2
.
The advantage of the high asymmetry in the signal states in terms of error rate disap-
pears quickly, once loss is added to the channel. For a fair comparison of the performances
of the different protocols, we must specify an error model for an optical channel, and com-
pare the protocols in dependence of channel parameters, such as the distance between Alice
and Bob.
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6.6 Security proof for realistic devices
The qubit security proof is tailored to the situation where Alice and Bob use perfect qubits
(e.g. single photons). The actual experimental implementations, however, are performed
with optical modes in an infinite-dimensional Hilbert space. In particular, Alice’s device
can send vacuum and multi-photon states into the channel, and Bob’s detector can receive
vacuum and multi-photon states from the channel. In order to achieve a complete security
proof, we need to include the deviation from the ideal qubit-to-qubit scenario.
Recently, several powerful tools in Refs. [62, 41, 51, 5, 92, 71] have been developed
to bridge the gap between theory and experiment, with the aim to extend the validity of
qubit-based security proofs to the more realistic scenario of optical modes. On Alice’s side,
the multi-photon components are taken care of by using decoy states [62], supported by
tagging [41, 51]. This essentially permits us to estimate the fraction of the single photon
contributions in the data. On the other hand, the multi-photon states entering Bob’s
detector are taken care of by the squashing method in Refs. [5, 92, 71]. If a squashing
map exists for a certain measurement setup, then the detection pattern resulting from an
arbitrary input state into Bob’s detector can be interpreted as if it were coming from a
single photon or a vacuum input. These tools require that the states leaving Alice’s lab
and entering Bob’s lab are diagonal in the Fock basis. On the source side, this assumption
is justified, because Alice prepares a phase-randomized laser pulse, which was shown to be
Fock-diagonal in the Eq. (2.35). On the receiver’s side, the assumption is justified because
the POVM elements of Bob’s threshold detectors are Block diagonal in the Fock basis.
Therefore, for any state ρB entering Bob’s detector generates the same detection pattern
as the corresponding Fock-diagonal state ρFock−diagB .
Note that the security proof approach presented here for the UPE protocol gives a
provable secure key rate. However, higher key rates may be achievable with a refined
analysis. The starting point for the refined analysis is the observation that, in contrast to
the general squashing and tagging assumption, a photon number splitting attack on multi-
photon signals in the case of the UPE protocol does not leak the information in the signal
states with certainty to Eve, even after the basis announcement. However, such an analysis
will be more involved. It is expected that for strong asymmetries in the signal states a
similar performance could be expected as the strong reference pulse schemes analyzed in
[55, 90].
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Figure 6.8: The basic POVM combined with classical post-processing forms the effective
POVM, which is mapped to the target (qubit) POVM by the squashing map.
6.6.1 Security proof for UPE protocol with realistic devices
For the unbalanced phase-encoded detector setup, a valid squashing map has been proven
to exist, in Ref. [71]. In the proof it is assumed that Bob’s detectors can resolve the three
different time slots shown in Fig. 6.1.
A schematic of the squashing idea is shown in Fig. 6.8: a general incoming optical mode
can trigger any possible click pattern in the six detection slots. A POVM is associated
to this measurement, called the basic POVM. Through classical post-processing, several
basic POVM elements are combined to form the effective (single-click) POVM elements.
The effective POVM has five elements {F eff,yB : y = 0, ..., 3} and F eff,outB , which reflects
the single-click structure of the real qubit POVM given in Eq. (6.5). The function of the
squashing map is to map the effective POVM to the real POVM. If such a squashing map
exists, we can assume that all detection events on Bob’s side are single-photon events,
whereas Alice’s source can either send a vacuum signal (v), a single photon (s) or multiple
photons (m).
In the error correction step, Alice and Bob must correct all errors in their data. There-
fore, the error correction term, which is the mutual information, depends on the total
observed error rate Qtot: I¯obs = 1 − h(Qtot). Due to the decoy states and the tagging
method, however, the privacy amplification term, which is the Holevo quantity, splits into
the individual contributions from vacuum, single-photon and multi-photon signals (χ¯v, χ¯s
and χ¯m). Let us define by pmid(a) the frequency with which the signal a ∈ {v, s,m} sent
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by Alice produces a click in a middle time slot in Bob’s detector, and the total frequency
of a middle click by pmid =
∑
a∈{v,s,m} pmid(a). Then the total key rate is given by
R =
1
2
pmidI¯obs − ∑
a∈{v,s,m}
pmid(a) χ¯a
 . (6.41)
A factor 1/2 was introduced for the sifting.
Typically, we assume that Eve has full knowledge about the vacuum and the multi-
photon signals (tagging), therefore χ¯v = χ¯m = 1. Only the term χ¯s enters the optimization.
Due to the decoy and tagging methods, Alice and Bob have an estimate of the error rate
within the single photon events (q). The error rate q is the quantity appearing in the
optimization and is generally different from Qtot.
When we are no longer dealing with the strict qubit-to-qubit scenario, we must make
some modifications to the constraint on ρA in order to adapt to the realistic scenario. We
can no longer use the full information ρA in Eq. (6.3) to constrain the reduced density
matrix trB(ρ¯AB) in Eq. (6.39). Recall that the fixed reduced density matrix ρA describes
the reduced density matrix of all single-photon states exiting the source. These photons are
each lost in the channel with probability plost, and arrive in Bob’s detector with probability
1− plost. The reduced density operator ρA is conserved in this process
ρA = (1− plost) trB(ρ¯AB) + plostρlostA . (6.42)
In this equation, ρlostA is an unknown density operator corresponding to the lost photons.
We use this weaker version to constrain trB(ρ¯AB) in the optimization of the Holevo quantity
χ¯s.
We optimize the Holevo quantity χ¯s over the set of symmetric states ρ¯AB (Eq. (6.38))
with the error rate constrain q and the relaxed constraint in Eq. (6.42) on the reduced
density matrix. The dependence of the optimized Holevo quantity on q, plost and κ is
denoted in square brackets χ¯maxs [q, plost, κ]. The total optimized key rate for the unbalanced
phase-encoded protocol is then given by
R =
1
2
(
− pmidh(Qtot) + pmid(s)(1− χ¯maxs [q, plost, κ])
)
. (6.43)
In Figs. 6.9 and 6.10 we plot the key rates of the unbalanced phase-encoded protocol
and the hardware fixes for different values of κ. We simulate Bob’s observations using the
experimental values in Ref. [40] for channel loss, dark counts, detector efficiency, alignment
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Figure 6.9: Plot of the key rates in the realistic scenario. a) Key rate of the PBS protocol
with no loss (dashed blue line). b) Key rate of the PBS protocol with κ = 0.5 (dashed red
line). c) Key rate of the unbalanced phase-encoded protocol with no loss (κ = 1) (solid
blue line). d) Key rate of the unbalanced phase-encoded protocol with κ = 0.5 (solid red
line) coinciding with the key rate of the hardware fix with an uneven beamsplitter (black
circles). e) Key rate of the hardware fix with additional loss in the short arm (black line).
error and error correction efficiency. We assume that the detector efficiency is symmetric in
the two detectors, so that we can equivalently treat this efficiency as an overall loss in the
channel. Furthermore, we assume that no double clicks were observed. We also optimize
over the mean photon number of the signal pulses leaving Alice’s device.
We compare the performance of different UPE protocols depending on the value of κ to
each other: generally, we see that the smaller κ, the more the key rate decreases. Further-
more, for any κ, the performance of the UPE protocol coincides with the performance of
the corresponding hardware fix with an uneven beamsplitter, providing a choice between
the hardware fix (requiring a special unsymmetrical beam splitter), and the improved se-
curity proof analysis presented here. Both of these scenarios, however, outperform the
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Figure 6.10: Plot of the key rates of the unbalanced phase-encoded protocol for different
values of κ.
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Figure 6.11: Comparison of different security proof methods: the key rate obtained us-
ing our improved security proof analysis (solid line) and the key rate obtained using the
BB84 security analysis (dashed line) for the same protocol with κ = 0.1, perfect detection
efficiency, and a high alignment error ealign = 6%. In the range of low channel loss (up to
a distance of approximately 2 km), the improved security analysis for the UPE protocol
gives higher key rates than the BB84 security analysis.
second hardware fix with an additional loss in the short arm.
We also compare different security proof methods: we applied our improved security
proof analysis and the BB84 security analysis to the same simulated observations for the
UPE protocol for a fixed κ, and compared the resulting key rates. It turns out that both
approaches yield the same key rate for the typical range of observations. However, if the
error rate is high, the channel loss is low and κ is small enough, then our improved security
proof analysis yields a higher key rate than the BB84 analysis. In Fig. 6.11 we compare the
key rates using our improved security proof analysis and the BB84 security analysis for a
protocol with κ = 0.1, perfect detection efficiency, and a high alignment error (ealign = 6%
defined like in Ref. [40]). In the range where the loss is low (approximately up to a distance
of 2 km), our security analysis gives a higher key rate than the BB84 analysis.
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6.6.2 Security proof for PBS protocol with realistic devices
For the PBS protocol detector setup the squashing map is shown to exist in Refs. [5, 92].
Since all pulses interfere, we can drop the specification on middle clicks in the key rate. We
call the frequency with which Alice sent a single photon and Bob detected it by pdet(s) and
the total detection frequency pdet =
∑
a∈{v,s,m} pdet(a). The key rate in the PBS scenario
is then
R =
1
2
(
− pdeth(Qtot) + pdet(s)(1− χ¯maxs [q, plost, κ])
)
. (6.44)
We plot the key rates of the PBS protocol in Fig. 6.9 for different values of κ. The key
rates of the PBS protocol are higher than the key rates of the UPE protocol for the same
loss in the phase modulator, because no signal is lost due to outside clicks. Nevertheless,
the loss in the phase modulator decreases the key rates of the PBS protocol compared to
a protocol without loss.
6.7 Conclusion
We analyzed the security of the phase-encoded BB84 protocol with a lossy phase modulator
in one arm of the Mach-Zehnder interferometer. We consider two protocols, the UPE and
the PBS protocol. We provide a qubit-based security proof, which we embed in the more
general framework of optical modes using the decoy states method, tagging and squashing.
In general, it turns out that the proven secure key rates are lowered by the unbalanced
loss in the Mach-Zehnder interferometer compared to a protocol without loss in the phase
modulator. The standard BB84 security analysis provides the same result as our refined
analysis for the typical range of observations. For hight error rate and low channel loss,
though, our refined security analysis outperforms the BB84 analysis in terms of key rate.
The implementation with additional polarization encoding of the pulses (PBS proto-
col) performs better than the one with no additional polarization encoding (unbalanced
phase-encoded protocol), because all signals forcedly interfere in Bob’s interferometer. A
comparison of the key rates of the unbalanced phase-encoded protocol to the key rates of
the two suggested hardware fixes shows that an experimental remedy is not necessary and
does not contribute to an improvement of the key rate.
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Chapter 7
Measurement-device-independent
QKD
7.1 Introduction
The security proofs for QKD protocols guarantee unconditional security. This statement
is based on idealized models of the devices used in experiments. The actual experimental
implementations often diverge from the models under which the security proofs hold. This
leaves an open window (loophole) for the eavesdropper to launch an attack on the compo-
nents not covered by the theoretical security proof. A particular weak spot in this respect
are detector imperfections. Attacks have been demonstrated exploiting detector loopholes
for example in Ref. [65].
Since a full characterization of all devices is hardly realizable, one needs to invent other
methods to guarantee security. One solution is to use device-independent QKD (DI-QKD)
security proofs proposed in Refs. [69, 1]. The idea of DI-QKD is to prove security based
on violations of Bell-type inequalities. As a consequence, the security proof is independent
of the internal workings of the devices. However, there are also loopholes for Bell tests
themselves, for example photon loss. Therefore, DI-QKD security proofs based on Bell-
type inequalities are rather demanding on the experimental implementation, and therefore,
a rather impractical attempt to apply to realistic QKD implementations.
Recently, a variation of a DI-QKD has been proposed in Refs. [61, 14], where only
the measurement apparatus is device-independent. In a measurement-device independent
(MDI) setup, the two honest parties (Alice and Bob) are both senders of quantum signals,
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while an intermediate node acts as the receiver of the signals, and performs a measurement
[50]. The intermediate node is typically not trusted, and can even be controlled by the
eavesdropper Eve. For each signal sent by Alice and Bob the intermediate node makes
a measurement and announces a classical message to the honest parties. Based on that
message, Alice and Bob are able to effectively generate correlated data. An experimental
implementation of this setup has recently been realized in Ref. [83].
MDI-QKD is immune against all detector loopholes, because all assumptions about
the workings of the detectors can be dropped. In a way, all detector imperfections are
outsourced to Eve and included in the description of her attack. The only assumption are
on Alice and Bob’s signal preparation.
In this chapter we provide a security proof for an MDI-QKD setup based on the
Devetak-Winter security proof [31, 57]. We do this on the example of an MDI setup with
B92 signal states (MDI-B92). Using the symmetry techniques of Chapter 4, we establish
that the optimal attack for MDI-B92 is symmetric, and calculate the key rate numerically
for a realistic channel model. We also analyze two special attacks, the minimum error dis-
crimination (MED) attack, and the unambiguous state discrimination (USD) attack on the
MDI-B92 protocol. In case of the MED attack, no secret key can be established, because
the MED attack always results in a separable state between Alice and Bob. Furthermore,
we apply the MDI-B92 security proof to prove the security of the B92 protocol using a
strong reference pulse [9].
7.2 Measurement-device-independent B92 protocol
In this section, we describe a protocol with B92 signal states in an MDI setup (MDI-B92).
In the original B92 protocol [9] Alice chooses one of two nonorthogonal quantum states
with a priori probability 1
2
. The two states encode the bits 0 and 1, respectively. in the
original B92 protocol, the nonorthogonal states are encoded into two weak coherent states
|±α〉 for α ∈ R, which are accompanied by a strong reference pulse. Another possibility is
to encode the states into a polarisation degee of freedom [90, 89]. The B92 protocol follows
the traditional steps of a QKD protocol, with a quantum phase and a classical phase.
In the MDI-B92 protocol, both Alice and Bob are senders of quantum states, and an
intermediate node acts as the receiver and performs the measurements [see Fig. 7.1 ]. Alice
and Bob send the states | ± α〉 to the node. If the implementation is done with coherent
states, we assume that the node has a common phase reference with Alice and with Bob.
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This can be achieved, for example, if the signal states coming from Alice and bob are
accompanied by a strong reference pulse.
We now give the detailed steps of the MDI-B92 setup. In particular, the quantum phase
of the MDI-B92 protocol differs from the quantum phase of a traditional QKD protocol.
Quantum phase:
1. Preparation. Alice chooses a coherent state with equal probability from the set SA =
{|α〉, |−α〉} on the Hilbert space HA′ , and Bob from the set SB = {|β〉, |−β〉} on the
Hilbert space HB′ . The signal state with the positive (negative) phase corresponds to
a bit value 0 (1). Alice and Bob send their chosen signal state through the quantum
channels lA and lB that connect them to an intermediate node. They choose the
timing such that the signals arrive at the same time at the node. They also calibrate
the amplitudes of their coherent states (α and β) so that the states, after travelling
through the channels of length lA or lB, have the same amplitude (α
′) when arriving
at the node. As already mentioned above, the coherent states are accompanied by
a strong reference pulse, from which the node can determine a common reference
system with Alice and Bob, and the phase difference between the reference systems.
2. Joint quantum operation by the node. Upon arrival of a pair of signals, the interme-
diate node performs a joint quantum operation. The goal of the quantum operation
is to distinguish whether Alice and Bob sent a correlated pair of states (|α, β〉 or
| − α,−β〉) or an anti-correlated pair of states (|α,−β〉 or | − α, β〉). It is also pos-
sible that the quantum operation has an inconclusive outcome. the joint quantum
operation is for exampel, a joint measurement of the signal states. In order to achieve
this joint measurement, the node uses the knowledge of the phase difference between
the reference systems. A classical feedforward of the phase difference allows the node
to align Alice and Bob’s reference systems, and then perform the joint measurement.
3. Announcement by the node. For each signal, the outcome (γ) of the quantum oper-
ation is broadcast to all parties. If the node detected a correlated pair of states, it
announces γ = “ + ”; if it detected an anti-correlated pair it announces γ = “ − ”,
and when the outcome was inconclusive, the node announces γ = “?”. This divides
the data collected by Alice and Bob into subsets indexed by γ. The probability that
the outcome γ is announced is p(γ).
4. Postprocessing. Based on the announcement, Alice and Bob do the following post-
processing of their data:
• γ = “ + ”: Alice and Bob do nothing to their data bits.
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|Φ〉BB′|Φ〉AA′
| ± α〉 | ± β〉
lA lB
Node
γ ∈ {+,−, ?}
Sunday, October 21, 2012
Figure 7.1: MDI-B92 setup in the two-party source-replacement scheme.
• γ = “− ”: Bob performs a bit flip to his bit value.
• γ = “?”: Alice and Bob discard the data point.
The classical phase of the MDI-B92 protocol remains the same: Alice and Bob perform
error correction and privacy amplification on their data sets γ = “ ± ” independently, in
order to extract a secret key. We choose here to calculate the key for a direct reconciliation
protocol, but reverse reconciliation would yield the same results.
7.3 Two special attacks on MDI-B92 protocol
In the following we investigate two special eavesdropping attacks on the MDI-B92 protocol,
which have analytical solutions. These special cases give limits to the performance of the
protocol, but they are only valid if Alice and Bob observe particular values in their collected
data.
In order to prove the security, we assume that Eve is in control of the node and both
channels lA and lB. We assume that Eve implements the quantum operation in the node
and is responsible for making the announcement γ. Effectively, Eve must distinguish
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between the correlated and the anti-correlated joint states
ρ+ =
1
2
(|α, β〉〈α, β|+ | − α,−β〉〈−α,−β|) (7.1)
ρ− =
1
2
(|α,−β〉〈α,−β|+ | − α, β〉〈−α, β|). (7.2)
7.3.1 Minimum error discrimination attack
For the first special case, assume Alice and Bob observe the following values:
Observed values: There are no inconclusive announcements, namely, p(“?”) = 0.
If Alice and Bob make this observation, Eve must have made a conclusive announcement
γ = “±” for each signal. However, it is not possible to distinguish the two states ρ+ and ρ−
without errors, because these two states are not orthogonal. Therefore, Eve will sometimes
make a wrong announcement, e.g. she will announce “+” (“-”) when the state was actually
ρ− (ρ+). The strategy with the lowest amount of wrong announcements is the minimum
error discrimination strategy. The minimum error caused by this strategy is [45]
Qmin =
1
2
(
1− |1
2
(ρ− − ρ+)|1
)
. (7.3)
Let us first look at the signal states before calculating Qmin. Although the states |±α〉
are in principle defined on the infinite-dimensional Fock space, they actually span a 2-
dimensional subspace. We define the canonical basis of this space by {|φ0A〉, |φ1A〉}, and
parametrize the signal states in this basis:
| ± α〉 = c0|φ0A〉 ± c1|φ1A〉. (7.4)
The coefficients c0 and c1 follow the normalization condition |c0|2+|c1|2, and are determined
from the overlap condition 〈α| − α〉 = |c0|2 − |c1|2:
|c0|2 = 1
2
(1 + 〈α| − α〉) (7.5)
|c1|2 = 1
2
(1− 〈α| − α〉) (7.6)
Similar formula hold for Bob’s signal states | ± β〉.
For the calculation of the term |1
2
(ρ−−ρ+)| we expand ρ+ and ρ− in the canonical basis
of the tensor product space {|φ0A, φ0B〉, |φ0A, φ1B〉, |φ1A, φ0B〉, |φ1A, φ1B〉}. In this parametrization,
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the density matrices of ρ+ and ρ− are represented by 4-by-4 matrices, for which the trace
norm is straightforward to calculate. The minimum error to distinguish the state ρ+ from
ρ− is
Qjointmin =
1
2
(
1−
√
1− 〈α| − α〉2
√
1− 〈β| − β〉2
)
. (7.7)
We show now that the joint MED strategy is effectively equivalent to a separable
strategy, where Eve does a MED on Alice’s and Bob’s link lA and lB independently, and
combines the outcomes classically. The minimum error made in discriminating between
|α〉 and | −α〉 on the link lA is QAmin = 12
(
1−√1− 〈α| − α〉2) (a similar expression holds
for | ± β〉). Having discriminated the states in each link separately, the error made to
discriminate the correlated and anti-correlated states is
Qsepmin = (1−QAmin)QBmin + (1−QBmin)QAmin ≡ Qjointmin . (7.8)
Therefore, the data resulting from the joint MED strategy can be equivalently described
as resulting from a separable MED strategy. The separable MED strategy is an intercept-
resend strategy [29] on each link, which can be described by an entanglement breaking
channel (see Ref. [47]). It was shown in Ref. [28] that no secret key can be generated over
an entanglement breaking channel. In fact, any attack where Eve is forced to make an
announcement for every signal will ultimately result in a separable attack, because there
is no quantum operation that would introduce less error than the joint MED.
7.3.2 Unambiguous state discrimination attack
For the second special case, we make the following assumption on the observations:
Observed values: There are no errors in Alice and Bob’s data, but there are inconclusive
announcements, p(“?”) > 0.
These observations imply that Eve is allowed to make inconclusive announcements, but
she must distinguish the joint states at the source, ρ+ and ρ−, with certainty, and never
output a wrong announcement. This type of strategy is an unambiguous state discrimi-
nation (USD) between ρ+ and ρ− with the possibility to output γ = “?” whenever the
discrimination failed.
A USD is a measurement that is described by three POVM elements {F+USD, F−USD, F ?USD}
corresponding to the three possible outcomes. The POVM elements satisfy tr{ρ+F−USD} =
100
tr{ρ−F+USD} = 0. If the USD is also optimal, the failure probability p(“?”) corresponding
to F ?USD is minimal.
Theorem 2 in Ref. [75] provides at method to calculate the POVM elements of a
measurement that implements the optimal joint USD. We calculate the POVM elements
F±USD and F
?
USD for the symmetric case α = β. By defining k = c
2
1/c
2
0 as the ratio between
the coefficients in Eq. (7.4), the POVM elements in the canonical basis of the tensor
product space are given by
F±USD =
1
2

|k|2 0 0 ±k∗
0 1 ±1 0
0 ±1 1 0
±k 0 0 1
 , F ?USD =

1− |k|2 0 0 0
0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0
 . (7.9)
The minimum failure probability p(“?”) of the optimal joint USD attack is
p(“?”)joint =
1
2
(
tr{F ?USDρ+}+ tr{F ?USDρ−}
)
= |〈α| − α〉|. (7.10)
From the POVM elements, we deduce the Kraus operators KγUSD =
√
F γUSD of the
optimal joint USD
K±USD =
1
2

√
2|k|2√
|k|2+1 0 0 ±
√
2k∗√
|k|2+1
0 1 ±1 0
0 ±1 1 0
±
√
2k√
|k|2+1 0 0
√
2√
|k|2+1
 , K?USD =

√
1− |k|2 0 0 0
0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0
 .
(7.11)
The Kraus operators allow us to calculate Eve’s states |ψγi 〉E conditioned on Alice’s bit
value i = 0, 1, and Eve’s total state ργE =
1
2
(|ψγ0 〉〈ψγ0 | + |ψγ1 〉〈ψγ1 |). Using these states
and that the von Neumann entropy of pure states is zero, we compute Eve’s information
χ(X : E)± about Alice’s bit values for γ = “± ”,
χ(X : E)± = S(ρ±E)−
∑
i
p(i)S(|ψ±0 〉〈ψ±0 |) = S(ρ±E) = h
(
1 + 〈α| − α〉
2
)
. (7.12)
The function h denotes the binary entropy function. Since Alice and Bob observe no errors,
they do not need to perform error correction. Therefore, the key rate under the optimal
joint USD attack is
rUSD = 1− 1
2
(
χ(X : E)+ + χ(X : E)−
)
= 1− h
(
1 + 〈α| − α〉
2
)
. (7.13)
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7.3.3 Implementation of the optimal joint USD
The measurement that implements the optimal joint USD between ρ+ and ρ− for the
symmetric case α = β is shown in Fig. 7.2. The joint state arriving at the node is one of
the four product states |α, α〉AB, |α,−α〉AB, | − α, α〉AB or | − α,−α〉AB with probability
1
4
. After arriving at the node, the joint state enters the input ports A and B of a balanced
beamsplitter, and exits from the output ports “ + ” and “− ”. The relation between input
and output state is
|α, α〉AB → |
√
2α, vac〉+−, (7.14)
|α,−α〉AB → |vac,
√
2α〉+−,
| − α, α〉AB → |vac,−
√
2α〉+−,
| − α,−α〉AB → | −
√
2α, vac〉+−.
The output states are then measured using the threshold detectors D+ and D−. These
detectors are “click/no click” detectors, which means they don’t fire (“no click”) in the
absence of a photon, and they fire (they produce a “click”) whenever one or more photons
hit the detector. The POVM elements of this measurement in the Fock basis are projections
onto the vacuum Fvac = |vac〉〈vac| and onto the remaining orthogonal space Fclick = 1 −
|vac〉〈vac|.
The measurement outcomes of the threshold detectors is summarized in table 7.1: if the
detector D+ fires, the pair of states were correlated, and the node announces γ = “+”; if the
detector D− fires, the states were anti-correlated and the node announces γ = “− ”; with
probability p(“?”) = 〈α| − α〉 = e−2|α|2 none of the detectors fire, which is an inconclusive
announcement and the node announces γ = “?”.
7.4 Security proof of the MDI-B92 protocol
Typically, both errors and inconclusive announcements are part of the observations, so the
two special cases described in the previous section do not apply. We provide a security
proof for general measurements for the MDI-B92 protocol in the present section.
7.4.1 Two-party source-replacement scheme
The preparation of the signal states of Alice and Bob is cast in a source-replacement scheme
on each side, which we will refer to as the two-party source-replacement. The source states
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Figure 7.2: Implementation of the optimal joint USD between correlated and anti-
correlated states ρ+ and ρ− for the symmetric case α = β. The input states on the
systems A and B are combined at a balanced beamsplitter. The output states on the
systems + and − are measured by threshold detectors. If the detector in the output port
+/− fires, the input state was ρ+/− and the result of the USD is γ = “ + /− ”. If none of
the detectors fires, the outcome is inconclusive, γ = “?”.
Table 7.1: The measurement outcomes of the optimal joint unambiguous state discrimina-
tion between the states ρ+ and ρ−.
p(+) p(−) p(?)
|α, α〉 1− e−2|α|2 0 e−2|α|2
|α,−α〉 0 1− e−2|α|2 e−2|α|2
| − α, α〉 0 1− e−2|α|2 e−2|α|2
| − α,−α〉 1− e−2|α|2 0 e−2|α|2
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in the two-party source-replacement scheme are the entangled states
|Φ〉AA′ = 1√
2
(|0〉|α〉+ |1〉| − α〉), (7.15)
|Φ〉BB′ = 1√
2
(|0〉|β〉+ |1〉| − β〉), (7.16)
respectively. The systems A and B are 2-dimensional qubit spaces with a canonical basis
{|0〉, |1〉}. The systems A′ and B′ carry the signal states. The two-party source-replacement
scheme is shown in Fig. 7.1.
Alice and Bob send the systems A′ and B′ of the source states to the node. The node
then performs the joint quantum operation and the announcement γ, which effectively
creates entanglement between Alice and Bob, and is commonly referred to as entanglement
swapping. The entanglement between Alice and Bob is formally captured by introducing
a bipartite quantum state ργAB on the systems A and B for each announcement γ. The
dimensions of the systems A and B depend on the number of signal states. In particular,
for the MDI-B92 protocol, the dimension is two. The total state held by Alice and Bob
including the classical announcements is described by a convex combination
ρABC =
∑
γ
p(γ)ργAB ⊗ |γ〉〈γ|C . (7.17)
where the classical system C holds a description of the announcement γ, and p(γ) is the
probability that the announcement γ was made by the node. The classical system C is
public and accessible to all parties, including Eve.
In the two-party source-replacement scheme the reduced state ρAB = trC ρABC is a fixed
quantity and equal to the reduced state of the source
ρAB = trA′B′{|Φ〉〈Φ|AA′ ⊗ |Φ〉〈Φ|BB′} = ρA ⊗ ρB. (7.18)
In the canonical basis {|00〉, |01〉, |10〉, |11〉} the density matrix ρAB is given by
ρAB =
1
4

1 B0 A0 A0B0
B0 1 A0B0 A0
A0 A0B0 1 B0
A0B0 A0 B0 1
 (7.19)
and where A0 = 〈α| − α〉 = exp(−2α2) and B0 = 〈β| − β〉 = exp(−2β2).
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Alice and Bob perform measurements MK = {F xK} for K ∈ {A,B} with POVM
elements F 0K = |0〉〈0| and F 1K = |1〉〈1| on the systems A and B, followed by the classical
postprocessing of their data.
Instead of specifying the postprocessing on the classical data after the measurement,
we can equivalently describe it on the quantum level before the measurement.
Postprocessing on the quantum level:
• If γ = “ + ”, Alice and Bob do nothing to ρ+AB.
• If γ = “− ”, Bob applies the Pauli operator σX (bit flip operator) to his part of ρ−AB,
and Alice does nothing.
• If γ = “?”, Alice and Bob do nothing to ρ?AB.
This postprocessing is described by the quantum map
Vγ[ργAB] := 1⊗ Vγ ργAB 1⊗ V †γ := σγAB. (7.20)
where the Vγ are unitary transformations on Bob’s system B defined by
V+ = 12, (7.21)
V− = σX , (7.22)
V? = 12. (7.23)
Finally, Alice and Bob measure each Vγ[ργAB] with respect to the POVMs MK = {F xK}
for K ∈ {A,B}. If γ = “?”, they discard the data point. Otherwise, from the probability
distribution of the measurement outcomes p±(x, y) = tr{F xA⊗F yB V±[ρ±AB]}, they determine
the average error rate
Q± = p±(0, 1) + p±(1, 0) (7.24)
in each data subset γ = “ ± ”. They perform parameter estimation based on the average
error rates and a known probability p(“?”) in order to constrain the form of the density
operators ρABC . The set of density operators ρABC compatible with the observations are
defined as follows:
Definition 23 The set Γ contains all density operators ρABC, which are compatible with
1. The density operator ρAB = ρA ⊗ ρB.
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2. The averaged error rates Q±.
3. The probability p(“?”).
Eve’s control over the node and the channel is described by giving her the power to gen-
erate the density operators ργAB at her will, of which she holds the purification |Ψγ〉ABE.
Therefore, each ρABC ∈ Γ corresponds to a possible eavesdropping attack.
Remark: we fix the value of p(“?”) in the parameter estimation, but not the values of
p(“+”) and p(“−”). This allows us later to prove that the optimal attack has a symmetry
with respect to the “ + ” and “− ” terms.
7.4.2 Key rate optimization problem
We assume that Alice and Bob choose to extract the key from each V [ρ±AB] individually.
Consequently, the key rate is given by
r = I¯obs − max
ρABC∈Γ
χ¯tot(ρABC), (7.25)
where the maximum is taken over the set Γ of states ρABC established in the parameter
estimation. The mutual information, Iobs, depends only on observations, while the total
Holevo quantity,
χ¯tot(ρABC) =
∑
γ=±
p(γ) χ(Vγ[ργAB],MA), (7.26)
depends on the choice of ρABC .
7.4.3 Symmetric optimal attack for the MDI-B92 protocol
In this technical section we show that the optimal attack on the MDI-B92 protocol lies in
a symmetric subset Γ¯ of the set Γ using the techniques established in Chapter 4.
The signal states SA′ = {| ± α〉A′} and SB′ = {| ± β〉B′} are invariant under a group G
with two group elements
U1 = 12, (7.27)
U2 = σX . (7.28)
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in the basis {|φ0K′〉, |φ1K′〉} for K ′ ∈ {A′, B′}. It is important to note that the group elements
are the same as the unitaries Vγ.
First, we define a subset Γ¯ of Γ, that contains only symmetrized states:
Definition 24 The set Γ¯ contains all symmetrized states
ρ¯ABC =
∑
γ
p(γ)ρ¯γAB ⊗ |γ〉〈γ|C , (7.29)
which are compatible with the error rates Q±, the probability p(“?”) and the reduced state
ρAB. The symmetrized states ρ¯
γ
AB are defined by
ρ¯γAB =
1
|G|
∑
g
Ug[ργAB], (7.30)
Ug[ργAB] = (Ug ⊗ Ug) ργAB (U †g ⊗ U †g ). (7.31)
The unitary transformations Ug ∈ {1, σX} are defined in the canonical basis {|0〉, |1〉} of
the Hilbert spaces HA and HB. We stick to the general notation Ug for the transformations,
even though our group G only has two elements.
The main result of this section is summarized in the following theorem.
Theorem 13 For all states ρABC in Γ, it holds that
χ¯tot(ρABC) ≤ χ¯tot(ρ¯ABC), (7.32)
where ρ¯ABC is in Γ¯. This implies that the optimal attack of the MDI-B92 protocol lies in
the subset Γ¯ of Γ.
We show two lemmas, which together prove the result of Theorem 13.
Lemma 4 For each ρABC in Γ, the symmetrically transformed state
ρgABC =
∑
γ
p(γ) Ug[ργAB]⊗ |γ〉〈γ|C , (7.33)
for all g ∈ G also lies in Γ.
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Proof. From the commutator [Ug ⊗ Ug,1 ⊗ Vγ] = 0 for all g ∈ G and γ ∈ {+,−, ?} it
follows that
Vγ[Ug[ργAB]] = Ug[Vγ[ργAB]]. (7.34)
The POVMs MA/B = {|0〉〈0|, |1〉〈1|} are invariant under the unitaries Ug. Let us define
the POVM element associated with the error rate by FQ = |01〉〈01| + |10〉〈10|. With this
notation, the error rates are Q± = tr{FQ ρ±AB}. The operator FQ satisfies the invariance
FQ = Ug[FQ] for all g ∈ G. If we calculate the error rates Qg± of ρgABC , we obtain
Qg± = tr{FQ Ug[ρ±AB]} = tr{Ug[FQ]ρ±AB} = Q±. (7.35)
Here we used that U †g = Ug for all g ∈ G. Furthermore, the reduced state ρAB also satisfies
the invariance ρAB = Ug[ρAB] for all g ∈ G. From this invariance and the linearity of Ug it
follows that the reduced state ρgAB of ρ
g
ABC is
ρgAB =
∑
γ
p(γ) Ug[ργAB] = Ug[ρAB] = ρAB. (7.36)
Finally, ρgABC satisfies the constraint on p(“?”) trivially by definition. Therefore, ρ
g
ABC
satisfies all constraints imposed by the set Γ. 
Now we show that the Holevo quantity χ¯tot satisfies the concavity and equivalence
property.
Lemma 5 The Holevo quantity satisfies the concavity and equivalence property
χ¯tot(ρ
g
ABC) = χ¯tot(ρABC), (7.37)
χ¯tot(ρ¯ABC) ≥ 1|G|
∑
g
χ¯tot(ρ
g
ABC). (7.38)
Proof. Using the concavity of χ in Theorem 8 and the definition of ρ¯γAB, we deduce that
χ(Vγ[ρ¯γAB],MA) ≥
1
|G|
∑
g
χ (Vγ[Ug[ργAB]],MA) . (7.39)
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Using this property, it follows that the total Holevo quantity is concave:
χ¯tot(ρ¯ABC) =
∑
γ=“±”
p(γ) χ(Vγ[ρ¯γAB],MA) (7.40)
≥
∑
γ=“±”
p(γ)
[
1
|G|
∑
g
χ (Vγ[Ug[ργAB]],MA)
]
(7.41)
=
1
|G|
∑
g
χ¯tot(ρ
g
ABC). (7.42)
From the invariance property of the Holevo quantity in Lemma 2 and the commutation
relation in Eq. (7.34), it follows that
χ(Vγ[Ug[ργAB]],MA) = χ(Vγ[ργAB],MA). (7.43)
From this equation, if follows that the Holevo quantity satisfies the equivalence property
χ¯tot(ρ
g
ABC) =
∑
γ=“±”
p(γ) χ(Vγ[Ug[ργAB]],MA) (7.44)
=
∑
γ=“±”
p(γ) χ(Vγ[ργAB],MA) (7.45)
= χ¯tot(ρABC). (7.46)

Form the concavity and equivalence property of χ¯tot, the result of Theorem 13 follows.
Further symmetrization
We perform a second symmetrization step using again the concavity and equivalence of
χ¯tot to confine the optimal attack to a set of states with a symmetry in the γ = “ + ” and
γ = “− ” terms. For this to succeed, we define a superset ΓQ of Γ¯ and optimize χ¯tot over
the larger set ΓQ. The optimization over the larger set can only decrease the key rate.
Definition 25 The set ΓQ contains all symmetrized states ρ¯ABC, which are compatible
with the average error rate, Q = 1
1−p(“?”)
(
p(“ + ”)Q+ + p(“ − ”)Q−
)
, the probability
p(“?”) and the reduced density operator ρAB.
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For every ρ¯ABC ∈ ΓQ we construct a state
τ¯ABC =p(“− ”) τ¯ +AB ⊗ |+〉〈+|C + p(“ + ”) τ¯ −AB ⊗ |−〉〈−|C + p(“?”) τ¯ ?AB ⊗ |?〉〈?|C ,
with interchanged roles of p(“ + ”) and p(“ − ”), and transformed states τ¯ +AB = V−[ρ¯ −AB],
τ¯ −AB = V−[ρ¯ +AB] and τ¯ ?AB = V−[ρ¯ ?AB].
The state τ¯ABC lies in the set ΓQ, because it is compatible with Q, p(“?”) and the
reduced state ρAB. Furthermore, for states ρ¯ABC and τ¯ABC , the Holevo quantity satisfies
the equivalence property
χ¯tot(τ¯ABC) = p(“− ”)χ(V+[τ¯ +AB],MA) + p(“ + ”)χ(V−[τ¯ −AB],MA) (7.47)
= p(“− ”)χ(ρ¯ −AB,MA) + p(“ + ”)χ(ρ¯ +AB,MA) (7.48)
= χ¯tot(ρ¯ABC). (7.49)
Using the concavity of the Holevo quantity in Eq. (7.38) and the just established
equivalence, it follows that
χ¯tot
( ρ¯ABC + τ¯ABC
2
)
≥ χ¯tot(ρ¯ABC) (7.50)
for all ρ¯ABC ∈ ΓQ. Therefore, the optimal attack ρ¯optABC lies in a subset Γ¯Q of ΓQ, containing
only states of the form σ¯ABC =
ρ¯ABC+τ¯ABC
2
.
The states σ¯ABC ∈ Γ¯Q have the properties that p(“ + ”) = p(“ − ”) = 1−p(“?”)2 are
defined in terms the fixed quantity p(“?”), and that there is a symmetry in the “ + ” and
“− ” terms: V+[σ¯+AB] = V−[σ¯−AB].
7.4.4 Parametrization of the symmetric optimal attack
The parametrization of the states in Γ¯Q in the basis {|00〉, |01〉, |10〉, |11〉} are given by the
density operators
V+[σ¯+AB] = V−[σ¯−AB] =

x a b c
a∗ y d b∗
b∗ d y a∗
c b a x
 (7.51)
σ¯?AB =

x? a? b? c?
a∗? y? d? b
∗
?
b∗? d? y? a
∗
?
c? b? a? x?
 (7.52)
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By concavity, the coefficients a and b can be chosen real. Two more parameters are
eliminated by imposing the equality constraint Q and the normalization of the trace: x =
1−Q
2
and y = Q
2
. Finally, the equality constrain ρAB eliminates several parameters in ρ
?
AB:
x? = y? =
1
4
, d? = c? and a?, b? ∈ R, while the remaining parameters (a?, b? and c?) are
expressed in dependence of a, b, c and d:
a? =
1
p(“?”)
(
B0
4
− (1− p(“?”))a
)
(7.53)
b? =
1
p(“?”)
(
A0
4
− (1− p(“?”))b
)
(7.54)
c? =
1
p(“?”)
(
A0B0
4
− (1− p(“?”))c+ d
2
)
(7.55)
We are now left with four parameters, a, b, c and d. Additionally, σ¯+AB, σ¯
−
AB and σ¯
?
AB must
be chosen positive.
7.5 Implementations with realistic devices
In this section we simulate the expected observations (Q and p(“?”)) for a realistic imple-
mentation in the node. We choose the implementation of the optimal USD in Sec. 7.3.3,
and use the experimental values (channel loss ξ, the dark counts dc, and alignment errors
Qalign) in Refs. [61, 91] for our simulation. Then, using a subgradient method [12], we
optimize χtot numerically over the set Γ¯Q in MATLAB with the simulated observations.
The channels lA and lB are characterized by transmissivity coefficients ηA = 10
−lAξ/10
and ηB = 10
−lBξ/10, where the channel loss ξ is in units of dB/km. If Alice sends coherent
states |±α〉, and Bob sends coherent states |±
√
ηA
ηB
α〉, the states arriving at the node are
coherent states | ± α′〉 with equal magnitude α′ = √ηAα. We treat detector inefficiencies
as a lossy element (a beamsplitter with transmissivity ηdet) followed by a perfect lossless
detector, and assume that the detector losses are symmetric over the detectors D+ and
D−. Two types of events cause the detectors to click: (i) an incoming state, (ii) a dark
count dc or an alignment error Qalign. We assume the limit of a negligable dark count rate
and a negligable double click rate in the detectors.
The plots the key rates in dependence of the total distance between Alice and Bob
L = lA + lB are shown in Figs. 7.4 and 7.3. Since the amplitude α is under Alice’s control,
we maximize the key rate over α in order to obtain the best key rate for a given distance.
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Figure 7.3: Plot of key rates for the different settings for experimental values from Ref.
[91]. (a) Asymmetric MDI scenario lB = 0 (green line), overlapping with symmetric MDI
scenario lA = lB (black line). (b) Strong reference pulse scenario (lB = 0).
We plot two scenarios: (i) lA = lB, a symmetric placement of the node between Alice and
Bob (black line), and (ii) lB = 0 and lA = L, an asymmetric placement of the node next
to Bob (green line).
The black and the green line lie on top of each other, suggesting that the placement
of the node has little importance on the performance of the protocol. However, it turns
out that the distance, for which a secure key rate can be obtained, is rather low, because
the MDI-B92 protocol is not very robust against loss. For the experimental parameters in
Ref. [91] and [61], the maximal distance is approximately 48 km and 38 km, respectively.
In comparison, the maximal distance of the MDI protocol with BB84 states in Ref. [61] is
more than 200 km.
7.5.1 Homodyne measurement and postselection
Another possible strategy for the node is to do homodyne measurements instead of using
threshold detectors. For example, the node could measure the quadrature xˆ on the “+”
output port, and the quadrature pˆ on the “-” output port. The probability distribution
of the outcomes (x, p) for coherent state inputs [Eq. (7.14)] is shown in Fig. 7.5. The
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Figure 7.4: Plot of key rates for the different settings for for experimental values from Ref.
[61]. (a) Symmetric MDI scenario lA = lB (black line). (b) Strong reference pulse scenario
lB = 0.
colour-coding represents the regions of outcomes (x, p) which are predominantly triggered
by correlated (anti-correlated) input states.
The homodyne measurements always yield a conclusive outcome (p(“?”) = 0), for
which we have already shown in Sec. 7.3.1 that no key can be generated. However, we
allow the node to postselect on the “good” measurement outcomes and make a inconclusive
announcement for “bad” measurement outcomes. At the border of the regions in Fig. 7.5
we expect a high error rate, because it is equally likely that the input state was correlated
and an anti-correlated. Therefore, we identify the points close to the border as “bad”
and assign to them an inconclusive announcement γ = “?”. The amount of inconclusive
announcements must not exceed the failure probability p(“?”)sepUSD = 〈α| − α〉(2 − 〈α| −
α〉), which is the failure probability of a separable USD attack, otherwise the protocol is
insecure.
We computed the effective error rate after the postselection on “good” outcomes for
several values of α, and compared it to the tolerable error rate obtained from our numerical
calculations of the key rate. It turns out that the effective error rate was too high in order
to generate a secure key.
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Sunday, October 21, 2012
Figure 7.5: Probability distribution of measurement outcomes after a homodyne detection
in the measurement values x and p. The yellow and blue regions correspond the data points
(x, p) where the correlated and anti-correlated pairs are identified.
7.6 Security proof of the strong reference pulse B92
protocol
7.6.1 Strong reference pulse B92 protocol
In the original B92 protocol the signal states are accompanied by a strong reference pulse
(SRP), which must be detected at Bob’s side for every signal [2]. The strong reference pulse
does not carry any information about the key bits, but it is important for the security.
If the protocol is implemented without a strong reference pulse, the protocol becomes
insecure under channel loss, because Eve can do a USD attack on the signal states. This
result was shown in Refs. [89, 90].
The setup of the SRP-B92 scheme is shown in Fig. 7.6. The strong reference pulse
is generated in Alice’s laboratory by a source that emits coherent states. Alice splits the
coherent states into a weak pulse (the signal pulse), and a strong pulse (the reference
pulse). She applies a phase shift of 0 or pi to the signal pulse, which prepares one of the
two weak coherent states | ± α〉. The phases + or − of the coherent states denote the bit
values 0 or 1, respectively. Finally, Alice sends the signal and the reference pulse through a
quantum channel to Bob. Before performing his measurement, Bob attenuates the strong
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Figure 7.6: Setup of the strong reference pulse scheme.
reference pulse to match the intensity of the signal pulse. He applies a phase shift 0 or pi
to the reference pulse before recombining the signal and the attenuated reference pulse at
a balanced beamsplitter. The beams exiting from the output ports of the beamsplitter are
measured using threshold detectors D+ and D−. Bob also monitors the intensity of the
incoming strong reference pulse at all times to ensure that it was not blocked.
The security proof for the strong reference pulse scheme has been developed in Refs.
[91, 55]. In the security proof in Ref. [91], two photon-number-resolving detectors are
required at Bob’s side.
7.6.2 Adaptation of the MDI-B92 security proof to the SRP-B92
protocol
We derive a security proof for the SRP-B92 protocol from the security proof that we
developed for the MDI-B92 protocol in the previous sections. The main idea is to show
that the security proof that holds in the MDI scenario also holds for the SRP scenario.
There are several steps between the initial SRP scenario and the final MDI scenario, that
we describe here.
(a) We start with the original SRP scenario. If we assume that Bob can generate a reference
pulse in his own laboratory, the original SRP scenario is equivalent to the scenario in
115
Bob
Alice
Source
c
Source
| ± α〉
| ± β〉
ηA
ηdet
ηdet
Sunday, October 21, 2012
(a) The SRP is generated locally in Bob’s labo-
ratory. The detector loss is modeled by beam-
splitters with transmissitivity ηdet.
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(b) Equivalent scenario with the detector loss in
the channels.
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(c) The detector loss is absorbed in Bob’s source.
His signal states are now described by |√ηdetβ〉.
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(d) Eve’s domain is extended to the beamsplitter
and the two threshold detectors.
Figure 7.7: Steps leading from the SRP scenario to the MDI scenario.
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Fig. 7.7 (a), where Bob generates the reference pulse locally. This assumption is
justified in Ref. [55] provided that Bob is able to transfer the phase of Alice’s reference
pulse to his local pulse. Moreover, in classical telecommunication protocols with high
detection rates it is already common practice to generate the phase reference locally.
(b) We describe the detector inefficiencies in the threshold detectors by beamsplitters with
transmissivity ηdet ≤ 1 followed by perfect lossless detectors. If we place the beamsplit-
ters ηdet into the links lA and lB, the security is not compromised. In this equivalent
scenario, we are able to treat the losses like channel losses [see Fig. 7.7 (b)]. The
assumption that went into this step is that the losses in D+ and D− are symmetric.
(c) In the scenario in Fig. 7.7 (b), Bob’s source emits |β〉 followed by an attenuation in
the link by ηdet. This scenario is equivalent to the scenario in Fig. 7.7 (c), where
Bob’s source emits a coherent state |√ηdetβ〉 into a lossless link. Therefore, we absorb
the loss in the link lB into Bob’s source by recalibrating the intensity of the emitted
coherent state |β〉 by a factor of ηdet.
(d) Finally, in Fig. 7.7 (d) we extend Eve’s domain to the balanced beamsplitter and the
detectors D±. We are now the MDI scenario, except that Eve does not have access to
one of the loss ηdet that was absorbed in Bob’s source.
In the simulation we assume that the link lB carries no channel loss because the node is
placed at zero distance from Bob (lB = 0). To obtain the optimal key rates, we maximize
over the amplitude α. We plot the key rates in red in Figs. 7.4 and 7.3 for different
experimental parameters. The key rate of the SRP-B92 beats the key rate of the MDI-B92
scenario, because on of the losses ηdet is absorbed in Bob’s source, is not accessible to
Eve. However, our key rate for the SRP-B92 is low in comparison to the key rates in Ref.
[91, 55]. This can be understood because we give Eve more power that she actually has.
In reality Eve does not have access to the entire measurement apparatus.
7.7 Conclusion
In this chapter we analyze the performance of a MDI protocol with B92 signal states. Alice
and Bob are both senders, while a node in the middle acts as the receiver and performs
the measurement. To each measurement outcome the node makes an announcement that
is used by Alice and Bob to postprocess their data in order to generate correlated strings
of bits.
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We provide a security proof for the protocol under the assumption of an MED attack
and a USD attack. The assumption of these specific attacks is only valid for certain
observations. If the observations indicate an MED attack, we find that no key can be
generated, because the joint attack MED is equivalent to the separable MED attack, which
yields no positive key rate. In fact, any strategy where the node is forced to make an
announcement for each signal is equivalent to a separable strategy and yields no key. On
the other hand, if the observations indicate a USD attack, a positive key rate is possible,
because the joint and the separable eavesdropping strategy is different.
We also provide a security proof for the MDI-B92 protocol for general observations.
The MDI-B92 protocol exhibits enough symmetries in order to justify a symmetric optimal
attack. We simulate the measurement outcomes for the optimal joint USD setup in the
node, including channel loss, detector efficiency, dark counts and misalignment errors.
Although we obtain positive key rates, it turns out that the MDI-B92 protocol is vulnerable
to channel loss. In terms of distance, the MDI-B92 protocol is outperformed by the MDI
protocol with BB84 signal states and Decoy states.
Finally, we apply the established MDI-B92 security proof to generate a security proof
for the B92 protocol with a strong reference pulse. Our method yields positive key rates,
but it is not an improvement over already existing security proofs.
It would be interesting to apply the methods developed in this chapter to analyze MDI
protocols with other sets of signal states that are less vulnerable to channel loss or to MED
attacks.
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Chapter 8
Application of the entropic
uncertainty relation to security
proofs of continuous-variable QKD
As an alternative to the discrete-variable encoding schemes, protocols with continuous-
variable encoding schemes have been suggested, for example, in Refs. [46, 74]. Instead
of photon counters, continuous-variable (CV) schemes employ homodyne or heterodyne
quadrature measurements on the receiver’s side, which provide a continuous spectrum of
outcomes. While homodyne measurements are fast and have high efficiencies, the data
processing is more involved, because of the continuous nature of the outcomes. Moreover,
in the source replacement scheme, Bob’s system is infinite-dimensional which can pose
difficulties for the security proof.
In this chapter we analyze the 2-state protocol with discrete modulation and homodyne
measurements. This protocol is actually rather simple to implement experimentally. Alice
has the choice between two coherent states with opposite phases | ± α〉, where α is real.
Bob does a homodyne measurement of the xˆ quadrature half of the time, and if his outcome
is positive/negative, he identifies the bit value by 0/1. He also measures the pˆ quadrature
half of the time in order to check for Eve’s presence.
For this protocol, the quantum state ρAB in the source-replacement scheme is infinite-
dimensional on system B. In the parameter estimation the state ρAB is typically character-
ized in terms of Bob’s observed first and second moments of the xˆ and pˆ quadrature. For
general observations, this characterization of ρAB still leaves infinitely many eavesdropping
attacks, and therefore, the optimization of the key rate is difficult. However, for some spe-
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cial observations, the eavesdropping attacks can be constructed analytically. For example,
if Bob can verify from his observations that he receives pure states, the attack must have
been a beamsplitter attack, for which a security proof is analytically given in Ref. [44].
Furthermore, for observations with very small excess noise, numerical security proofs were
found in Ref. [96].
Recently, a new entropic uncertainty relation under assumption of a quantum memory
was proven in Ref. [11]. Using this relation it was possible to provide a new security proof
for the BB84 protocol based on Alice and Bob’s observations, without having to specify
the exact structure of ρAB. The security proof reproduced the exact BB84 key rates [11].
The goal of this chapter is to use the new uncertainty relation to provide an alternative
approach to prove the security of CV QKD protocols with reverse reconciliation and homo-
dyne measurements on Bob’s side. On the one hand, we analyze the continuous-variable
counterpart of the BB84 protocol with squeezed coherent states and Gaussian modulation.
We find that the key rate is only positive, if Bob can verify a minimum amount of squeezing
in his observations. On the other hand, we analyze the 2-state protocol. We hoped that
the method based on the uncertainty relation would be successful, but unfortunately, it
did not yield positive key rates. The reason is that there is not enough information in the
observations in order to make a sufficiently good estimate of Eve’s knowlegde.
8.1 Entropic uncertainty relations
We demonstrate the entropic uncertainty relation in a similar fashion as in Ref. [11].
Alice prepares the state ρB and sends it to Bob. Bob chooses to measure one of the non-
commuting observables xˆ or pˆ and announces the choice of the observable publicly. Alice’s
task is to guess Bob’s measurement outcome knowing which observable he measured. We
allow Alice to keep a description of ρB in a memory, represented by an initial quantum state
ρAB between Alice and Bob with the property trA ρAB = ρB. The correlations between
the systems A and B can range from basic classical correlations (classical memory) to
entanglement (quantum memory).
For practical calculations we write the measurement outcomes in a classical system XB
or PB. The joint state between Alice and Bob after the measurement is a cq state
ρAXB =
∑
x
p(x)ρxA ⊗ |x〉〈x|XB , (8.1)
ρAPB =
∑
p
p(p)ρpA ⊗ |p〉〈p|PB , (8.2)
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where p(x) and p(p) denote the continuous probability density functions of the measure-
ment outcomes, and the states ρxA and ρ
p
A are the conditional states held by Alice. Alice’s
uncertainty about Bob’s measurement outcome is captured in the conditional differential
entropy H(XB|A) and H(PB|A) defined as
H(XB|A) = H(XB) +
∑
x
p(x)S(ρxA)− S(ρA). (8.3)
In this expression, the Shannon entropy of a continuous probability density function p(x) is
called differential entropy or continuous entropy. It is given byH(XB) = −
∫
dx p(x) log p(x).
The first entropic uncertainty relation, which was introduced in Ref. [66], characterize
how much uncertainty Alice has about Bob’s outcome if her memory is purely classical. The
entropic uncertainty principle recently proven in Ref. [11] characterizes Alice’s uncertainty
about Bob’s measurement outcomes also for quantum memories. The entropic uncertainty
relation reads:
H(XB|A) +H(PB|A) ≥ log2
1
c
+ S(B|A). (8.4)
In this relation, the term c represents the complementarity between xˆ and pˆ. If xˆ and pˆ are
two non-degenerate observables with eigenvectors {|φx〉} and {|ψp〉}, c = maxx,p |〈φx|ψp〉|2.
The conditional entropy S(B|A) quantifies the initial entanglement in the state ρAB be-
tween Alice and Bob. In fact, this term can be negative and can cancel out the term log2
1
c
.
For example, let Alice and Bob’s initial state be the perfectly entangled two-qubit state
|φ〉AB = 1√2(|00〉+ |11〉), and let Bob measure either in the Pauli X or Z eigenbasis. Then,
c = 1/2, S(B|A) = − log2 2 = −1 [11], and the right hand side of Eq. (8.4) cancels out.
In this case, Alice is able to predict Bob’s measurement outcomes perfectly, because the
entropic uncertainty relations implies that H(XB|A) = H(PB|A) = 0.
If the initial state ρAB is mixed, we can construct a tripartite purification |Ψ〉ABE on
an additional system E, and the entropic uncertainty relation can be written involving
the system E. Due to the Schmidt decomposition it follows that S(ρE) = S(ρAB) and
S(ρAXB) = S(ρXBE). From these identities, it follows that
H(XB|A)− S(B|A) = S(ρAXB)− S(ρA)− S(ρAB) + S(ρA) (8.5)
= S(ρXBE)− S(ρE) (8.6)
= H(XB|E) (8.7)
Inserting this into the entropic uncertainty relation in Eq. (8.4), we obtain
H(XB|E) +H(PB|A) ≥ log2
1
c
. (8.8)
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Furthermore, the entropic uncertainty is valid for generalized measurements with POVM
elements {Fx}x and {Fp}p. The generalized version of the term c is given by
c = max
p
||
∑
x
FxFpFx||∞, (8.9)
where the infinity norm ||C||∞ (or operator norm) is defined as ||C||∞ = max|Ψ〉
√〈Ψ|C†C|Ψ〉.
If C is Hermitian, the operator norm is equal to the largest eigenvalue of C.
8.2 Entropic uncertainty relations in QKD
8.2.1 Key rate with reverse reconciliation
In this section we use the entropic uncertainty relation to provide a security proof for
continuous-variable protocols with reverse reconciliation. Reverse reconciliation in CV
QKD protocols allows to find a positive secret key rate even beyond the 3dB loss limit
[43, 72].
As usually, we work in the source-replacement scheme, and describe the state between
Alice and Bob by a bipartite state ρAB, of which Eve holds the purification |Ψ〉ABE. We
call Alice’s generic measurements M with outcomes i and probabilities p(i). There are no
assumptions on the spectrum of Alice’s measurement outcomes i, which can be discrete
or continuous at this point. Bob does a homodyne measurement on the system B with
respect to one of the quadratures xˆ or pˆ. The key is build from the data that Bob obtained
by measuring xˆ, while the other measurement (pˆ) is used to check for Eve’s presence. The
key generated using reverse reconciliation is given by the Devetak-Winter formula
rRR = I(MA : XB)− χ(XB : E) = H(XB|E)−H(XB|MA). (8.10)
If we use the entropic uncertainty relation in Eq. (8.4) to estimate Eve’s uncertainty by
H(XB|E) ≥ log2 1c −H(PB|A), we obtain a bound for the key rate
rRR ≥ log2
1
c
−H(PB|A)−H(XB|MA), (8.11)
that depends only on Alice and Bob’s systems, and not on Eve.
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8.2.2 Entropic uncertainty relation and homodyne measurements
In this section we calculate the constant c for homodyne measurements [82]. We first define
the coarse-grained homodyne measurements with POVM elements that are projectors onto
finite intervals (xi − ∆2 , xi + ∆2 ) of width ∆:
Fxi =
∫ xi+∆/2
xi−∆/2
|x〉〈x|dx (8.12)
Fpj =
∫ pj+∆/2
pj−∆/2
|p〉〈p|dp. (8.13)
If a state ρ is measured with respect to the coarse-grained measurement, the probability
distribution of the outcomes is discretized p(xi) = tr{ρFxi} =
∫ xi+∆/2
xi−∆/2 p(x)dx. We write
the outcomes of the coarse-grained measurements into classical systems X∆ and P∆.
For the coarse-grained homodye measurement we can calculate the constant c according
to the definition in Eq. (8.9). In the limit ∆ → 0, we then obtain the value of c for a
homodyne measurement.
Lemma 6 The constant c for the coarse-grained homodyne measurement is lower bounded
by
c ≤ ∆
2
2pi
. (8.14)
In the limit of small ∆, this result is tight. The same result was independently found in
Ref. [37].
Proof. The term
∑
i FxiFpjFxi is a Hermitian operator, and thus the operator norm is
simply the maximal eigenvalue. Since the POVM elements Fpj are projectors onto disjoint
subspaces Hi, each block FxiFpjFxi lives on the operator space B(Hi). Consequently, the
maximum eigenvalue of the sum
∑
i FxiFpjFxi is found on one of the blocks with index i.
This means that ||∑i FxiFpjFxi ||∞ = maxi ||FxiFpjFxi ||∞. Therefore, the constant that we
need to approximate is
c = max
i,j
||FxiFpjFxi ||∞. (8.15)
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We expand the product FxiFpjFxi using the overlaps 〈x|p〉 = 1√2pie−ipx, and compute the
integral over p:
FxiFpjFxi =
∫ xi+∆/2
xi−∆/2
∫ pj+∆/2
pj−∆/2
∫ xi+∆/2
xi−∆/2
dx dp dx′|x〉〈x|p〉〈p|x′〉〈x′| (8.16)
=
1
2pi
∫ xi+∆/2
xi−∆/2
∫ xi+∆/2
xi−∆/2
dx dx′|x〉〈x′|
(∫ pj+∆/2
pj−∆/2
dp e−ip(x−x
′)
)
(8.17)
=
1
2pi
∫ xi+∆/2
xi−∆/2
∫ xi+∆/2
xi−∆/2
dx dx′|x〉〈x′|
(
e−ipj(x−x
′) e
−i(x−x′)∆/2 − ei(x−x′)∆/2
−i(x− x′)
)
(8.18)
=
∆
2pi
∫ xi−∆/2
xi+∆/2
∫ xi−∆/2
xi+∆/2
dx dx′|x〉〈x′| e−ipj(x−x′) sinc
(
∆
2
(x− x′)
)
, (8.19)
where the sinus cardinalis is defined by sinc(x) = sin(x)/x.
Let |ψxi〉 be a normalized state on D(Hi). We estimate the operator norm of FxiFpjFxi
as follows:
||FxiFpjFxi||∞ = max|ψxi 〉
〈ψxi |FxiFpjFxi |ψxi〉
≤ max
|ψxi 〉
|〈ψxi|FxiFpjFxi |ψxi〉|
≤ max
|ψxi 〉
∆
2pi
∫ ∫
dx dx′ |〈ψxi |x〉〈x′|ψxi〉|
∣∣∣eip(x−x′)∣∣∣ ∣∣∣∣sinc(∆2 (x− x′)
)∣∣∣∣
≤ max
|ψxi 〉
∆
2pi
∫ ∫
dx dx′|〈ψxi |x〉〈x′|ψxi〉| (8.20)
In the second line we used that maxy f(y) ≤ maxy |f(y)|, and in the last line we lower-
bounded | sinc(x)| ≤ 1. If we choose |ψxi〉 such that the overlap 〈ψxi|x〉 ≥ 0 and real for all
x, we can drop the absolute values in line (8.20). Furthermore, we define the normalized
uniform superposition state on D(Hi) by |Φxi〉 = 1√∆
∫ xi+∆/2
xi−∆/2 |x〉. Then Eq. (8.20) becomes
max
|ψxi 〉
∆
2pi
∫ ∫
dx dx′〈ψxi |x〉〈x′|ψxi〉 = max|ψxi 〉
∆2
2pi
〈ψxi |Φxi〉〈Φxi |ψxi〉 =
∆2
2pi
. (8.21)
In the last equality we chose |ψxi〉 = |Φxi〉. 
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The limit of small ∆
In the limit of small ∆, the conditional entropy H(X∆B |E) of the coarse-grained random
variable X∆ is approximated by the conditional differential entropy H(XB|E) defined
in Eq. (8.3) of the continuous random variable X. For the Shannon entropy and the
conditional von Neumann entropy the following approximations hold:
Lemma 7 The discrete entropies are approximated by the continuous entropies:
H(X∆B ) ' H(XB)− log2 ∆, (8.22)
H(X∆B |E) ' H(XB|E)− log2 ∆.. (8.23)
Using Eq. (8.23) we are able to approximate the classical conditional entropyH(X∆B |MA) '
H(XB|MA)− log2 ∆. Furthermore, if we substitute these approximations into the key rate
together with c ≤ ∆2/2pi, all terms ∆ cancel out
rRR ≥ log2(2pi)−H(PB|A)−H(XB|MA). (8.24)
Proof. Eq. (8.22) is proved using the mean value theorem, which states that for a
continuous function f(x) there exists a x¯i in the interval (xi − ∆2 , xi + ∆2 ) such that∫ xi+∆x/2
xi−∆x/2
f(x)dx = f(x¯i)∆. (8.25)
We identify f(x) with the probability density function p(x) of measurement outcomes of
X. Using the mean value theorem, we expand the Shannon entropy
H(X∆B ) = −
∑
i
p(xi) log2 p(xi) (8.26)
= −
∑
i
∆p(x¯i) log2(∆p(x¯i)) (8.27)
= −
∑
i
∆p(x¯i) log2(p(x¯i))−
(∑
i
∆p(x¯i)
)
log2 ∆ (8.28)
In the limit of small ∆, the first term tends to − ∫ p(x) log2 p(x)dx, while the second term
is − log2 ∆ because of the identity
∑
i ∆p(x¯i) =
∫
p(x)dx = 1 according to the mean value
theorem. This proves the first approximation in Eq. (8.22).
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In order to prove Eq. (8.23), we expand H(X∆B |E) = H(X∆B ) + S(E|X∆B )− S(E). The
only unknown term is S(E|X∆B ) =
∑
i p(xi)S(ρ
xi
E ) with conditional states
ρxiE =
∫ xi+∆x/2
xi−∆x/2 p(x)ρ
x
Edx
p(xi)
=
∆f(x¯i)
p(xi)
(8.29)
We identified f(x) = p(x)ρxE and used the mean value theorem in the last equation. We
get rid of denominator p(xi) using the identity S(ρ/p) = S(ρ)/p+ log2 p in S(E|X∆B ) and
regroup the terms
H(X∆B |E) = H(X∆B ) +
∑
i
p(xi)S
(
∆f(x¯i)
p(xi)
)
− S(E) (8.30)
=
∑
i
S (∆f(x¯i))− S(E) (8.31)
= −
∑
i
∆ tr{f(x¯i) log2 f(x¯i)} − tr
{∑
i
∆f(x¯i)
}
log2 ∆− S(E) (8.32)
' −
∫
dx tr{f(x) log2 f(x)} − log2 ∆− S(E). (8.33)
In the last line we used that, in the limit of small ∆, the first term approaches the in-
tegral − ∫ dx tr{f(x) log2 f(x)}. The second term in (8.32) is equal to − log2 ∆ because
tr{∑i ∆f(x¯i)} = tr{∫ dx p(x)ρxE} = 1. If we substitute f(x) = p(x)ρxE we obtain
−
∫
dx tr{f(x) log2 f(x)} = −
∫
dx p(x) log2 p(x)−
∫
dx p(x) tr{ρxE log2 ρxE} (8.34)
= H(XB) + S(E|XB). (8.35)
Finally, substituting this result into H(X∆B |E), we obtain Eq. (8.23). 
8.3 CV QKD protocol examples
In this section we calculate the key rates of two continuous-variable protocols using the
entropic uncertainty principle.
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8.3.1 Protocol with Gaussian modulation and squeezed states
First we analyze a protocol with Gaussian modulated squeezed states and homodyne de-
tection. This protocol is generally seen as the continuous-variable counterpart of the BB84
protocol. It was proposed in Ref. [23], and unconditional security was proven in Refs. [42].
We use the entropic uncertainty relation to calculate the key rate of this protocol, which
was also done in Ref. [37].
Alice chooses with probability 1/2 to prepare a squeezed vacuum state in either the
xˆ or the pˆ quadrature. If she chose xˆ (pˆ), she modulates the squeezed state according
to a Gaussian probability density function p(xA) (p(pA)) along the xˆ- (pˆ) -quadrature.
She then sends the squeezed state to Bob, who does a homodyne measurement of either
the xˆ or the pˆ quadrature, with continuous outcomes xB or pB. Finally, Alice and Bob
postselect on the data where both chose the same quadrature, which is equivalent to the
basis sifting step in the BB84 protocol. After the postselection on matching quadratures,
the data is divided into two sets, one set where both chose the xˆ quadrature, and one where
both chose the pˆ quadrature, with conditional probability density functions p(xB|xA) and
p(pB|pA) describing each set.
In the source-replacement scheme Alice prepares a two-mode squeezed state |ΨTMSS〉AB
defined in Eq. (2.39) in her laboratory, and sends the second half to Bob. Alice randomly
chooses to measure her part with respect to one of the two homodyne measurements xˆ
or pˆ, with continuous outcomes xA or pA according to a Gaussian distribution. This
measurement effectively prepares a squeezed coherent state |α, r〉 for Bob.
In the quantum description of the postselection, the Kraus operators KxA ⊗ KxB and
KpA⊗KpB associated to the matching quadratures are proportional to the identity, because
the measurement xˆ and pˆ are complete von Neumann measurements [see Sec. 3.5.1].
If we denote the state between Alice and Bob by ρAB, the conditional states after the
postselection remain unchanged:
ρxxAB = K
x
A ⊗KxBρAB(KxA ⊗KxB)† = ρAB, (8.36)
ρppAB = K
x
A ⊗KxBρAB(KxA ⊗KxB)† = ρAB. (8.37)
If we choose to extract the key from the data where the xˆ quadrature was matching,
the key rate is
rRR = H(XB|E)xx −H(XB|XA)xx (8.38)
≥ log2(2pi)−H(PB|A)xx −H(XB|XA)xx. (8.39)
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In this expression we do not know the conditional entropy H(PB|A)xx, because the state
ρxxAB is never actually measured with respect to the pˆ quadrature on Bob’s side. However,
since ρxxAB = ρ
pp
AB, we can estimate the conditional entropyH(PB|A)xx from the pˆ quadrature
measurement of ρppAB by H(PB|A)xx = H(PB|A)pp. Finally, since Alice actually performs a
measurement on her system, we use the bound H(PB|A)xx ≤ H(PB|PA)xx to estimate he
remaining term. We are now able to express the key rate in terms of measured quantities
only
rRR ≥ log2(2pi)−H(PB|PA)pp −H(XB|XA)xx. (8.40)
Now we evaluate the key rate for a typical setup. We model Bob’s measurement out-
comes by Gaussian distributions. This is reasonable to expect in an experiment where
Alice sends squeezed vacuum states through a lossy channel. We define Bob’s first and
second moments in each set of matching measurements by (〈xB〉, Varx) and (〈pB〉,Varp).
Furthermore, we assume that the variances are independent of Alice’s values xA and pA.
Since the entropy
H(pG(x)) = −
∫
dx pG(x) log2 pG(x) = log2
√
2piVarx e, (8.41)
of a Gaussian probability density function pG(x) with first and second moments (〈x〉,Varx)
is independent of the first moment, it follows that the Bob’s conditional entropies are given
by
H(XB|XA)xx = log2
√
2piVarxe, (8.42)
H(PB|PA)pp = log2
√
2piVarpe. (8.43)
We substitute these results into the key rate and obtain
rRR ≥ log2
(
1
e
√
VarxVarp
)
. (8.44)
It turns out that this expression is only positive if the states arriving at Bob’s side have a
minimum amount of squeezing. In terms of the Bob’s observed data, the variances must
satisfy at least
√
VarxVarp ≤ 1e , otherwise the key rate is zero. For example, if Bob receives
coherent states, then Varx = Varp =
1
2
, and thus the key rate is zero. The squeezing can
be expressed in terms of the squeezing parameter r (see Sec. 2.2.2), which must exceed
r > 0.15 for a positive key rate.
128
Remark: Recall that the variances do not need to satisfy VarxVarp ≥ 14 , because Varx
is obtained from measuring ρxxAB and Varp from measuring ρ
pp
AB after the postselection on
matching bases.
In Ref. [42], unconditional security was proven for this protocol in connection with
error corrections codes for a squeezing parameter r > 0.28.
8.3.2 The 2-state protocol
The 2-state protocol is the simplest CV protocol. In contrast to the previous protocol,
Alice sends only two states to Bob. In a sense this is a “hybrid” protocol with a discrete
modulation in a continuous-variable setting.
Alice chooses randomly one of two coherent states with opposite phases | ± α〉. The
phases of the coherent states represent the two bit values 0 and 1. The coherent states
are chosen with a priori probability p(i) = 1/2 for i = 0, 1. While travelling through the
quantum channel, the states are typically attenuated by the loss and experience a broad-
ening in phase space (excess noise) [64]. After traveling through the channel, Bob obtains
conditional states ρiB for i = 0, 1. He does either an xˆ or a pˆ quadrature measurement, and
identifies the bit value from the sign of his xˆ measurement outcome. The pˆ measurement
is used to check for Eve’s presence. We assume that Bob’s probability probability density
functions p(xB|i) and p(pB|i) are Gaussian with variances Varx and Varp.
In the source-replacement scheme, the source state is entangled between a qubit system
A and a infinite-dimensional system B,
|Φ〉AB = 1√
2
(|0〉|α〉+ |1〉| − α〉), (8.45)
Alice’s measurement M is a von Neumann measurement with projectors {|0〉〈0|, |1〉〈1|},
which prepares the two coherent signal states on Bob’s side. Since there is only one
measurement on Alice’s side, the key rate
r ≥ log2(2pi)−H(PB|A)−H(XB|MA) (8.46)
in Eq. (8.24) applies here.
Estimation of H(PB|A) for the 2-state protocol
In order to give a lower bound on the key rate, we make an estimate of the term H(PB|A).
In a first step, we use the bound H(PB|A) ≤ H(PB|MA) to make all quantities that
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appear in the key rate dependent on measured quantities. For a Gaussian distribution,
the conditional entropies were given in Eqs. (8.42) and (8.43). However, in contrast to the
CV protocol with squeezed states and postselection, the variances in case of the 2-state
protocol must satisfy the Heisenberg uncertainty relation VarxVarp ≥ 1/4. If we calculate
the key rate, we obtain
rRR ≥ log2(2pi)−H(PB|MA)−H(XB|MA) = log2
(
1
e
√
VarxVarp
)
≥ log2
(
2
e
)
. (8.47)
The term log2
2
e
is negative. This shows that our first estimate of H(PB|A) needs to be
improved for a positive key rate.
In a second step, we tried to estimate H(PB|A) directly. Unfortunately, though, we
did not succeed in finding a better bound in this case either. In the remaining part of this
section, we show the steps that we tried to obtain an estimate of H(PB|A).
Let Alice, Bob and Eve share a pure tripartite state |Ψ〉ABE. We would like to find an
upper bound for the conditional entropy
H(PB|A) = S(A|PB)− S(A) +H(PB), (8.48)
after Bob did a pˆ quadrature measurement. The term H(PB) is known from Bob’s the
observations. Here we assume again that Bob sees a Gaussian distribution in the pˆ-
quadrature, so that H(PB) = log2
√
2piVarpe. The term S(A) = S(ρA) = h(µ+) is
computed from the eigenvalues µ± = 12(1 ± e−2|α|
2
) of the known reduced density oper-
ators
ρA = trB |Φ〉〈Φ| = 1
2
(
1 〈−α|α〉
〈α| − α〉 1
)
(8.49)
given here in the canonical basis {|0〉, |1〉}. In order to calculate S(A|PB) =
∫
dpB p(pB) S(ρ
pB
A )
we parametrize Alice’s conditional states ρpBA in the canonical basis by density matrices
ρpBA =
(
p(0|pB) t(pB)
t(pB)
∗ p(1|pB)
)
=
(
1/2 t(pB)
t(pB)
∗ 1/2
)
(8.50)
with unknown off-diagonal coefficients t(pB). The coefficients t(pB) are not arbitrary, since
the states ρpBA must the following constraints:
(i) The states ρpBA are positive.
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(ii) The integral
∫
dpB p(pB)ρ
pB
A must be equal to the reduced state ρA.
(iii) The first and second moments of Bob’s measurement outcomes are fixed.
If we drop the third constraint, a solution is t(pB) =
1
2
〈−α|α〉. This implies that ρpBA = ρA
for all pB, and it follows that H(PB|A) = H(PB) = log2
√
2piVarpe. We already know
that this estimate does not yield any positive key rate. Therefore, the bound on H(PB|A)
obtained from constraints (i) and (ii) alone is not strong enough
We tried to incorporate the third constraint into the estimation, but we had no success.
One would need to have an estimate of the entropies S(ρpBA ) depending on Bob’s first and
second moments.
Beamsplitter attack on the 2-state protocol
The estimate of the key rate using the entropic uncertainty relation (Eq. 8.11) is a lower
bound of the Devetak-Winter key rate in Eq. (8.10). Since there is a “ ≥ ” sign in the
entropic uncertainty relation, it is possible that this bound is not tight in all cases. In this
section, we investigate the size of the gap between the bound using the entropic uncertainty
relation and the Devetak-Winter formula on an example, where we model Eve’s interaction
by a beamsplitter.
The security proof of the 2-state protocol under the assumption of a beamsplitter
attack using the Devetak-Winter proof is found in Ref. [44]. Eve’s interaction with the
signal states | ± α〉 is modelled by a beamsplitter with transmissivity η that transforms
| ± α〉 → | ±√ηα〉B ⊗ | ±√ηα〉E. Eve keeps system E for herself, and sends system B to
Bob. After this interaction, in the source-replacement scheme, the state shared between
Alice, Bob and Eve is the pure state
|Ψ〉ABE = 1√
2
(
|0〉A ⊗ |√ηα〉B ⊗ |
√
1− ηα〉E + |1〉A ⊗ | −√ηα〉B ⊗ | −
√
1− ηα〉E
)
.
(8.51)
We calculate the bound on the key rate using the entropic uncertainty relation in Eq.
(8.46) and compare it to the Devetak-Winter key rate obtained in Ref. [44]. To obtain
the bound, we compute the entropy H(PB|A) using the decomposition in Eq. (8.48) for a
given state |Ψ〉ABE. The only term missing in the decomposition is the entropy S(A|PB),
which is given in terms of the eigenvalues λ± = 12(1± e−2(1−η)|α|
2
) of the conditional states
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Figure 8.1: Two bounds on the key rate of the 2-state protocol under the assumption of
a beamsplitter attack for different values of α and η. (a) The bound obtained using the
entropic uncertainty relation. (b) The bound obtained using the Devetak-Winter key rate
formula.
ρpBA by
S(A|PB) =
∫
dpB p(pB) h(λ+) = h(λ+). (8.52)
The bound on the key rate using the uncertainty relation,
runcert = log2(2pi)−H(PB|A)−H(XB|MA) (8.53)
= log2(2pi)−
(
1
e
√
VarxVarp
)
+ h(µ+)− h(λ+), (8.54)
and the key rate rDW obtained with the Devetak-Winter key rate formula in Ref. [44] are
plotted in Fig. 8.1 for different values of α and η. As expected, the difference rDW−runcert ≥
0 at each point, which can be seen in Fig. 8.2. In certain regions, the gap between rDW
and runcert is as large as 0.4 bits per signal.
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Figure 8.2: A plot of the difference rDW − runcert for different values of α and η.
8.4 Conclusion
In this chapter, we used the entropic uncertainty principle as a tool to calculate key rates
of continuous-variable QKD protocols with reverse reconciliation. We demonstrated the
performance of the new tool on the example of two protocols: first, we analyzed a Gaussian
protocol with squeezed coherent states, which is the continuous-variable counterpart of the
BB84 protocol, and second we analyzed the 2-state protocol, which uses two coherent
states with opposite phases as signal states. For the former protocol it turns out that a
minimum amount of squeezing must be observed in order to obtain a positive key rate, if
following a proof using the uncertainty principle. For the latter protocol the estimation
of Eve’s information was not sufficient to prove a positive key rate. The reasons that no
positive key could be established are
1. The key rate was found to be negative when we estimated the entropy H(PB|A) by
H(PB|MA).
2. One would need an estimate of H(PB|A) based on Bob’s fist and second moments.
To our knowledge there is no such estimate.
133
Chapter 9
Concluding remarks
In this thesis we analyzed the security of different protocols. We were able to prove
the security and analyze the performance in realistic implementations for a number of
protocols. For others, we explored new security proof methods and compared them to
existing methods.
In order to simplify key rate calculations, it is beneficial to know if the optimal attack
carries the symmetry of the the signal states of the underlying protocol. We answer the
question under what conditions this claim is true in the Devetak-Winter security proof
framework in Chapter 4. We work in the scenario where the parameter estimation is based
on coarse-grained quantities, typically the error rate. Not only the measurements, but
also the postselection needs to exhibit a certain symmetry in order to prove a symmetric
optimal attack. Protocols with sets of orthonormal bases as signal states and a postselection
on matching bases satisfy these conditions. Using these tools we were able to analyze
the security of protocols with mutually unbiased bases on d-dimensional Hilbert spaces,
and identify qubit protocols which have the same optimal attack as the BB84 or 6-state
protocol.
In Chapter 5, we study the question if the optimal eavesdropping and the optimal
cloning transformation coincide in the Devetak-Winter framework. We restrict our study
to protocols where the optimal attack can be proven to be symmetric, such as protocols
with orthonormal bases. We found that the optimal cloning transformation is drawn from
the same set of symmetric transformations as the optimal eavesdropping transformation,
if the optimal cloner has a strong covariant realization. However, this condition alone
does not guarantee that the transformations are equivalent, unless the set of symmetric
transformations contains only one transformation. Moreover, no general rule was found
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to determine the answer to our question. Specific examples of protocols with n mutually
unbiased bases in d dimensions demonstrate that for some cases the optimal attack is an
optimal cloner (n = 2, d+ 1), and for other cases it is not (n = d).
We prove the security of the unbalanced phase-encoded BB84 protocol with a lossy
phase modulator under implementation of Decoy states in Chapter 6. The typical BB84
signal states and measurements are no longer guaranteed if the phase modulator is lossy.
We propose two experimental remedies that restore conditions for which the BB84 security
proof holds, but also provide a refined security proof taking into account the modified
signal and measurement structure. Our security proof is a qubit-to-qubit security proof
embedded into the more general framework of realistic devices using standard techniques.
The unbalanced phase-encoded protocol exhibits enough symmetries in order to support the
claim of a symmetric optimal attack for the qubit-to-qubit part. Using our security proof,
we compare the performance of different protocols, which we characterize by the amount
of loss in the phase modulator. We find that, as the loss increases, the performance of the
protocols decreases. Therefore, the loss should not be ignored. Our results also suggest
that the experimental remedies are not necessary to implement, because the refined analysis
guarantees equal or better key rates. Comparing different security proof methods, we found
that, for the typical range of observations, the standard BB84 security analysis yields the
same result as our refined analysis. However, for protocols with a high loss in the phase
modulator, in the range of hight error rates and low channel loss, our security analysis
outperforms the BB84 analysis in terms of key rate.
Using the symmetry tools in Chapter 4, we were able to provide a security proof for a
measurement-device-independent QKD setup with B92 signal states in Chapter 7. In the
measurement-device-independent setup, Alice and Bob send quantum states to an adver-
sary intermediate node held by Eve, that acts as the receiver. By making announcements
for each obtained signal, Eve effectively prepares entanglement between Alice and Bob, who
then extract a secret key using traditional QKD methods. If Eve must make a conclusive
announcement for every signal, Alice and Bob can not establish a key, because the eaves-
dropping strategy can always be explained by a separable eavesdropping strategy. On the
other hand, if Eve announces inconclusive results as well, the eavesdropping strategy is not
forcedly a separable strategy. Therefore, a positive key rate can be achieved. However, the
key rate of the MDI-B92 protocol is low, because the protocol is sensitive to channel loss,
like the the B92 protocol with polarization encoding. Furthermore, the established MDI
security proof acts as a new security proof technique for the strong reference pulse B92 pro-
tocol. Using the MDI security proof, we were able to outsource the measurement involving
the strong reference pulse to Eve, making it part of the eavesdropping attack. Although
we obtain positive key rates for the strong reference pulse B92 protocol, already existing
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security proofs beat our results. Nevertheless, the MDI security proof is a promising new
tool to provide security proofs for other protocols.
Finally, in Chapter 8, we establish security proofs based on the entropic uncertainty
relation for continuous-variable protocols with reverse reconciliation. We demonstrate the
new security proof method on two examples. In the example of a protocol with squeezed
states and Gaussian modulation, a minimum amount of squeezing must be observed by Bob
in order to obtain a positive key rate. In the second example of the discrete modulated
2-state protocol with coherent states, we were not able to establish positive key rates.
The method failed because it was not possible to incorporate all observations into the
estimation of Eve’s knowledge, in particular, the second moments of Bob’s observations.
For known attacks, such as the beamsplitter attack, the security proof based on the entropic
uncertainty relation leads to lower key rates than using the traditional Devetak-Winter
security proof. Therefore, it is possible that the new method is not the optimal tool to
prove the security of the 2-state protocol.
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Appendix A
Proofs of theorems and lemmas in
Chapters 3 and 4
A.1 Proof of the weak convexity of the classical mu-
tual information
In this appendix we prove Theorem 7 in Sec. 3.4.
Proof. The mutual information I(ρAB,MAB) depends only on the probability distri-
bution p(x, y). For ρ¯AB the mutual information is explicitly given by I(ρ¯AB,MAB) =
H(p¯(x)) − H(X|Y )p¯, where H(p(x)) = −
∑
x p(x) log p(x) is the Shannon entropy, and
H(X|Y )p¯ =
∑
x,y p¯(x, y) log
(
p¯(x,y)
p¯(y)
)
is the conditional entropy. The first term satisfies
H(p¯(x)) = H(p(x)) = H(q(x)), (A.1)
because p(x) = q(x) = p¯(x). The second term, the conditional entropy, is concave, namely
H(X|Y )p¯ ≤ λH(X|Y )p + (1− λ)H(X|Y )q, (A.2)
where H(X|Y )p = −
∑
x,y p(x, y) log
(
p(x,y)
p(y)
)
and similarly for H(X|Y )q. The concavity of
the conditional entropy is shown by applying the log sum inequality [27],(∑
i
ai
)
log
(∑
j aj∑
k bk
)
≤
∑
i
ai log
(
ai
bi
)
, (A.3)
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to H(X|Y )p¯. Eqs. (A.1) and (A.2) together imply the weak convexity of the classical
mutual information.

A.2 Proof of the concavity of the Holevo quantity
In this appendix we prove Theorem 8 in Sec. 3.4. We will use the traditional notation
χ(X : E)ρXE :=
∑
x
p(x)S(ρxE)
to denote the Holevo quantity of the cq state ρXE =
∑
x p(x)|x〉〈x| ⊗ ρxE.
Proof. Given the states ρAB and σAB with purifications |Ψ〉ABE′ and |Σ〉ABE′ on the
system E = E ′. Alice measures the states with respect to the POVM elements Ax and
stores the result in the system X. The cq states describing the situation for Alice and Eve
after the measurement are
|Ψ〉 → ρXE′ =
∑
x
p(x)|x〉〈x| ⊗ ρxE′ , (A.4)
|Σ〉 → σXE′ =
∑
x
q(x)|x〉〈x| ⊗ σxE′ , (A.5)
with Eve’s conditional states ρxE′ = trAB{Ax ⊗ 1|Ψ〉〈Ψ|}/p(x) and σxE′ = trAB{Ax ⊗
1|Σ〉〈Σ|}/q(x). The Holevo quantity of ρXE′ and σXE′ is given by
χ(ρAB,MA)) = χ(X : E
′)ρXE′ ,
χ(σAB,MA)) = χ(X : E
′)σXE′ . (A.6)
We construct a particular purification on the joint system E = E ′F for the convex sum
ρ¯AB = λρAB + (1− λ)σAB:
|Ψ¯〉ABE′F =
√
λ|Ψ〉|0〉F +
√
1− λ|Σ〉|1〉F . (A.7)
After measuring |Ψ¯〉ABE′F with respect to Ax, the state shared by Alice and Eve is
ρ¯XE′F =
∑
x
p¯(x)|x〉〈x| ⊗ ρ¯xE′F (A.8)
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with Eve’s conditional states ρ¯xE′F = trAB{Ax ⊗ 1BE′F |Ψ¯〉〈Ψ¯|}/p¯(x) and p¯(x) = λp(x) +
(1− λ)q(x). The Holevo quantity of ρ¯XE′F is
χ(ρ¯AB,MA)) = χ(X : E
′F )ρXE′F .
Let M : F → F ′ be a trace-preserving quantum operation. For our purposes, we
identifyM with a measurement on F in the standard basis {|0〉, |1〉} and write the outcome
in a new register F ′. By defining λx = λ
p(x)
p¯(x)
, the state after the measurement is given by
ρXE′F ′ =
∑
x
p¯(x)|x〉〈x| ⊗ [λxρxE′ ⊗ |0〉〈0|F ′ + (1− λx)σxE′ ⊗ |1〉〈1|F ′ ]. (A.9)
Let us state a lemma about the Holevo quantity extracted from a state of the form
ρXE′F ′ :
Lemma 8 The Holevo quantity extracted from ρXE′F ′ satisfies
χ(X : E ′F ′)ρXE′F ′ ≥ λχ(X : E ′)ρXE′ + (1− λ)χ(X : E ′)σXE′ ,
with χ(X : E ′)ρXE′ and χ(X : E
′)σXE′ given in Eq. (A.6). Equality holds, if the probabilities
λx are independent of x, λx = λ.
Proof. From ρXE′F ′ we calculate the Holevo quantity using the joint entropy theorem of
the von Neuman entropy [73]
χ(X : EF ′) = λχ(X : E ′)ρXE′ + (1− λ)χ(X : E ′)σXE′ + h(λ)−
∑
x
p¯(x)h(λx),
with the binary entropy function h(x) = −x log(x)− (1− x) log(1− x), and where χ(X :
E ′)ρXE′ and χ(X : E
′)σXE′ are given in Eq. (A.6). From the concavity of the Shannon
entropy it follows that h(λ)−∑x p¯(x)h(λx) ≥ 0, and in particular, if λ = λx for all x, the
equality holds. 
According to Ref. [73], a map of the form M : F → F ′ can only decrease the Holevo
quantity:
χ(X : E ′F )ρXE′F ≥ χ(X : E ′F ′)ρXE′F ′ . (A.10)
Equation (A.10) together with Eq. (A.10), show that the desired result. 
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A.3 Proof of Lemma 3
In this appendix we prove Lemma 3 in Sec. 4.2.
Proof. We trace out system S from the source state |Φ〉AS in equation (3.2) and identify
Alice’s reduced state ρA by
ρA =
∑
i
κi|i〉〈i| =
∑
x
p(x)|ϕx〉〈ϕx|. (A.11)
From the G-invariance of the signal states and the uniform distribution of p(x), it follows
that ρA is also G-invariant. Since ρA is diagonal in the Schmidt basis B with real eigenvalues
κi, it holds that
ρ∗A = ρA.
Therefore, ρA is also G
∗-invariance (where the complex conjugate is taken with respect to
the Schmidt basis) as can be easily seen from U∗g ρAU
T
g = (UgρAU
†
g )
∗ = ρA.
Due to the positivity of the coefficients κi and the full rank of ρA, the square root
√
ρA
and the inverse ρ−1A are well-defined. The G- and G
∗-invariance of ρ−1A can be straightfor-
wardly verified: Ugρ
−1
A U
†
g = (UgρAU
†
g )
−1 = ρ−1A , and similarly for the G
∗-invariance.
In Ref. [25], it is shown for permutation groups, that for every positive G-invariant
operator ρA,
√
ρA is also G-invariant. The same proof applies also here, and thus, the G-
and G∗-invariance of ρA also implies the G- and G∗-invariance of
√
ρA.
By using the G-invariance of the signals states, and the G∗-invariance of
√
ρA and ρ
−1
A ,
the G∗-invariance of Ax follows directly from the definition in Eq. (3.3).
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